

## [MS-LSAD-Diff]:

# Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol

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# 1 Introduction

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol is used to manage various machine and **domain** security policies. All versions of Windows NT operating system-based products, in all configurations, implement and listen on the server side of this protocol. However, not all operations are meaningful in all configurations.

This protocol, with minor exceptions, enables remote policy-management scenarios. Therefore, the majority of this interface does not need to be implemented to achieve Windows client-to-server (**domain controller** configuration and otherwise) interoperability, as defined by the ability for Windows clients to retrieve policy settings from servers.

Policy settings controlled by this protocol relate to the following:

- **Account objects:** The rights and **privileges** that **security principals** have on the server.
- **Secret objects:** Mechanisms that securely store data on the server.
- **Trusted domain objects:** Mechanisms that the Windows operating system uses for describing **trust** relationships between domains and **forests**.
- Other miscellaneous settings, such as lifetimes of Kerberos tickets, states of domain controller (backup or primary), and other unrelated pieces of policy.

All of these types of policy are addressed in sections of this document that specify the server data model.

Sections 1.5, 1.8, 1.9, 2, and 3 of this specification are normative ~~and can contain the terms MAY, SHOULD, MUST, MUST NOT, and SHOULD NOT as defined in [RFC2119]. Sections 1.5 and 1.9 are also normative but do not contain those terms.~~ All other sections and examples in this specification are informative.

## 1.1 Glossary

~~The~~This document uses the following terms ~~are~~:

**64-bit Network Data Representation (NDR64):** ~~A specific to this document instance of a~~ remote procedure call (RPC) transfer syntax. For more information about RPC transfer syntax, see [C706] section 14.

**access control list (ACL):** A list of access control entries (ACEs) that collectively describe the security rules for authorizing access to some resource; for example, an object or set of objects.

**account domain:** A **domain**, identified by a **security identifier (SID)**, that is the **SID** namespace for which a given machine is authoritative. The **account domain** is the same as the **primary domain** for a **domain controller (DC)** and is its default **domain**. For a Windows machine that is joined to a **domain**, the **account domain** is the **SID** namespace defined by the local Security Accounts Manager [MS-SAMR].

**account object:** An element of a Local Security Authority (LSA) policy database that describes the rights and privileges granted by the server to a **security principal**. The **security identifier (SID)** of the **security principal** matches that of the **account object**.

**ACID:** A term that refers to the four properties that any database system must achieve in order to be considered transactional: Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and Durability [GRAY].

**Active Directory:** A general-purpose network **directory service**. **Active Directory** also refers to the Windows implementation of a **directory service**. **Active Directory** stores information about a variety of objects in the network. Importantly, user accounts, computer accounts,



groups, and all related credential information used by the Windows implementation of Kerberos are stored in **Active Directory**. **Active Directory** is either deployed as Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) or Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS). [MS-ADTS] describes both forms. For more information, see [MS-AUTHSOD] section 1.1.1.5.2, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) versions 2 and 3, Kerberos, and DNS.

**backup domain controller (BDC):** A **domain controller (DC)** that receives a copy of the **domain** directory database from the **primary domain controller (PDC)**. This copy is synchronized periodically and automatically with the **primary domain controller (PDC)**. BDCs also authenticate user logons and can be promoted to function as the **PDC**. There is only one **PDC** or **PDC** emulator in a **domain**, and the rest are **backup domain controllers**.

**Coordinated Universal Time (UTC):** A high-precision atomic time standard that approximately tracks Universal Time (UT). It is the basis for legal, civil time all over the Earth. Time zones around the world are expressed as positive and negative offsets from UTC. In this role, it is also referred to as Zulu time (Z) and Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). In these specifications, all references to UTC refer to the time at UTC-0 (or GMT).

**directory:** The database that stores information about objects such as users, groups, computers, printers, and the **directory service** that makes this information available to users and applications.

**directory service (DS):** A service that stores and organizes information about a computer network's users and network shares, and that allows network administrators to manage users' access to the shares. See also **Active Directory**.

**discretionary access control list (DACL):** An **access control list (ACL)** that is controlled by the owner of an object and that specifies the access particular users or groups can have to the object.

**DNS name:** A fully qualified domain name (FQDN).

**domain:** A set of users and computers sharing a common namespace and management infrastructure. At least one computer member of the set must act as a **domain controller (DC)** and host a member list that identifies all members of the domain, as well as optionally hosting the **Active Directory** service. The domain controller provides authentication (2) of members, creating a unit of trust for its members. Each domain has an identifier that is shared among its members. For more information, see [MS-AUTHSOD] section 1.1.1.5 and [MS-ADTS].

**domain controller (DC):** The service, running on a server, that implements **Active Directory**, or the server hosting this service. The service hosts the data store for objects and interoperates with other **DCs** to ensure that a local change to an object replicates correctly across all **DCs**. When **Active Directory** is operating as Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), the **DC** contains full NC replicas of the configuration naming context (config NC), schema naming context (schema NC), and one of the **domain NCs** in its **forest**. If the AD DS **DC** is a **global catalog server (GC server)**, it contains partial NC replicas of the remaining **domain NCs** in its **forest**. For more information, see [MS-AUTHSOD] section 1.1.1.5.2 and [MS-ADTS]. When **Active Directory** is operating as Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS), several AD LDS **DCs** can run on one server. When **Active Directory** is operating as AD DS, only one AD DS **DC** can run on one server. However, several AD LDS **DCs** can coexist with one AD DS **DC** on one server. The AD LDS **DC** contains full NC replicas of the config NC and the schema NC in its **forest**. The domain controller is the server side of Authentication Protocol Domain Support [MS-APDS].

**domain member (member machine):** A machine that is joined to a domain by sharing a secret between the machine and the domain.

**domain name:** A **domain name** or a NetBIOS name that identifies a **domain**.

**domain naming context (domain NC):** A specific type of naming context (NC), or an instance of that type, that represents a **domain**. A **domain NC** can contain security principal objects; no other type of NC can contain security principal objects. **Domain NCs** appear in the global catalog (GC). A **domain NC** is hosted by one or more **domain controllers (DCs)** operating as AD DS. In AD DS, a **forest** has one or more **domain NCs**. A domain NC cannot exist in AD LDS. The root of a **domain NC** is an object of class domainDNS; for directory replication [MS-DRSR], see domainDNS.

**endpoint:** A network-specific address of a **remote procedure call (RPC) server** process for remote procedure calls. The actual name and type of the endpoint depends on the **RPC** protocol sequence that is being used. For example, for RPC over TCP (RPC Protocol Sequence ncacn\_ip\_tcp), an endpoint might be TCP port 1025. For RPC over Server Message Block (RPC Protocol Sequence ncacn\_np), an endpoint might be the name of a named pipe. For more information, see [C706].

**forest:** One or more **domains** that share a common schema and trust each other transitively. An organization can have multiple **forests**. A **forest** establishes the security and administrative boundary for all the objects that reside within the **domains** that belong to the **forest**. In contrast, a **domain** establishes the administrative boundary for managing objects, such as users, groups, and computers. In addition, each **domain** has individual security policies and trust relationships with other **domains**.

**forest functional level:** A specification of functionality available in a **forest**. It must be less than or equal to the **domain controller (DC)** functional level of every **DC** in the **forest**. See [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.4.4 for information on how the **forest functional level** is determined.

**forest trust:** A type of **trust** where the trusted party is a **forest**, which means that all **domains** in that **forest** are trusted.

**forest trust information:** Information about namespaces, **domain names**, and **security identifiers (SIDs)** owned by a trusted **forest**.

**global catalog server (GC server):** A **domain controller (DC)** that contains a naming context (NC) replica (one full, the rest partial) for each **domain naming context** in the **forest**.

**globally unique identifier (GUID):** A term used interchangeably with **universally unique identifier (UUID)** in Microsoft protocol technical documents (TDs). Interchanging the usage of these terms does not imply or require a specific algorithm or mechanism to generate the value. Specifically, the use of this term does not imply or require that the algorithms described in [RFC4122] or [C706] must be used for generating the **GUID**. See also **universally unique identifier (UUID)**.

**interdomain trust account:** An account that stores information associated with a **domain trust** in the **domain controllers (DCs)** of the **domain** that is trusted to perform authentication.

**local account domain:** A **domain**, identified by a **security identifier (SID)**, that is a **SID** namespace for which a given machine is authoritative. The **local account domain** is the same as the **account domain** for any non-**domain controller (DC)**. On a **DC**, the **local account domain** is an **account domain** local to the **DC**.

**locally unique identifier (LUID):** A 64-bit value guaranteed to be unique within the scope of a single machine.

~~**NDR64:** See 64-bit Network Data Representation (NDR64).~~

**Network Data Representation (NDR):** A specification that defines a mapping from Interface Definition Language (IDL) data types onto octet streams. **NDR** also refers to the runtime environment that implements the mapping facilities (for example, data provided to **NDR**). For more information, see [MS-RPCE] and [C706] section 14.

~~**OEM code page:** See original equipment manufacturer (OEM) code page.~~

**opnum:** An operation number or numeric identifier that is used to identify a specific **remote procedure call (RPC)** method or a method in an interface. For more information, see [C706] section 12.5.2.12 or [MS-RPCE].

**original equipment manufacturer (OEM) code page:** A code page used to translate between non-Unicode encoded strings and UTF-16 encoded strings.

**primary domain:** A **domain** (identified by a **security identifier (SID)**) that the server is joined to. For a **domain controller (DC)**, the **primary domain** is that of the **domain** itself.

**primary domain controller (PDC):** A **domain controller (DC)** designated to track changes made to the accounts of all computers on a **domain**. It is the only computer to receive these changes directly, and is specialized so as to ensure consistency and to eliminate the potential for conflicting entries in the **Active Directory** database. A **domain** has only one **PDC**.

**primary domain controller (PDC) role owner:** The **domain controller (DC)** that hosts the **primary domain controller** emulator FSMO role for a given domain naming context (NC).

**privilege:** The capability of a security principal to perform a type of operation on a computer system regardless of restrictions placed by discretionary access control.

**RC4:** A variable key-length symmetric encryption algorithm. For more information, see [SCHNEIER] section 17.1.

**read-only domain controller (RODC):** A **domain controller (DC)** that does not accept originating updates. Additionally, an **RODC** does not perform outbound replication. An **RODC** cannot be the primary domain controller (PDC) for its domain.

**remote procedure call (RPC):** A context-dependent term commonly overloaded with three meanings. Note that much of the industry literature concerning RPC technologies uses this term interchangeably for any of the three meanings. Following are the three definitions: (\*) The runtime environment providing remote procedure call facilities. The preferred usage for this meaning is "RPC runtime". (\*) The pattern of request and response message exchange between two parties (typically, a client and a server). The preferred usage for this meaning is "RPC exchange". (\*) A single message from an exchange as defined in the previous definition. The preferred usage for this term is "RPC message". For more information about RPC, see [C706].

**root domain:** The unique **domain naming contexts (domain NCs)** of an Active Directory **forest** that is the parent of the **forest's** config NC. The config NC's relative distinguished name (RDN) is "cn=Configuration" relative to the root object of the root domain. The root domain is the domain that is created first in a **forest**.

**RPC client:** A computer on the network that sends messages using remote procedure call (RPC) as its transport, waits for responses, and is the initiator in an RPC exchange.

**RPC protocol sequence:** A character string that represents a valid combination of a **remote procedure call (RPC)** protocol, a network layer protocol, and a transport layer protocol, as described in [C706] and [MS-RPCE].

**RPC server:** A computer on the network that waits for messages, processes them when they arrive, and sends responses using RPC as its transport acts as the responder during a remote procedure call (RPC) exchange.

**RPC transport:** The underlying network services used by the remote procedure call (RPC) runtime for communications between network nodes. For more information, see [C706] section 2.

**secret object:** An element of the Local Security Authority (LSA) Policy Database, which contains a value that is secret in that access to it is strictly controlled through cryptographic protections and restrictive access control mechanisms.

**security descriptor:** A data structure containing the security information associated with a securable object. A **security descriptor** identifies an object's owner by its **security identifier (SID)**. If access control is configured for the object, its **security descriptor** contains a **discretionary access control list (DACL)** with **SIDs** for the **security principals** who are allowed or denied access. Applications use this structure to set and query an object's security status. The **security descriptor** is used to guard access to an object as well as to control which type of auditing takes place when the object is accessed. The **security descriptor** format is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.6; a string representation of **security descriptors**, called **SDDL**, is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.5.1.

**security identifier (SID):** An identifier for **security principals** in Windows that is used to identify an account or a group. Conceptually, the **SID** is composed of an account authority portion (typically a **domain**) and a smaller integer representing an identity relative to the account authority, termed the relative identifier (RID). The **SID** format is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.2; a string representation of **SIDs** is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.2 and [MS-AZOD] section 1.1.1.2.

**security principal:** ~~An identity~~ A unique entity, also referred to as a principal, that can be used to regulate access authenticated by Active Directory. It frequently corresponds to resources, as specified in [MS-AUTHSOD] section 1.1.1.1. A security principal is a human user, but also can be a user, a computer, or service that offers a resource to other security principals. Other security principals might be a group that represents, which is a set of users principals. Groups are supported by Active Directory.

**Server Message Block (SMB):** A protocol that is used to request file and print services from server systems over a network. The SMB protocol extends the CIFS protocol with additional security, file, and disk management support. For more information, see [CIFS] and [MS-SMB].

**server role:** The state of a **domain controller (DC)**, which can be one of two values--primary DC or backup DC.

**service:** A process or agent that is available on the network, offering resources or services for clients. Examples of services include file servers, web servers, and so on.

**system access control list (SACL):** An **access control list (ACL)** that controls the generation of audit messages for attempts to access a securable object. The ability to get or set an object's **SACL** is controlled by a privilege typically held only by system administrators.

**trust:** To accept another authority's statements for the purposes of authentication and authorization, especially in the case of a relationship between two domains. If **domain A** trusts **domain B**, **domain A** accepts **domain B**'s authentication and authorization statements for principals represented by security principal objects in **domain B**; for example, the list of groups to which a particular user belongs. As a noun, a **trust** is the relationship between two **domains** described in the previous sentence.

**trust attributes:** A collection of attributes that define different characteristics of a trust within a domain or a forest.

**trusted domain:** A domain that is trusted to make authentication decisions for security principals in that domain.

**trusted domain object (TDO):** A collection of properties that define a trust relationship with another domain, such as direction (outbound, inbound, or both), trust attributes, name, and security identifier of the other domain. For more information, see [MS-ADTS].

**trusted forest:** A forest that is trusted to make authentication statements for security principals in that forest. Assuming forest A trusts forest B, all domains belonging to forest A will trust all domains in forest B, subject to policy configuration.

**universally unique identifier (UUID):** A 128-bit value. UUIDs can be used for multiple purposes, from tagging objects with an extremely short lifetime, to reliably identifying very persistent objects in cross-process communication such as client and server interfaces, manager entry-point vectors, and **RPC** objects. UUIDs are highly likely to be unique. UUIDs are also known as **globally unique identifiers (GUIDs)** and these terms are used interchangeably in the Microsoft protocol technical documents (TDs). Interchanging the usage of these terms does not imply or require a specific algorithm or mechanism to generate the UUID. Specifically, the use of this term does not imply or require that the algorithms described in [RFC4122] or [C706] must be used for generating the UUID.

**MAY, SHOULD, MUST, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT:** These terms (in all caps) are used as defined in [RFC2119]. All statements of optional behavior use either MAY, SHOULD, or SHOULD NOT.

## 1.2 References

Links to a document in the Microsoft Open Specifications library point to the correct section in the most recently published version of the referenced document. However, because individual documents in the library are not updated at the same time, the section numbers in the documents may not match. You can confirm the correct section numbering by checking the Errata.

### 1.2.1 Normative References

We conduct frequent surveys of the normative references to assure their continued availability. If you have any issue with finding a normative reference, please contact dohelp@microsoft.com. We will assist you in finding the relevant information.

[C706] The Open Group, "DCE 1.1: Remote Procedure Call", C706, August 1997, <https://www2.opengroup.org/ogsys/catalog/c706>

[FIPS81] FIPS PUBS, "DES Modes of Operation", December 1980, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips81/fips81.htm>

[GRAY] Gray, J. and Reuter, A., "Transaction Processing: Concepts and Techniques", San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1993, ISBN: 1558601902.

[MS-ADA1] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Attributes A-L".

[MS-ADA2] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Attributes M".

[MS-ADA3] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Attributes N-Z".

[MS-ADSC] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Schema Classes".

[MS-ADTS] Microsoft Corporation, "Active Directory Technical Specification".

[MS-DTYP] Microsoft Corporation, "Windows Data Types".

[MS-ERREF] Microsoft Corporation, "Windows Error Codes".

[MS-GPEF] Microsoft Corporation, "Group Policy: Encrypting File System Extension".

[MS-GPSB] Microsoft Corporation, "Group Policy: Security Protocol Extension".

[MS-KILE] Microsoft Corporation, "Kerberos Protocol Extensions".

[MS-LSAT] Microsoft Corporation, "Local Security Authority (Translation Methods) Remote Protocol".

[MS-NRPC] Microsoft Corporation, "Netlogon Remote Protocol".

[MS-RPCE] Microsoft Corporation, "Remote Procedure Call Protocol Extensions".

[MS-SAMR] Microsoft Corporation, "Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server)".

[MS-SMB2] Microsoft Corporation, "Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol Versions 2 and 3".

[MS-SMB] Microsoft Corporation, "Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol".

[MS-WKST] Microsoft Corporation, "Workstation Service Remote Protocol".

[\[MSKB-3149090\] Microsoft Corporation, "MS16-047: Description of the security update for SAM and LSAD remote protocols", April 2016, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3149090](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3149090)

[RFC1088] McLaughlin III, L., "A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over NetBIOS Networks", RFC 1088, February 1989, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1088.txt>

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>

[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3961.txt>

[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and Raeburn, K., "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120, July 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120.txt>

[RFC4757] Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and Brezak, J., "The RC4-HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft Windows", RFC 4757, December 2006, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4757.txt>

### 1.2.2 Informative References

[MS-DRSR] Microsoft Corporation, "Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol".

[MSFT-LSA-IDL] Microsoft Corporation, "Local Security Authority Merged IDL File", April 2009, <http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&familyID=7700ad04-866b-447a-9e08-21dbda94460f>

[\[SCHNEIER\] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography, Second Edition", John Wiley and Sons, 1996, ISBN: 0471117099, http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471117099.html](http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471117099.html)

### 1.3 Overview

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol provides a **remote procedure call (RPC)** interface used for providing remote management for policy settings related to **account objects, secret objects, trusted domain objects (TDOs)**, and other miscellaneous security-related policy settings. The client end of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol is an application that issues method calls on the RPC interface. The server end of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol is a **service** that implements support for this RPC interface.

The following represent primary use cases for remote management:

- Creating, deleting, enumerating, and modifying trusts, account objects, and secret objects.

- Querying and modifying policy settings unrelated to TDOs, account objects or secret objects, such as lifetimes of Kerberos tickets.

This protocol is used by Windows clients for the "domain join" operation (as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.4) as an implementation choice to achieve the end state, as specified in [MS-ADTS]. The specific profile of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol for the "domain join" scenario is specified in section 1.6 as "Retrieval of policy settings by clients".

The server end of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol can be implemented on a domain controller (DC), including **primary domain controllers (PDCs)**, **backup domain controllers (BDCs)**, **global catalog servers (GC servers)**, and **read-only domain controllers (RODCs)**, or on a non-domain controller. In the case of a DC, including PDCs, BDCs, GC servers, and RODCs, the server end of this protocol can be in one of the **forest functional levels**. The behavior of the server end of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol is the same in these cases, except when noted in the message processing descriptions for the methods of this protocol. See sections 3.1.4.4.1, 3.1.4.4.3, 3.1.4.4.5, 3.1.4.7, 3.1.4.7.3, 3.1.4.7.4, 3.1.4.7.10, 3.1.4.7.14, and 3.1.4.7.16 for details.

This protocol is a simple request/response-based RPC protocol. Typically, there are no long-lived sessions, although clients can cache the RPC connection and reuse it over time. A sample sequence of requests and responses is specified in section 4.

It is helpful to consider two perspectives when understanding and implementing this protocol: an object-based perspective and a method-based perspective.

The object-based perspective shows that the protocol exposes four main object abstractions: a policy object, an account object, a secret object, and a trusted domain object. A requester obtains a "handle" (an RPC context handle) to one of these objects and then performs one or more actions on the object. The following is a brief listing of methods that operate on each of the respective object types.

Policy object:

- LsarOpenPolicy2
- LsarQueryInformationPolicy2
- LsarSetInformationPolicy2
- LsarClose
- LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy
- LsarEnumeratePrivileges
- LsarLookupPrivilegeName
- LsarLookupPrivilegeValue
- LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName
- LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy
- LsarQuerySecurityObject
- LsarSetSecurityObject

Account object:

- LsarCreateAccount
- LsarOpenAccount

- LsarEnumerateAccounts
- LsarClose
- LsarDeleteObject
- LsarSetSystemAccessAccount
- LsarQuerySecurityObject
- LsarAddAccountRights
- LsarRemoveAccountRights
- LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount
- LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount
- LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight
- LsarGetSystemAccessAccount
- LsarSetSecurityObject
- LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount
- LsarEnumerateAccountRights

Secret object:

- LsarCreateSecret
- LsarOpenSecret
- LsarClose
- LsarDeleteObject
- LsarRetrievePrivateData
- LsarStorePrivateData
- LsarSetSecret
- LsarQuerySecret
- LsarQuerySecurityObject
- LsarSetSecurityObject

Trusted domain object:

- LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2
- LsarOpenTrustedDomain
- LsarClose
- LsarDeleteObject
- LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName
- LsarDeleteTrustedDomain



- LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx
- LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain
- LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain
- LsarQueryForestTrustInformation
- LsarSetForestTrustInformation
- LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo
- LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo
- LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName
- LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName

For example, to set a policy that controls the lifetime of Kerberos tickets, a requester opens a handle to the Policy object and updates the maximum service ticket age policy setting via a parameter called *MaxServiceTicketAge*. The call sequence from the requester appears as follows (with the parameter information removed for brevity):

1. Send LsarOpenPolicy2 request; receive LsarOpenPolicy2 reply.
2. Send LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy request; receive LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy reply.
3. Send LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy request; receive LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy reply.
4. Send LsarClose request; receive LsarClose reply.

The following is a brief explanation of the call sequence:

1. Using the network address of a responder that implements this protocol, a requester makes an LsarOpenPolicy2 request to obtain a handle to the policy object. This handle is necessary to examine and manipulate domain policy information.
2. Using the handle returned from LsarOpenPolicy2, the requester makes an LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy request to retrieve the current policy settings that affect Kerberos tickets.
3. After modifying the portions of the Kerberos ticket policy information to suit the requester, the requester makes the LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy request to set the policy to the new values.
4. The requester closes the policy handle returned from LsarOpenPolicy2. This releases responder resources associated with the handle.

In the method-based perspective, there is a common set of operations for each object type. The operations fall into patterns. The following is a list of the patterns and associated methods, along with a description of the pattern.

- **Open pattern:** This pattern returns an RPC context handle that references a specific object type. A requester uses this pattern by specifying a specific access for the handle in the request and using the returned handle to call other methods that require the returned handle and the associated access. For example, calling the LsarSetSecret method requires a secret object handle that has been opened with SECRET\_WRITE access.

LsarOpenPolicy2 is distinguished from the other methods in this pattern in two ways. First, the requestor ~~must call~~ calls this method before calling any other handle-based methods. Second, a network address, rather than a context handle, is required to indicate the responder.

The following are the methods that follow the open pattern:

- LsarOpenPolicy2
- LsarOpenPolicy
- LsarOpenAccount
- LsarOpenSecret
- LsarOpenTrustedDomain
- LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName
- **Enumerate pattern:** This pattern enables a requester to obtain a complete listing of all objects of a certain type (account or **trusted domain**) or to get all values of a certain type out of an object (for example, privileges known to the server).

The following are the methods that follow the enumerate pattern:

- LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx
- LsarEnumerateAccounts
- LsarEnumeratePrivileges
- LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount
- LsarEnumerateAccountRights
- LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight
- **Create pattern:** Methods in this pattern enable specified objects to be created. A handle to the newly created object is also returned.

The following are the methods that follow the create pattern:

- LsarCreateAccount
- LsarCreateSecret
- LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2
- **Query pattern:** This pattern enables specified attributes of an object to be returned. The requester indicates which attributes to return by specifying an "information class". This is an enumeration that the responder understands and translates to a specific structure to return (the structure contains the attributes indicated by the information class).

For example, to retrieve the name of a trusted domain, a requester would specify the information level "TrustedDomainNameInformation" to the LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo method.

The following are the methods that follow the query pattern:

- LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy
- LsarQueryForestTrustInformation
- LsarQueryInformationPolicy2
- LsarQuerySecret
- LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo

- LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName
- LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain
- **Set pattern:** This pattern enables specified object attributes to be set. The requester makes a request for which attributes to update by specifying an "information class". Similar to the Query pattern, this information level allows the caller to specify to the responder which attributes are being sent in the request.

The following are the methods that follow the set pattern:

- LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy
- LsarSetForestTrustInformation
- LsarSetInformationPolicy2
- LsarSetSecret
- LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount
- LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount
- LsarAddAccountRights
- LsarRemoveAccountRights
- **Delete pattern:** This pattern enables a requester to delete a specified object.

The following are the methods that follow the delete pattern:

- LsarDeleteObject
- LsarDeleteTrustedDomain
- **Lookup pattern:** This pattern enables a caller to translate between different representations of an entity (in the case of this protocol, names and identifiers of privileges).

The following are the methods that follow the lookup pattern:

- LsarLookupPrivilegeName
- LsarLookupPrivilegeValue
- LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName
- **Security pattern:** This pattern enables a caller to specify or query the access control at the level of individual objects.

The following are the methods that follow the security pattern:

- LsarSetSecurityObject
- LsarQuerySecurityObject
- **Miscellaneous:** The following method does not fall into a general pattern. A brief description is given here. See the message processing section for details.

LsarClose: This method releases responder resources associated with the RPC context handle that is passed as a parameter.

## 1.4 Relationship to Other Protocols

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol is composed of a subset of **opnums** in an interface that also includes the Local Security Authority (Translation Methods) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAT].

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol is dependent on RPC, which is used for communication between **domain members** and domain controllers.


This protocol shares the **Domain Name** field of the abstract data Account Domain Information, as specified in section 3.1.1.1 of this specification, with the Workstation Service Remote Protocol [MS-WKST].

This protocol depends on **Server Message Block (SMB)** protocols for sending messages on the wire.


Authentication protocols like the Kerberos Protocol Extensions [MS-KILE] and translation protocols like the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol [MS-DRSR] and Local Security Authority (Translation Methods) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAT] depend on the abstract data model introduced by this protocol in section 3.1.1. These protocols use the information in the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol to locate a domain that can process further requirements on that protocol.

The Active Directory Technical Specification [MS-ADTS] discusses **Active Directory**, which is used by this protocol when running on a domain controller.

The server-side protocol relationships for non-domain controller and domain controller configurations are illustrated in the following diagrams.



**Figure 1: Server-side protocol relationships for a non-domain controller configuration**



**Figure 2: Server-side protocol relationships for a domain controller configuration**

## 1.5 Prerequisites/Preconditions

This protocol has the prerequisites specified in [MS-RPCE] as being common to protocols that depend on RPC.

## 1.6 Applicability Statement

This protocol is applicable to the following two high-level scenarios:

1. Remote management of trusted domains, account objects or secret objects, or other miscellaneous machine and domain policy settings controlled by the protocol.
2. Retrieval of policy settings by clients.

To achieve the first scenario, this entire specification **must have to** be implemented.

To achieve the second scenario, only RPC methods LsarOpenPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.1), LsarOpenPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.2), LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.3), LsarQueryInformationPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.4), and LsarClose (section 3.1.4.9.4) (and associated data structures specified in these method definitions) **must have to** be implemented by a listener of this protocol.

Although significant protocol functionality is not dependent on server configuration, some functionality might depend on server configuration. Certain aspects of this protocol might depend on the server being a DC, including PDCs, BDCs, GC servers, and RODCs, or on being a non-DC, and also on the server reaching a certain forest functional level. These requirements are explained in their respective message processing sections.

## 1.7 Versioning and Capability Negotiation

- **Supported transports:** The protocol runs over RPC-named pipes and TCP/IP, as specified in section 2.1.
- **Protocol version:** This protocol's RPC interface has a single version number, but the interface has been extended by placing additional methods at the end. The use of these methods is specified in section 3.1.
- **Structure version:** LSAPR\_ACL (section 2.2.3.2) structures are versioned using the first field in the structure. Only one version of those structures is used in this protocol.
- **Localization:** This protocol uses text strings in various functions. Localization considerations for such strings are specified in section 3.1.1.2.1.

## 1.8 Vendor-Extensible Fields

This protocol uses NTSTATUS values as specified in [MS-ERREF] section 2.3. Vendors are free to choose their own values for this field, provided that the C bit (0x20000000) is set, which indicates that it is a customer code.

## 1.9 Standards Assignments

This protocol has no standards assignments. It uses private allocations for the RPC interface **universally unique identifier (UUID)** and the RPC **endpoint**.

Parameter	Value	Reference
Isarpc Interface UUID	{12345778-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AB}	[C706] section A.2.5.
RPC endpoint	\PIPE\Isarpc	section 2.1

## 2 Messages

This section describes the supported transports and details of the messages defined for this protocol.

### 2.1 Transport

This protocol MUST use Server Message Block (SMB) **RPC protocol sequences**.

This protocol MUST use "\\PIPE\lsarpc" as the RPC endpoint when using RPC over SMB.<1>

For authentication and authorization services, both the requester and responder of this protocol MUST use the SMB transport to communicate the identity of the requester, as specified in [MS-SMB] section 3.2.4.2.4 and [MS-SMB2] section 3.2.4.2.3.

For confidentiality and tamper resistance services, the requester and responder MAY use the functionality provided by the SMB transport, as specified in [MS-SMB] sections 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.4.5.2.1 and [MS-SMB2] sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.<2>

The requester MUST NOT use the RPC-provided security-support-provider mechanisms (for authentication, authorization, confidentiality, or tamper-resistance services).<3>

The responder MAY use the RPC-provided security-support-provider mechanisms as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3.2.1.4.1.1.<4>

The server SHOULD<5> reject calls that do not use an authentication level of RPC C AUTHN\_LEVEL\_NONE, RPC C AUTHN\_LEVEL\_PKT\_INTEGRITY, or RPC C AUTHN\_LEVEL\_PKT\_PRIVACY ([MS-RPCE] section 2.2.1.1.8).

Cryptographic operations (as specified in section 5.1) MUST utilize a session key obtained from the SMB session on the client or server.

This protocol MUST use the UUID and version number as follows:

- UUID: See Standards Assignments in section 1.9.
- Version number: 0.0.

The security settings used in this protocol vary depending on the role of the **RPC client** and **RPC server**, the function being used, and the specific parameters being used. Security settings are therefore specified in message processing sections for each message.

This protocol MUST configure RPC to enforce Maximum Server Input Data Size as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3.3.3.5.4.<56> This configuration introduces additional restrictions on the upper limits for the sizes of data types defined under section 2.2 when those data types are used in RPC messages.

### 2.2 Common Data Types

This protocol MUST indicate to the RPC runtime that it is to support both the **NDR** and **NDR64** transfer syntaxes and provide a negotiation mechanism for determining which transfer syntax will be used, as specified in [C706] section 12 and in [MS-RPCE] section 3.3.1.5.6.

This protocol contains messages with parameters that do not have any effect on message processing in any environment; however, the parameters remain for backward compatibility of the interfaces. These will be called out as ignored in sections on data type definition, message definition, and message processing. These values MUST be ignored on receipt and SHOULD be set to zero when sent, unless specified otherwise.

In addition to RPC base types and definitions specified in [C706] and [MS-DTYP], other data types are defined in this specification. <67>

The following lists summarize the types defined in this specification.

**Note** **LUID**, NTSTATUS, RPC\_SID, and RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING are specified in [MS-DTYP] sections 2.3.7, 2.2.38, 2.4. 2.4.2.3, and 2.3.10, respectively.

**Note** The LARGE\_INTEGER structure, when it represents time in this protocol, is used as a 64-bit value that represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601, **Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)**.

Constant value definitions:

- ACCESS\_MASK (section 2.2.1.1)
- POLICY\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS\_MODE (section 2.2.1.2)
- SECURITY\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.1.3)

Basic data types:

- LSAPR\_HANDLE (section 2.2.2.1)
- PLSAPR\_HANDLE (section 2.2.2.2)
- LSA\_UNICODE\_STRING (section 2.2.2.3)
- LSAPR\_OBJECT\_ATTRIBUTES (section 2.2.2.4)
- LSAPR\_SR\_SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR (section 2.2.2.5)

Data types referenced by basic data types:

- STRING (section 2.2.3.1)
- LSAPR\_ACL (section 2.2.3.2)
- SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR\_CONTROL (section 2.2.3.3)
- LSAPR\_SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR (section 2.2.3.4)
- SECURITY\_IMPERSONATION\_LEVEL (section 2.2.3.5)
- SECURITY\_CONTEXT\_TRACKING\_MODE (section 2.2.3.6)
- SECURITY\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE (section 2.2.3.7)

Policy query/set data types:

- POLICY\_INFORMATION\_CLASS (section 2.2.4.1)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.4.2)
- POLICY\_AUDIT\_LOG\_INFO (section 2.2.4.3)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_AUDIT\_EVENTS\_INFO (section 2.2.4.4)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIMARY\_DOM\_INFO (section 2.2.4.5)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_ACCOUNT\_DOM\_INFO (section 2.2.4.6)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_PD\_ACCOUNT\_INFO (section 2.2.4.7)



- POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE (section 2.2.4.8)
- POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE\_INFO (section 2.2.4.9)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_REPLICA\_SRCE\_INFO (section 2.2.4.10)
- POLICY\_MODIFICATION\_INFO (section 2.2.4.11)
- POLICY\_AUDIT\_FULL\_SET\_INFO (section 2.2.4.12)
- POLICY\_AUDIT\_FULL\_QUERY\_INFO (section 2.2.4.13)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_DNS\_DOMAIN\_INFO (section 2.2.4.14)
- POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_CLASS (section 2.2.4.15)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.4.16)
- POLICY\_DOMAIN\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE\_INFO (section 2.2.4.17)
- LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_EFS\_INFO (section 2.2.4.18)
- LSAPR\_DOMAIN\_KERBEROS\_TICKET\_INFO (section 2.2.4.19)

Account query/set data types:

- LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.5.1)
- LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_ENUM\_BUFFER (section 2.2.5.2)
- LSAPR\_USER\_RIGHT\_SET (section 2.2.5.3)
- LSAPR\_LUID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES (section 2.2.5.4)
- LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_SET (section 2.2.5.5)

Secret query/set data types:

- LSAPR\_CR\_CIPHER\_VALUE (section 2.2.6.1)

Trusted domain query/set data types:

- LSAPR\_TRUST\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.1)
- TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS (section 2.2.7.2)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFO (section 2.2.7.3)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_NAME\_INFO (section 2.2.7.4)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_CONTROLLERS\_INFO (section 2.2.7.5)
- TRUSTED\_POSIX\_OFFSET\_INFO (section 2.2.7.6)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_PASSWORD\_INFO (section 2.2.7.7)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_BASIC (section 2.2.7.8)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX (section 2.2.7.9)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX2 (section 2.2.7.10)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.11)

- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL (section 2.2.7.12)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.13)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL (section 2.2.7.14)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION2 (section 2.2.7.15)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB (section 2.2.7.16)
- LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.17)
- TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_SUPPORTED\_ENCRYPTION\_TYPES (section 2.2.7.18)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_ENUM\_BUFFER (section 2.2.7.19)
- LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_ENUM\_BUFFER\_EX (section 2.2.7.20)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD (section 2.2.7.21)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD\_TYPE (section 2.2.7.22)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_BINARY\_DATA (section 2.2.7.23)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_DOMAIN\_INFO (section 2.2.7.24)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.25)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD\_TYPE (section 2.2.7.26)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD (section 2.2.7.27)
- LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.28)

Privilege data types:

- LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIVILEGE\_DEF (section 2.2.8.1)
- LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_ENUM\_BUFFER (section 2.2.8.2)

The following citation contains a timeline of when each structure, data type, or enumeration was introduced. <78>

## 2.2.1 Constant Value Definitions

### 2.2.1.1 ACCESS\_MASK

The ACCESS\_MASK data type is a bitmask that defines the user rights that an object is to be granted. Access types are reconciled with the **discretionary access control list (DACL)** of the object to determine whether the access requested is assigned or denied.

The ACCESS\_MASK data type is defined in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.3. The following declaration is an alternative definition.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef unsigned long ACCESS_MASK;
```

#### 2.2.1.1.1 ACCESS\_MASK for All Objects

Certain ACCESS\_MASK flags apply equally to all types of objects. These flags are described in the following table.

Value	Meaning
DELETE 0x00010000	Delete object.
READ_CONTROL 0x00020000	The read value of a DACL and owner in a <b>security descriptor</b> .
WRITE_DAC 0x00040000	The write value of a DACL in a security descriptor.
WRITE_OWNER 0x00080000	The write value of the owner in a security descriptor.
MAXIMUM_ALLOWED 0x02000000	Used in requesting access; get as much access as the server will allow.

The four high-order bits in ACCESS\_MASK values are translated by the responder into specific ACCESS\_MASK values using the following tables, depending on the type of the object that the operation is performed on. For numeric values of the symbolic names used in these tables, refer to section 2.2.1.1.2 for policy objects, section 2.2.1.1.3 for account objects, section 2.2.1.1.4 for secret objects, and section 2.2.1.1.5 for trusted domain objects. In the following tables, the symbol '|' is used to indicate that the value represented by the symbol is to be logically combined by using the bitwise OR operation with the other operand.

ACCESS_MASK value to be translated	Translated to when used with policy object
0x80000000	POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION   POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION   READ_CONTROL 0x00020006
0x40000000	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN   POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT   POLICY_CREATE_SECRET   POLICY_CREATE_PRIVILEGE   POLICY_SET_DEFAULT_QUOTA_LIMITS   POLICY_SET_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS   POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_ADMIN   POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN   READ_CONTROL 0x000207F8
0x20000000	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION   POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES   READ_CONTROL 0x00020801
0x10000000	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION   POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION   POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION   POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN   POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT   POLICY_CREATE_SECRET   POLICY_CREATE_PRIVILEGE   POLICY_SET_DEFAULT_QUOTA_LIMITS   POLICY_SET_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS   POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_ADMIN   POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN   POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES   DELETE   READ_CONTROL   WRITE_DAC   WRITE_OWNER 0x000F0FFF

ACCESS_MASK value to be translated	Translated to when used with account object
0x80000000	ACCOUNT_VIEW   READ_CONTROL

<b>ACCESS_MASK value to be translated</b>	<b>Translated to when used with account object</b>
	0x00020001
0x40000000	ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_QUOTAS   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_SYSTEM_ACCESS   READ_CONTROL 0x0002000E
0x20000000	READ_CONTROL 0x00020000
0x10000000	ACCOUNT_VIEW   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_QUOTAS   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_SYSTEM_ACCESS   DELETE   READ_CONTROL   WRITE_DAC   WRITE_OWNER 0x000F000F

<b>ACCESS_MASK value to be translated</b>	<b>Translated to when used with secret object</b>
0x80000000	SECRET_QUERY_VALUE   READ_CONTROL 0x00020002
0x40000000	SECRET_SET_VALUE   READ_CONTROL 0x00020001
0x20000000	READ_CONTROL 0x00020000
0x10000000	SECRET_QUERY_VALUE   SECRET_SET_VALUE   DELETE   READ_CONTROL   WRITE_DAC   WRITE_OWNER 0x000F0003

<b>ACCESS_MASK value to be translated</b>	<b>Translated to when used with trusted domain object</b>
0x80000000	TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME   READ_CONTROL 0x00020001
0x40000000	TRUSTED_SET_CONTROLLERS   TRUSTED_SET_POSIX   READ_CONTROL 0x00020014
0x20000000	TRUSTED_QUERY_CONTROLLERS   TRUSTED_QUERY_POSIX   READ_CONTROL 0x0002000A
0x10000000	TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME   TRUSTED_QUERY_CONTROLLERS   TRUSTED_SET_CONTROLLERS   TRUSTED_QUERY_POSIX   TRUSTED_SET_POSIX   TRUSTED_SET_AUTH   TRUSTED_QUERY_AUTH   DELETE   READ_CONTROL   WRITE_DAC   WRITE_OWNER 0x000F007F

### 2.2.1.1.2 ACCESS\_MASK for Policy Objects

The following ACCESS\_MASK flags apply to policy objects.

Value	Meaning
0x00000000	No access.
POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION 0x00000001	Access to view local information.
POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION 0x00000002	Access to view audit information.
POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION 0x00000004	Access to view private information.
POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN 0x00000008	Access to administer trust relationships.
POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT 0x00000010	Access to create account objects.
POLICY_CREATE_SECRET 0x00000020	Access to create secret objects.
POLICY_CREATE_PRIVILEGE 0x00000040	Access to create privileges. <b>Note</b> New privilege creation is not currently a part of the protocol, so this flag is not actively used.
POLICY_SET_DEFAULT_QUOTA_LIMITS 0x00000080	Access to set default quota limits. <b>Note</b> Quota limits are not currently a part of the protocol, so this flag is not actively used.
POLICY_SET_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS 0x00000100	Access to set audit requirements.
POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_ADMIN 0x00000200	Access to administer the audit log.
POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN 0x00000400	Access to administer policy on the server.
POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES 0x00000800	Access to translate names and <b>security identifiers (SIDs)</b> .
POLICY_NOTIFICATION 0x00001000	Access to be notified of policy changes. <89>

### 2.2.1.1.3 ACCESS\_MASK for Account Objects

The following ACCESS\_MASK flags apply to account objects.

Value	Meaning
ACCOUNT_VIEW 0x00000001	View account information.
ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES	Change privileges on an account.

Value	Meaning
0x00000002	
ACCOUNT_ADJUST_QUOTAS 0x00000004	Change quotas on an account.
ACCOUNT_ADJUST_SYSTEM_ACCESS 0x00000008	Change system access.

#### 2.2.1.1.4 ACCESS\_MASK for Secret Objects

The following ACCESS\_MASK flags apply to secret objects.

Value	Meaning
SECRET_SET_VALUE 0x00000001	Set secret value.
SECRET_QUERY_VALUE 0x00000002	Query secret value.

#### 2.2.1.1.5 ACCESS\_MASK for Trusted Domain Objects

The following ACCESS\_MASK flags apply to trusted domain objects. <910>

Value	Meaning
TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME 0x00000001	View <b>domain name</b> information.
TRUSTED_QUERY_CONTROLLERS 0x00000002	View "Domain Controllers" information.
TRUSTED_SET_CONTROLLERS 0x00000004	Change "Domain Controllers" information.
TRUSTED_QUERY_POSIX 0x00000008	View POSIX information.
TRUSTED_SET_POSIX 0x00000010	Change POSIX information.
TRUSTED_SET_AUTH 0x00000020	Change authentication information.
TRUSTED_QUERY_AUTH 0x00000040	View authentication information.

### 2.2.1.2 POLICY\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS\_MODE

The POLICY\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS\_MODE data type determines the way in which a user (member of a group or alias) is allowed to access the system. All values can be combined in any way by using bitwise OR operations.

Value	Meaning
0x00000000	No access The user is not granted any access to the system.
POLICY_MODE_INTERACTIVE 0x00000001	The user can logon locally to the system.
POLICY_MODE_NETWORK 0x00000002	The user can logon to the system over the network.
POLICY_MODE_BATCH 0x00000004	The user can logon to the system as a batch job.
0x00000008	Reserved
POLICY_MODE_SERVICE 0x00000010	The user can logon to the system as a service.
0x00000020	Reserved
POLICY_MODE_DENY_INTERACTIVE 0x00000040	The user is denied the right to interactively logon to the system. This setting supersedes POLICY_MODE_INTERACTIVE.
POLICY_MODE_DENY_NETWORK 0x00000080	The user is denied the right to logon to the system from the network. This setting supersedes POLICY_MODE_NETWORK.
POLICY_MODE_DENY_BATCH 0x00000100	The user is denied the right to logon to the system as a batch job. This setting supersedes POLICY_MODE_BATCH.
POLICY_MODE_DENY_SERVICE 0x00000200	The user is denied the right to logon to the system as a service. This setting supersedes POLICY_MODE_SERVICE.
POLICY_MODE_REMOTE_INTERACTIVE 0x00000400	The user can logon to the system as a Remote Desktop client.
POLICY_MODE_DENY_REMOTE_INTERACTIVE 0x00000800	The user is denied the right to logon to the system as a Remote Desktop client.
POLICY_MODE_ALL 0x00000FF7	This flag indicates all allowed bits. <1011>
POLICY_MODE_ALL_NT4 0x00000037	This flag indicates all allowed bits. <1112>

The following citation contains a timeline of when each mode was introduced. <1213>

### 2.2.1.3 SECURITY\_INFORMATION

The SECURITY\_INFORMATION type is used to specify which portions of a security descriptor the caller would like to retrieve or set on an object.

The SECURITY\_INFORMATION data type is defined in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.7. The following declaration is an alternative definition.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef unsigned long SECURITY_INFORMATION;
```

The following table defines the bits that are relevant to the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol.

Value	Meaning
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION 0x00000001	Return the Owner portion of the security descriptor.
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION 0x00000002	Return the Group portion of the security descriptor.
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION 0x00000004	Return the DACL portion of the security descriptor.
SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION 0x00000008	Return the <b>SACL</b> portion of the security descriptor.

Other values SHOULD NOT be set.

The server honors the request to set or retrieve security information only if the caller has the appropriate rights to the object.

The following table lists the SECURITY\_INFORMATION bits and the corresponding user rights required of the caller requesting to query information.

Security information access requested	Rights required of caller on server	Privileges required of caller on server
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION	READ_CONTROL	Does not apply.
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION	READ_CONTROL	Does not apply.
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION	READ_CONTROL	Does not apply.
SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION	Does not apply.	Security privilege.

The following table lists the SECURITY\_INFORMATION bits and the corresponding user rights required of the caller requesting to set information.

Security information access requested	Rights required of caller on server	Privileges required of caller on server
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION	WRITE_OWNER	Take ownership privilege. <b>Note</b> Either the access bit or the privilege is sufficient; the caller does not need both.
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION	WRITE_OWNER	Take-ownership privilege.
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION	WRITE_DAC	Does not apply.
SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION	Does not apply.	Security privilege.



## 2.2.2 Basic Data Types

### 2.2.2.1 LSAPR\_HANDLE

The LSAPR\_HANDLE type defines a context handle (as specified in [C706] section 6) to the target server.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef [context_handle] void* LSAPR_HANDLE;
```

**Note** For information about the relevance of the context\_handle attribute in this data type, see section 3.1.1.7.

### 2.2.2.2 PLSAPR\_HANDLE

The PLSAPR\_HANDLE type defines a pointer to a context handle (as specified in [C706] section 6).

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef LSAPR_HANDLE* PLSAPR_HANDLE;
```

### 2.2.2.3 LSA\_UNICODE\_STRING

The LSA\_UNICODE\_STRING type is identical to RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING, as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.3.10.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef RPC_UNICODE_STRING LSA_UNICODE_STRING, *PLSA_UNICODE_STRING;
```

### 2.2.2.4 LSAPR\_OBJECT\_ATTRIBUTES

The LSAPR\_OBJECT\_ATTRIBUTES structure specifies an object and its properties. This structure MUST be ignored except for the **RootDirectory** field, which MUST be NULL. <~~1314~~>

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
    unsigned long Length;
    unsigned char* RootDirectory;
    PSTRING ObjectName;
    unsigned long Attributes;
    PLSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor;
    PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE SecurityQualityOfService;
} LSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES,
*PLSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
```

**Length:** The length of the structure, in bytes. This field is not used and MUST be ignored.

**RootDirectory:** This field is not used and MUST be NULL.

**ObjectName:** A pointer to a STRING structure that contains the object name. This field MUST be ignored. The content is unspecified and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**Attributes:** This field MUST be ignored. The content is unspecified and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**SecurityDescriptor:** This field contains the security attributes of the object. This field MUST be ignored. The content is unspecified and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**SecurityQualityOfService:** This field MUST be ignored. The content is unspecified and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

### 2.2.2.5 LSAPR\_SR\_SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR

The LSAPR\_SR\_SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR structure is used to communicate a self-relative security descriptor, as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.6.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR {
    [range(0, 262144)] unsigned long Length;
    [size_is(Length)] unsigned char* SecurityDescriptor;
} LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
*PLSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR;
```

**Length:** The count of bytes in SecurityDescriptor. <~~1415~~>

**SecurityDescriptor:** The contiguous buffer containing the self-relative security descriptor. This field MUST contain the **Length** number of bytes. If the **Length** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

## 2.2.3 Data Types Referenced by Basic Data Types

### 2.2.3.1 STRING

The STRING structure holds a counted string encoded in the **OEM code page**.

This structure has no effect on message processing in any environment.

```
typedef struct _STRING {
    unsigned short Length;
    unsigned short MaximumLength;
    [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length)]
    char* Buffer;
} STRING,
*PSTRING;
```

**Length:** The length, in bytes, of the string pointed to by the **Buffer** member, not including the terminating null character (if any).

**MaximumLength:** This field contains the total number of bytes in the **Buffer** field.

**Buffer:** A pointer to the actual string. If **Length** is greater than 0, this field MUST contain a non-NULL value. If **Length** is 0, this field MUST be ignored.

### 2.2.3.2 LSAPR\_ACL

The LSAPR\_ACL structure defines the header of an **access control list (ACL)** that specifies a list of security protections applied to an object.

This structure has no effect on message processing in any environment.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_ACL {
    unsigned char AclRevision;
    unsigned char Sbz1;
    unsigned short AclSize;
    [size_is(AclSize - 4)] unsigned char Dummy1[*];
} LSAPR_ACL,
*PLSAPR_ACL;
```

**AclRevision:** The revision level of the LSAPR\_ACL structure. This field **MUST** be ignored. The content is unspecified, and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**Sbz1:** This field is used for alignment. This field **MUST** be ignored. The content is unspecified, and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**AclSize:** The size of this structure in bytes, including the size of the variable sized **Dummy1** field.

**Dummy1:** This field **MUST** be ignored. The content is unspecified, and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

The ACL structure is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.5.

### 2.2.3.3 SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR\_CONTROL

The SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR\_CONTROL type contains a set of bit flags that qualify the meaning of a security descriptor or its components.

This type has no effect on message processing in any environment.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef unsigned short SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL, *PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL;
```

The flags that are used with this type are as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.6, under the **Control** member of the SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR structure.

### 2.2.3.4 LSAPR\_SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR

The LSAPR\_SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR structure defines an object's security descriptor.

This structure has no effect on message processing in any environment.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR {
    unsigned char Revision;
    unsigned char Sbz1;
    SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL Control;
    PRPC_SID Owner;
    PRPC_SID Group;
    PLSAPR_ACL Sacl;
    PLSAPR_ACL Dacl;
} LSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
*PLSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR;
```

**Revision:** The security descriptor revision level. This field MUST be ignored. The content is unspecified, and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**Sbz1:** This field is used for alignment. This field MUST be ignored. The content is unspecified, and no requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**Control:** A set of flags (as specified in section 2.2.3.3) that qualify the meaning of the security descriptor or its individual fields.

**Owner:** A pointer to the RPC\_SID structure that represents an object's owner as a SID.

**Group:** A pointer to the RPC\_SID structure that represents an object's primary group as a SID.

**Sacl:** A pointer to an ACL structure (as specified in 2.2.3.2) that contains a system access control list (SACL).

**Dacl:** A pointer to an ACL structure that contains a discretionary access control list (DACL).

The SECURITY\_DESCRIPTOR structure is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.6.

### 2.2.3.5 SECURITY\_IMPERSONATION\_LEVEL

The SECURITY\_IMPERSONATION\_LEVEL enumeration defines a set of values that specifies security impersonation levels. These levels govern the degree to which a server process can act on behalf of a client process.

This enumeration has no effect on message processing in any environment.

```
typedef enum _SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL
{
    SecurityAnonymous = 0,
    SecurityIdentification = 1,
    SecurityImpersonation = 2,
    SecurityDelegation = 3
} SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL,
*PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL;
```

**SecurityAnonymous:** The server cannot obtain information about the client and cannot impersonate the client.

**SecurityIdentification:** The server can obtain information such as security identifiers and privileges, but the server cannot impersonate the client.

**SecurityImpersonation:** The server can impersonate the client's security context on its local system, but cannot impersonate the client when communicating with services on remote systems.

**SecurityDelegation:** The server can impersonate the client's security context when communicating with services on remote systems.

### 2.2.3.6 SECURITY\_CONTEXT\_TRACKING\_MODE

The SECURITY\_CONTEXT\_TRACKING\_MODE type specifies whether the server is to be given a snapshot of the client's security context (called "static tracking") or is to be continually updated to track changes to the client's security context (called "dynamic tracking").

This structure has no effect on message processing in any environment and SHOULD be ignored.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef unsigned char SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE, *PSECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE;
```

The following values are possible.

Value	Meaning
0x00	The server is given a snapshot of the client's security context.
0x01	The server is continually updated with changes.

All other values SHOULD be ignored.

### 2.2.3.7 SECURITY\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE

The SECURITY\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE structure defines information used to support client impersonation.

This structure has no effect on message processing in any environment.

```
typedef struct _SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE {  
    unsigned long Length;  
    SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel;  
    SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE ContextTrackingMode;  
    unsigned char EffectiveOnly;  
} SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE,  
*PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE;
```

**Length:** This value MUST be ignored. No requirements are placed on its value because it is never used.

**ImpersonationLevel:** This field contains information (as specified in section 2.2.3.5) given to the server about the client that describes how the server can represent, or impersonate, the client.

**ContextTrackingMode:** This field specifies how the server tracks changes to the client's security context (as specified in section 2.2.3.6).

**EffectiveOnly:** This field specifies whether the server can enable or disable privileges and groups that the client's security context might include. This value MUST be TRUE (nonzero) if the server has this right; otherwise, it MUST be FALSE (0).

## 2.2.4 Policy Query/Set Data Types

### 2.2.4.1 POLICY\_INFORMATION\_CLASS

The POLICY\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration type contains values that specify the type of policy being queried or set by the client.

```
typedef enum _POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS  
{  
    PolicyAuditLogInformation = 1,  
    PolicyAuditEventsInformation,  
    PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation,  
    PolicyPdAccountInformation,  
    PolicyAccountDomainInformation,  
    PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation,  
    PolicyReplicaSourceInformation,  
    PolicyInformationNotUsedOnWire,  
}
```

```

    PolicyModificationInformation,
    PolicyAuditFullSetInformation,
    PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation,
    PolicyDnsDomainInformation,
    PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt,
    PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation,
    PolicyLastEntry
} POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS,
*PPOLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS;

```

**PolicyAuditLogInformation:** Information about audit log.

**PolicyAuditEventsInformation:** Auditing options.

**PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation:** Primary domain information.

**PolicyPdAccountInformation:** Obsolete information class.

**PolicyAccountDomainInformation:** Account domain information.

**PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation:** Server role information.

**PolicyReplicaSourceInformation:** Replica source information.

**PolicyInformationNotUsedOnWire:** This enumeration value does not appear on the wire.

**PolicyModificationInformation:** Obsolete information class.

**PolicyAuditFullSetInformation:** Obsolete information class.

**PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation:** Audit log state.

**PolicyDnsDomainInformation:** DNS domain information.

**PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt:** DNS domain information.

**PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation:** **Local account domain** information.

**PolicyLastEntry:** Not used in this protocol. Present to mark the end of the enumeration.

The following citation contains a timeline of when each enumeration value was introduced. <[1516](#)>

The values in this enumeration are used to define the contents of the LSAPR\_POLICY\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.4.2) union, where the structure associated with each enumeration value is specified. The structure associated with each enumeration value defines the meaning of that value to this protocol.

## 2.2.4.2 LSAPR\_POLICY\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_INFORMATION union is defined as follows, where the structure depends on the POLICY\_INFORMATION\_CLASS specified in this message.

```

typedef
[switch_type(POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS)]
union_LSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION {
    [case(PolicyAuditLogInformation)]
        POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO PolicyAuditLogInfo;
    [case(PolicyAuditEventsInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO PolicyAuditEventsInfo;
    [case(PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO PolicyPrimaryDomainInfo;
    [case(PolicyAccountDomainInformation)]

```

```

    LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO PolicyAccountDomainInfo;
[case(PolicyPdAccountInformation)]
    LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO PolicyPdAccountInfo;
[case(PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation)]
    POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO PolicyServerRoleInfo;
[case(PolicyReplicaSourceInformation)]
    LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO PolicyReplicaSourceInfo;
[case(PolicyModificationInformation)]
    POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO PolicyModificationInfo;
[case(PolicyAuditFullSetInformation)]
    POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO PolicyAuditFullSetInfo;
[case(PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation)]
    POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO PolicyAuditFullQueryInfo;
[case(PolicyDnsDomainInformation)]
    LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO PolicyDnsDomainInfo;
[case(PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt)]
    LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO PolicyDnsDomainInfoInt;
[case(PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation)]
    LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO PolicyLocalAccountDomainInfo;
} LSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION;

```

### 2.2.4.3 POLICY\_AUDIT\_LOG\_INFO

The POLICY\_AUDIT\_LOG\_INFO structure contains information about the state of the audit log. The following structure corresponds to the PolicyAuditLogInformation information class.

```

typedef struct _POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO {
    unsigned long AuditLogPercentFull;
    unsigned long MaximumLogSize;
    LARGE_INTEGER AuditRetentionPeriod;
    unsigned char AuditLogFullShutdownInProgress;
    LARGE_INTEGER TimeToShutdown;
    unsigned long NextAuditRecordId;
} POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO,
*PPOLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO;

```

**AuditLogPercentFull:** A measure of how full the audit log is, as a percentage.

**MaximumLogSize:** The maximum size of the auditing log, in kilobytes (KB).

**AuditRetentionPeriod:** The auditing log retention period (64-bit signed integer), a 64-bit value that represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601, UTC. An audit record can be discarded if its time stamp predates the current time minus the retention period.

**AuditLogFullShutdownInProgress:** A Boolean flag; indicates whether or not a system shutdown is being initiated due to the security audit log becoming full. This condition occurs only if the system is configured to shut down when the log becomes full.

After a shutdown has been initiated, this flag MUST be set to TRUE (nonzero). If an administrator can correct the situation before the shutdown becomes irreversible, this flag MUST be reset to FALSE (0).

This field MUST be ignored for set operations.

**TimeToShutdown:** A 64-bit value that represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601, UTC. If the AuditLogFullShutdownInProgress flag is set, this field MUST contain the time left before the shutdown becomes irreversible.

**NextAuditRecordId:** Not in use. This field SHOULD be set to zero when sent, and MUST be ignored on receipt.

## 2.2.4.4 LSAPR\_POLICY\_AUDIT\_EVENTS\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_AUDIT\_EVENTS\_INFO structure contains auditing options on the server.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO {
    unsigned char AuditingMode;
    [size_is(MaximumAuditEventCount)]
    unsigned long* EventAuditingOptions;
    [range(0,1000)] unsigned long MaximumAuditEventCount;
} LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO;
```

**AuditingMode:** 0 indicates that auditing is disabled. All other values indicate that auditing is enabled.

**EventAuditingOptions:** An array of values specifying the auditing options for a particular audit type. The auditing type of an element is represented by its index in the array, which is identified by the POLICY\_AUDIT\_EVENT\_TYPE enumeration (see section 2.2.4.20). Each element MUST contain one or more of the values in the table below.

If the **MaximumAuditingEventCount** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

Value	Meaning
POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_UNCHANGED 0x00000000	Leave existing auditing options unchanged for events of this type; used only for set operations. This value cannot be combined with values in this table.
POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_NONE 0x00000004	Upon updates, this value causes the existing auditing options for events of this type to be deleted and replaced with any other new values specified. If specified by itself, this value cancels all auditing options for events of this type. This value is used only for set operations.
POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_SUCCESS 0x00000001	When auditing is enabled, audit all successful occurrences of events of the given type.
POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_FAILURE 0x00000002	When auditing is enabled, audit all unsuccessful occurrences of events of the given type.

**MaximumAuditEventCount:** The number of entries in the EventAuditingOptions array. <del>1617</del>

## 2.2.4.5 LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIMARY\_DOM\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIMARY\_DOM\_INFO structure defines the server's **primary domain**.

The following structure corresponds to the PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO;
```

**Name:** This field contains a name for the primary domain that is subject to the restrictions of a NetBIOS name, as specified in [RFC1088]. The value SHOULD be used (by implementations external to this protocol) to identify the domain via the NetBIOS API, as specified in [RFC1088].



**Sid:** The SID of the primary domain.

#### 2.2.4.6 LSAPR\_POLICY\_ACCOUNT\_DOM\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_ACCOUNT\_DOM\_INFO structure contains information about the server's **account domain**. The following structure corresponds to the PolicyAccountDomainInformation and PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation information classes.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainName;
    PRPC_SID DomainSid;
} LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO;
```

**DomainName:** This field contains a name for the account domain that is subjected to the restrictions of a NetBIOS name, as specified in [RFC1088]. This value SHOULD be used (by implementations external to this protocol) to identify the domain via the NetBIOS API, as specified in [RFC1088].

**DomainSid:** The SID of the account domain. This field MUST NOT be NULL.

#### 2.2.4.7 LSAPR\_POLICY\_PD\_ACCOUNT\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_PD\_ACCOUNT\_INFO structure is obsolete and exists for backward compatibility purposes only.

**Name:** Represents the name of an account in the domain that shouldis to be used for authentication and name/ID lookup requests.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
} LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO;
```

#### 2.2.4.8 POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE

The POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE enumeration takes one of two possible values, depending on which capacity the account domain database is in: primary or backup. Certain operations of the protocol are allowed only against a primary account database. On non-domain controller machines, the account domain database is in primary state. On domain controllers, if the machine is the **primary domain controller (PDC) role owner**, then the account domain database is in primary state; otherwise, it is in backup state.

```
typedef enum _POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE
{
    PolicyServerRoleBackup = 2,
    PolicyServerRolePrimary
} POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE,
*PPOLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE;
```

**PolicyServerRoleBackup:** A backup account database.

**PolicyServerRolePrimary:** A primary account database.

#### 2.2.4.9 POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE\_INFO

The POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE\_INFO structure is used to allow callers to query and set whether the account domain database acts as the primary copy or backup copy. The following structure corresponds to the PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO {
    POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE LsaServerRole;
} POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO,
*PPOLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO;
```

**LsaServerRole:** One of the values of the POLICY\_LSA\_SERVER\_ROLE enumeration on return.

#### 2.2.4.10 LSAPR\_POLICY\_REPLICA\_SRCE\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_REPLICA\_SRCE\_INFO structure corresponds to the PolicyReplicaSourceInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ReplicaSource;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ReplicaAccountName;
} LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO;
```

**ReplicaSource:** A string.

**ReplicaAccountName:** A string.

#### 2.2.4.11 POLICY\_MODIFICATION\_INFO

The POLICY\_MODIFICATION\_INFO structure is obsolete and exists for backward compatibility purposes only. Callers of this protocol MUST NOT be able to set or retrieve this structure.

```
typedef struct _POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO {
    LARGE_INTEGER ModifiedId;
    LARGE_INTEGER DatabaseCreationTime;
} POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO,
*PPOLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO;
```

**ModifiedId:** A 64-bit unsigned integer that is incremented each time anything in the Local Security Authority (LSA) database is modified.

**DatabaseCreationTime:** The date and time when the LSA database was created. It is a 64-bit value that represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601, UTC.

#### 2.2.4.12 POLICY\_AUDIT\_FULL\_SET\_INFO

The POLICY\_AUDIT\_FULL\_SET\_INFO structure contains information to set on the server that is controlling audit log behavior. The following structure corresponds to the PolicyAuditFullSetInformation information class. This information class is not supported.

```
typedef struct _POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO {
    unsigned char ShutDownOnFull;
} POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO,
*PPOLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO;
```

**ShutDownOnFull:** A nonzero value means that the system MUST shut down when the event log is full, while zero means that the system MUST NOT shut down when the event log is full.

#### 2.2.4.13 POLICY\_AUDIT\_FULL\_QUERY\_INFO

The POLICY\_AUDIT\_FULL\_QUERY\_INFO structure is used to query information about the state of the audit log on the server. The following structure corresponds to the PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation information class.

This information class is obsolete and exists for backward compatibility purposes only.

```
typedef struct _POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO {
    unsigned char ShutDownOnFull;
    unsigned char LogIsFull;
} POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO,
*PPOLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO;
```

**ShutDownOnFull:** This field indicates whether the system MUST shut down when the event log is full.

**LogIsFull:** This field indicates whether the event log is full or not.

#### 2.2.4.14 LSAPR\_POLICY\_DNS\_DOMAIN\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_DNS\_DOMAIN\_INFO structure is used to allow callers to query and set the server's primary domain. <~~1718~~>

The following structure corresponds to the PolicyDnsDomainInformation and PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt information classes.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsDomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsForestName;
    GUID DomainGuid;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO;
```

**Name:** This field contains a name for the domain that is subject to the restrictions of a NetBIOS name, as specified in [RFC1088]. This value SHOULD be used (by implementations external to this protocol) to identify the domain via the NetBIOS API, as specified in [RFC1088].

**DnsDomainName:** The fully qualified **DNS name** of the domain.

**DnsForestName:** The fully qualified DNS name of the forest containing this domain.

**DomainGuid:** The **globally unique identifier (GUID)**, as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.3.4.1, of the domain.

**Sid:** The SID of the domain.

#### 2.2.4.15 POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_CLASS

The POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration type contains values that specify the type of policy being queried or set by the client.

```

typedef enum _POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS
{
    PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation = 1,
    PolicyDomainEfsInformation = 2,
    PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation = 3
} POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS,
*PPOLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS;

```

The values in this enumeration are used in defining the contents of the LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION union.

#### 2.2.4.16 LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION union is defined as follows, where the structure depends on the POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_CLASS that is specified in the message.

```

typedef
[switch_type(POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS)]
union LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION {
    [case(PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation)]
        POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInfo;
    [case(PolicyDomainEfsInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO PolicyDomainEfsInfo;
    [case(PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation)]
        POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO PolicyDomainKerbTicketInfo;
} LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION;

```

**PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInfo:** The complete description is as specified in section 2.2.4.17.<~~18~~19>

**PolicyDomainEfsInfo:** The complete description is as specified in section 2.2.4.18.

**PolicyDomainKerbTicketInfo:** The complete description is as specified in section 2.2.4.19.

#### 2.2.4.17 POLICY\_DOMAIN\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE\_INFO

The POLICY\_DOMAIN\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE\_INFO structure is obsolete and exists for backward compatibility purposes only.

```

typedef struct _POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO {
    unsigned long QualityOfService;
} POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO,
*PPOLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO;

```

**QualityOfService:** Quality of service of the responder. MUST be set to zero when sent and MUST be ignored on receipt.

#### 2.2.4.18 LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_EFS\_INFO

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_EFS\_INFO structure communicates a counted binary byte array.

```

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO {
    unsigned long InfoLength;
    [size_is(InfoLength)] unsigned char* EfsBlob;
} LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO,

```

\*PLSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_EFS\_INFO;

**InfoLength:** The count of bytes in the **EfsBlob**.

**EfsBlob:** An array of bytes, of size **InfoLength** bytes. If the value of **InfoLength** is other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL. The syntax of this blob SHOULD <del>1920</del> conform to the layout specified in [MS-GPEF] section 2.2.1.2.1.

### 2.2.4.19 POLICY\_DOMAIN\_KERBEROS\_TICKET\_INFO

The POLICY\_DOMAIN\_KERBEROS\_TICKET\_INFO structure communicates policy information about the Kerberos security provider.

```
typedef struct _POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO {
    unsigned long AuthenticationOptions;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxServiceTicketAge;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxTicketAge;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxRenewAge;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxClockSkew;
    LARGE_INTEGER Reserved;
} POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO,
*PPOLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO;
```

**AuthenticationOptions:** Optional flags that affect validations performed during authentication.

											1										2														3		
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	V	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
																							C														

Where the bits are defined as:

Value	Description
VC POLICY_KERBEROS_VALIDATE_CLIENT (0x00000080)	This is the only flag that is currently defined. When this bit is set, the AuthenticationOptions flag of the Key Distribution Center (KDC) configuration setting will be set to POLICY_KERBEROS_VALIDATE_CLIENT (as described in [MS-KILE] section 3.3.1). All other bits SHOULD be set to 0 and ignored upon receipt.

**MaxServiceTicketAge:** This is in units of 10<sup>(-7)</sup> seconds. It corresponds to Maximum ticket lifetime (as specified in [RFC4120] section 8.2) for service tickets only. The default value of this setting is 10 hours.

**MaxTicketAge:** This is in units of 10<sup>(-7)</sup> seconds. It corresponds to the Maximum ticket lifetime (as specified in [RFC4120] section 8.2) for ticket-granting ticket (TGT) only. The default value of this setting is 10 hours.

**MaxRenewAge:** This is in units of 10<sup>(-7)</sup> seconds. It corresponds to the Maximum renewable lifetime, as specified in [RFC4120] section 8.2. The default value of this setting is one week.

**MaxClockSkew:** This is in units of 10<sup>(-7)</sup> seconds. It corresponds to the Acceptable clock skew, as specified in [RFC4120] section 8.2. The default value of this setting is five minutes.

**Reserved:** The value of this field SHOULD be set to zero when sent or on receipt.

## 2.2.4.20 POLICY\_AUDIT\_EVENT\_TYPE

```
typedef enum _POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE
{
    AuditCategorySystem = 0,
    AuditCategoryLogon,
    AuditCategoryObjectAccess,
    AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse,
    AuditCategoryDetailedTracking,
    AuditCategoryPolicyChange,
    AuditCategoryAccountManagement,
    AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess,
    AuditCategoryAccountLogon
} POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE,
*PPOLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE;
```

**AuditCategorySystem:** Manages auditing of system-related events

**AuditCategoryLogon:** Manages auditing of account logon events

**AuditCategoryObjectAccess:** Manages auditing of object access events

**AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse:** Manages auditing of privilege use events

**AuditCategoryDetailedTracking:** Manages detailed auditing

**AuditCategoryPolicyChange:** Manages auditing of policy change events

**AuditCategoryAccountManagement:** Manages auditing of account management events

**AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess:** Manages auditing of Active Directory access events

**AuditCategoryAccountLogon:** Manages auditing of account logon events

The values in this enumeration are used as indices into the **EventAuditingOptions** field of the LSAPR\_POLICY\_AUDIT\_EVENTS\_INFO structure (see section 2.2.4.4).

## 2.2.5 Account Query/Set Data Types

### 2.2.5.1 LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_INFORMATION structure specifies a security principal security identifier (SID).

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION {
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION;
```

**Sid:** This field contains the SID of the security principal. This field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.5.2 LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_ENUM\_BUFFER

The LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_ENUM\_BUFFER structure specifies a collection of security principal SIDs represented in an array of structures of type LSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_INFORMATION.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER {
    unsigned long EntriesRead;
    [size_is(EntriesRead)] PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION Information;
} LSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER,
```

\*PLSAPR\_ACCOUNT\_ENUM\_BUFFER;

**EntriesRead:** This field contains the number of security principals.

**Information:** This field contains a set of structures that define the security principal SID, as specified in section 2.2.5.1. If the EntriesRead field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.5.3 LSAPR\_USER\_RIGHT\_SET

The LSAPR\_USER\_RIGHT\_SET structure specifies a collection of user rights.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET {
    [range(0,256)] unsigned long Entries;
    [size_is(Entries)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING UserRights;
} LSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET,
*PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET;
```

**Entries:** This field contains the number of rights. <2021>

**UserRights:** An array of strings specifying the rights. These can be string names corresponding to either privilege names or system access names, as specified in section 3.1.1.2. If the **Entries** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.5.4 LSAPR\_LUID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES

The LSAPR\_LUID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES structure is a tuple defining a locally unique identifier (LUID) and a field defining the attributes of the LUID.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES {
    LUID Luid;
    unsigned long Attributes;
} LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES,
*PLSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES;
```

**Luid:** The locally unique identifier.

**Attributes:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the properties of the privilege set. One or more of the following flags can be set.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	E	D

**D:** The privilege is enabled by default.

**E:** The privilege is enabled.

All other bits SHOULD be 0 and ignored upon receipt.

### 2.2.5.5 LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_SET

The LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_SET structure defines a set of privileges that belong to an account.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET {
```

```

    [range(0,1000)] unsigned long PrivilegeCount;
    unsigned long Control;
    [size_is(PrivilegeCount)] LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Privilege[*];
} LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET,
*PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET;

```

**PrivilegeCount:** This field contains the number of privileges. <2122>

**Control:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the properties of the privilege set.

										1										2																	3				
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**0:** Valid for a set operation indicating that all specified privileges that are not already assigned should be assigned.

All other bits SHOULD be set to zero when sent, and ignored on receipt.

**Privilege:** An array of LSAPR\_LUID\_AND\_ATTRIBUTES structures. If the **PrivilegeCount** field has a value different than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

## 2.2.6 Secret Query/Set Data Types

### 2.2.6.1 LSAPR\_CR\_CIPHER\_VALUE

The LSAPR\_CR\_CIPHER\_VALUE structure is a counted buffer of bytes containing a secret object.

```

typedef struct _LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE {
    [range(0,131088)] unsigned long Length;
    [range(0,131088)] unsigned long MaximumLength;
    [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length)]
    unsigned char* Buffer;
} LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE,
*PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE;

```

**Length:** This field contains the number of valid bytes in the **Buffer** field. <2223>

**MaximumLength:** This field contains the number of allocated bytes in the **Buffer** field. <2324>

**Buffer:** This field contains the actual secret data. If the value of the **MaximumLength** field is greater than 0, this field MUST contain a non-NULL value. This field is always encrypted using algorithms as specified in section 5.1.2.

## 2.2.7 Trusted Domain Query/Set Data Types

### 2.2.7.1 LSAPR\_TRUST\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_TRUST\_INFORMATION structure identifies a domain.

```

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION;

```



**Name:** This field contains a name for the domain that is subject to the restrictions of a NetBIOS name, as specified in [RFC1088]. This value SHOULD be used (by implementations external to this protocol) to identify the domain via the NetBIOS, as specified in [RFC1088].

**Sid:** The SID of the domain. This field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.7.2 TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS

The TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration type contains values that specify the type of trusted domain information queried or set by the client.

```
typedef enum _TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS
{
    TrustedDomainNameInformation = 1,
    TrustedControllersInformation,
    TrustedPosixOffsetInformation,
    TrustedPasswordInformation,
    TrustedDomainInformationBasic,
    TrustedDomainInformationEx,
    TrustedDomainAuthInformation,
    TrustedDomainFullInformation,
    TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal,
    TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal,
    TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal,
    TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal,
    TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes
} TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS,
*PTRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS;
```

**TrustedDomainNameInformation:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_NAME\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.4.

**TrustedControllersInformation:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_CONTROLLERS\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.5.

**TrustedPosixOffsetInformation:** The trusted domain information contains the TRUSTED\_POSIX\_OFFSET\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.6.

**TrustedPasswordInformation:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_PASSWORD\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.7.

**TrustedDomainInformationBasic:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_BASIC structure specified in section 2.2.7.8.

**TrustedDomainInformationEx:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX structure specified in section 2.2.7.9.

**TrustedDomainAuthInformation:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structure specified in section 2.2.7.11.

**TrustedDomainFullInformation:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION structure specified in section 2.2.7.13.

**TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL structure specified in section 2.2.7.12.

**TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL structure specified in section 2.2.7.14.

**TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX2 structure specified in section 2.2.7.10.

**TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal:** The trusted domain information contains the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION2 structure specified in section 2.2.7.15.

**TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes:** The trusted domain information contains the TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_SUPPORTED\_ENCRYPTION\_TYPES structure specified in section 2.2.7.18.

The following citation contains a timeline of when each enumeration value was introduced. <[2425](#)>

The values in this enumeration are used in defining the contents of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFO union.

### 2.2.7.3 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFO

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFO union is defined as follows, where the structure depends on the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS that is specified in the message.

```
typedef
[switch_type(TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS)]
union LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO {
    [case(TrustedDomainNameInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO TrustedDomainNameInfo;
    [case(TrustedControllersInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO TrustedControllersInfo;
    [case(TrustedPosixOffsetInformation)]
        TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO TrustedPosixOffsetInfo;
    [case(TrustedPasswordInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO TrustedPasswordInfo;
    [case(TrustedDomainInformationBasic)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_BASIC TrustedDomainInfoBasic;
    [case(TrustedDomainInformationEx)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX TrustedDomainInfoEx;
    [case(TrustedDomainAuthInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION TrustedAuthInfo;
    [case(TrustedDomainFullInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION TrustedFullInfo;
    [case(TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL TrustedAuthInfoInternal;
    [case(TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL TrustedFullInfoInternal;
    [case(TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 TrustedDomainInfoEx2;
    [case(TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2 TrustedFullInfo2;
    [case(TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes)]
        TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES TrustedDomainSETs;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO;
```

**TrustedDomainNameInfo:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_NAME\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.4.

**TrustedControllersInfo:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_CONTROLLERS\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.5.

**TrustedPosixOffsetInfo:** An instance of the TRUSTED\_POSIX\_OFFSET\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.6.

**TrustedPasswordInfo:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_PASSWORD\_INFO structure specified in section 2.2.7.7.

**TrustedDomainInfoBasic:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_BASIC structure specified in section 2.2.7.8.

**TrustedDomainInfoEx:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX structure specified in section 2.2.7.9.

**TrustedAuthInfo:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structure specified in section 2.2.7.11.

**TrustedFullInfo:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION structure specified in section 2.2.7.13.

**TrustedAuthInfoInternal:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL structure specified in section 2.2.7.12.

**TrustedFullInfoInternal:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL structure specified in section 2.2.7.14.

**TrustedDomainInfoEx2:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX2 structure specified in section 2.2.7.10.

**TrustedFullInfo2:** An instance of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION2 structure specified in section 2.2.7.15.

**TrustedDomainSETs:** An instance of the TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_SUPPORTED\_ENCRYPTION\_TYPES structure specified in section 2.2.7.18.

#### 2.2.7.4 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_NAME\_INFO

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_NAME\_INFO structure is used to communicate the name of a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainNameInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO;
```

**Name:** This field contains a name for the domain that is subject to the restrictions of a NetBIOS name, as specified in [RFC1088]. This field SHOULD be used (by implementations external to this protocol) to identify the domain via the NetBIOS API, as specified in [RFC1088].

#### 2.2.7.5 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_CONTROLLERS\_INFO

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_CONTROLLERS\_INFO structure is used to communicate a set of names of domain controllers (DCs) in a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedControllersInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO {
    [range(0,5)] unsigned long Entries;
    [size_is(Entries)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING Names;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO;
```

**Entries:** The count of names. <2526>

**Names:** This field contains an array of DC names that are subject to the restrictions of a NetBIOS name, as specified in [RFC1088]. This field SHOULD be used (by implementations external to this protocol) to identify the DCs via the NetBIOS API, as specified in [RFC1088]. If the **Entries** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.7.6 TRUSTED\_POSIX\_OFFSET\_INFO

The TRUSTED\_POSIX\_OFFSET\_INFO structure communicates any offset necessary for POSIX compliance. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedPosixOffsetInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO {
    unsigned long Offset;
} TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO,
*PTRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO;
```

**Offset:** The offset to use for the generation of POSIX IDs for users and groups, as specified in "trustPosixOffset" in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.14.

### 2.2.7.7 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_PASSWORD\_INFO

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_PASSWORD\_INFO structure is used to communicate trust-authentication material. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedPasswordInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO {
    PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE Password;
    PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE OldPassword;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO;
```

**Password:** The current authentication material. See section 2.2.6.1.

**OldPassword:** The version prior to the current version of the authentication material. See section 2.2.6.1.

### 2.2.7.8 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_BASIC

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_BASIC type is identical to the LSAPR\_TRUST\_INFORMATION structure. This type corresponds to the TrustedDomainInformationBasic information class.

This type is declared as follows:

```
typedef LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_BASIC;
```

### 2.2.7.9 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX

~~Note: Some of the information in this section is subject to change because it applies to a preliminary product version, and thus may differ from the final version of the software when released. All behavior notes that pertain to the preliminary product version contain specific references to it in the Product Behavior appendix.~~

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX structure communicates properties of a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainInformationEx information class. Domain trusts are specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FlatName;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    unsigned long TrustDirection;
    unsigned long TrustType;
    unsigned long TrustAttributes;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX;
```

**Name:** The DNS name of the domain. Maps to the **Name** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**FlatName:** The NetBIOS name of the trusted domain, as specified in [RFC1088]. Maps to the **Flat Name** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**Sid:** The domain SID. Maps to the **Security Identifier** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**TrustDirection:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the properties of the direction of trust between the local domain and the named domain. One or more of the valid flags can be set. If all bits are 0, the trust is said to be disabled.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	2	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	3	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	I	O

**I:** The trust is inbound.

**O:** The trust is outbound.

All other bits SHOULD be 0 and ignored upon receipt.

Maps to the **Trust Direction** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**TrustType:** This field specifies the type of trust between the local domain and the named domain.

Value	Meaning
0x00000001	Trust with a Windows domain that is not running Active Directory.
0x00000002	Trust with a Windows domain that is running Active Directory.
0x00000003	Trust with a non-Windows-compliant Kerberos distribution, as specified in [RFC4120].
0x00000004	Trust with a distributed computing environment (DCE) realm. This is a historical reference and is not used.

**Note** Other values SHOULD NOT be set.

Maps to the **Trust Type** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**TrustAttributes:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the attributes of the trust. <[2627](#)>

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	2	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	3	0	1	
R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	O	O	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	T	T	R	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	A	A	N
																						P	A		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	U	A	

																		T	C			C	E	F	O	T	D	O	T
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	---	---	--	--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

TrustAttribute values are described in section 3.1.1.5. The following table shows how these values map to the Trust Attributes field in section 3.1.1.5.

Value	Mapping
TANT (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE)	Trust Attributes: Non-transitive
TAUO (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_Uplevel_ONLY)	Trust Attributes: Uplevel only
TAQD (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN)	Trust Attributes: Quarantined
TAFT (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE)	Trust Attributes: Forest trust
TACO (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION)	Trust Attributes: Cross organization
TAWF (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)	Trust Attributes: Within forest
TATE (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL)	Trust Attributes: Treat as external
TARC (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION)	Trust Attributes: Use <b>RC4</b> Encryption <a href="#">(for more information about RC4, see [SCHNEIER] section 17.1).</a>
TANC (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION_NO_TGT_DELEGATION)	Trust Attributes: Tokens must not be trusted for delegation.
TAPT (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST)	Trust Attributes: PrivilegedIdentityManagement (PIM) trust.
O	Obsolete. SHOULD be set to 0.
R	Reserved for future use. SHOULD be set to zero.

### 2.2.7.10 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX2

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX2 structure communicates properties of a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal information class. Domain trusts are specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FlatName;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    unsigned long TrustDirection;
    unsigned long TrustType;
    unsigned long TrustAttributes;
    unsigned long ForestTrustLength;
    [size_is(ForestTrustLength)] unsigned char* ForestTrustInfo;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2;
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2;
```

**Name:** The DNS name of the domain. Maps to the **Name** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**FlatName:** The NetBIOS name of the trusted domain, as specified in [RFC1088]. Maps to the **Flat Name** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**Sid:** The domain SID. Maps to the **Security Identifier** field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**TrustDirection:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the properties of the direction of trust between the local domain and the named domain. See section 2.2.7.9 for valid values and a description of each flag. Maps to the Trusted Direction field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**TrustType:** This field specifies the type of trust between the local domain and the named domain. See section 2.2.7.9 for valid values and a description of each value. Maps to the Trusted Type field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**TrustAttributes:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the attributes of the trust. See section 2.2.7.9 for valid values and a description of each flag. Maps to the Trusted Attributes field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

**ForestTrustLength:** The count of bytes in **ForestTrustInfo**.

**ForestTrustInfo:** Binary data for the **forest trust**. For more information, see "Trust Objects" in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6. Maps to the Forest Trust Information field, as specified in section 3.1.1.5. Conversion from this binary format to the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION format is specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.3. If the **ForestTrustLength** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

## 2.2.7.11 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structure communicates authentication material. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainAuthInformation information class. Domain trust authentication is specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1. This structure maps to the Incoming and Outgoing Trust Password fields, as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION {
    [range(0,1)] unsigned long IncomingAuthInfos;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION IncomingAuthenticationInformation;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION IncomingPreviousAuthenticationInformation;
    [range(0,1)] unsigned long OutgoingAuthInfos;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION OutgoingAuthenticationInformation;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION OutgoingPreviousAuthenticationInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION;
```

**IncomingAuthInfos:** The count of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries (section 2.2.7.17) in the **IncomingAuthenticationInformation** field. <2728>

**IncomingAuthenticationInformation:** An array of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structures. The values are used to compute keys used in inbound trust validation, as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1.

**IncomingPreviousAuthenticationInformation:** Same as **IncomingAuthenticationInformation**, but the data is the previous version of the authentication information.

**OutgoingAuthInfos:** The count of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in the **OutgoingAuthenticationInformation** field. <2829>

**OutgoingAuthenticationInformation:** An array of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structures. The values are used to compute keys used in outbound trust validation, as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1.

**OutgoingPreviousAuthenticationInformation:** Same as **OutgoingAuthenticationInformation**, but the data is the previous version of the authentication information.

### 2.2.7.12 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL structure communicates authentication material. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal information class. For more information about domain trust authentication material, see [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB AuthBlob;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL;
```

**AuthBlob:** An LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB.

### 2.2.7.13 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION structure communicates identification, POSIX compatibility, and authentication information for a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainFullInformation information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX Information;
    TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO PosixOffset;
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION AuthInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION;
```

**Information:** A structure containing name, SID, and **trust attributes**, as specified in section 2.2.7.9.

**PosixOffset:** Any offset required for POSIX compliance, as specified in section 2.2.7.6.

**AuthInformation:** Authentication material, as specified in section 2.2.7.11.

### 2.2.7.14 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION\_INTERNAL structure communicates identification and authentication information for a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal information class.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX Information;
    TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO PosixOffset;
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL AuthInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL;
```

**Information:** A structure containing name, SID, and trust attributes, as specified in section 2.2.7.9.

**PosixOffset:** Any offset required for POSIX compliance, as specified in section 2.2.7.6.

**AuthInformation:** Authentication material, as specified in section 2.2.7.12.



## 2.2.7.15 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION2

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_FULL\_INFORMATION2 structure is used to communicate identification, POSIX compatibility, and authentication information for a trusted domain. The following structure corresponds to the TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal information class.

```
typedef struct LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2 {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 Information;
    TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO PosixOffset;
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION AuthInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2;
```

**Information:** A structure containing name, SID, and trust attributes, as specified in section 2.2.7.10.

**PosixOffset:** Any offset required for POSIX compliance, as specified in section 2.2.7.6.

**AuthInformation:** Authentication material, as specified in section 2.2.7.11.

## 2.2.7.16 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB structure contains a counted buffer of authentication material. Domain trust authentication is specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1.

```
typedef struct LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB {
    [range(0,65536)] unsigned long AuthSize;
    [size_is(AuthSize)] unsigned char* AuthBlob;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB;
```

**AuthSize:** The count of bytes in **AuthBlob**.<2930>

**AuthBlob:** An array of bytes containing the authentication material. If the **AuthSize** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL. Always encrypted using algorithms, as specified in section 5.1.1. The plaintext layout is in the following format.

The incoming and outgoing authentication information buffer size included at the end of the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB can be used to extract the incoming and outgoing authentication information buffers from the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB. Each of these buffers contains the byte offset to both the current and the previous authentication information. This information can be used to extract current and (if any) previous authentication information.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
512 bytes of random data (512 bytes)																															
...																															
...																															
CountOutgoingAuthInfos																															
ByteOffsetCurrentOutgoingAuthInfo																															

ByteOffsetPreviousOutgoingAuthInfo
CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos (variable)
...
...
PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos (variable)
...
...
CountIncomingAuthInfos
ByteOffsetCurrentIncomingAuthInfo
ByteOffsetPreviousIncomingAuthInfo
CurrentIncomingAuthInfos (variable)
...
...
PreviousIncomingAuthInfos (variable)
...
...
OutgoingAuthInfoSize
IncomingAuthInfoSize

**CountOutgoingAuthInfos (4 bytes):** Specifies the count of entries present in the CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos field. If optional field PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos is present, the number of entries in PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos is also equal to CountOutgoingAuthInfos.

**ByteOffsetCurrentOutgoingAuthInfo (4 bytes):** Specifies the byte offset from the beginning of CountOutgoingAuthInfos to the start of the CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos field. If CountOutgoingAuthInfos is 0, this field MUST be ignored.

**ByteOffsetPreviousOutgoingAuthInfo (4 bytes):** Specifies the byte offset from the beginning of CountOutgoingAuthInfos to the start of the PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos field. If the difference between ByteOffsetPreviousOutgoingAuthInfo and OutgoingAuthInfoSize is 0, the PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos field has zero entries.

**CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos:** Contains an array of CountOutgoingAuthInfos of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.17) entries in self-relative format. Each

LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entry in the array MUST be 4-byte aligned. When it is necessary to insert unused padding bytes into a buffer for data alignment, such bytes MUST be set to 0.

**PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos:** Contains an array of **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in self-relative format. See the comments for the **ByteOffsetPreviousOutgoingAuthInfo** field to determine when this field is present. Each LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entry in the array MUST be 4-byte aligned. When it is necessary to insert unused padding bytes into a buffer for data alignment, such bytes MUST be set to 0.

**CountIncomingAuthInfos (4 bytes):** Specifies the count of entries present in the **CurrentIncomingAuthInfos** field. If optional field **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** is present, the number of entries in **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** is also equal to **CountIncomingAuthInfos**.

**ByteOffsetCurrentIncomingAuthInfo (4 bytes):** Specifies the byte offset from the beginning of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** to the start of the **CurrentIncomingAuthInfos** field. If **CountIncomingAuthInfos** is 0, this field MUST be ignored.

**ByteOffsetPreviousIncomingAuthInfo (4 bytes):** Specifies the byte offset from the beginning of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** to the start of the **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** field. If the difference between **ByteOffsetPreviousIncomingAuthInfo** and **IncomingAuthInfoSize** is 0, the **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** field has zero entries.

**CurrentIncomingAuthInfos:** Contains an array of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in self-relative format. Each LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entry in the array MUST be 4-byte aligned. When it is necessary to insert unused padding bytes into a buffer for data alignment, such bytes MUST be set to 0.

**PreviousIncomingAuthInfos:** Contains an array of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in self-relative format. See the comments for the **ByteOffsetPreviousIncomingAuthInfo** field to determine when this field is present. Each LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entry in the array MUST be 4-byte aligned. When it is necessary to insert unused padding bytes into a buffer for data alignment, such bytes MUST be set to 0.

**OutgoingAuthInfoSize (4 bytes):** Specifies the size, in bytes, of the subportion of the structure from the beginning of the **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** field through the end of the of the **PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos** field.

**IncomingAuthInfoSize (4 bytes):** Specifies the size, in bytes, of the sub-portion of the structure from the beginning of the **CountIncomingAuthInfos** field through the end of the of the **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** field.

### 2.2.7.17 LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION

The LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structure communicates information about authentication between trusted domains. Domain trust authentication is specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION {
    LARGE_INTEGER LastUpdateTime;
    unsigned long AuthType;
    [range(0,65536)] unsigned long AuthInfoLength;
    [size_is(AuthInfoLength)] unsigned char* AuthInfo;
} LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION;
```

**LastUpdateTime:** The date and time when this authentication information was last updated. It is a 64-bit value that represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601, UTC.


**AuthType:** A type for the AuthInfo, as specified in the following table.

Value	Meaning
0x00000000	This type MUST be ignored.
0x00000001	Derived RC4HMAC key. For more information, see [RFC4757].
0x00000002	A plaintext password. Indicates that the information stored in the attribute is a Unicode plaintext password. If this AuthType is present, Kerberos can then use this password to derive additional key types that are needed to encrypt and decrypt cross-realm TGTs.
0x00000003	A plaintext password version number that is a single, unsigned long integer consisting of 32 bits.

**AuthInfoLength:** The count of bytes in AuthInfo buffer. <3031>

**AuthInfo:** Authentication data that depends on the **AuthType**.

The self-relative form of the LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION structure is used in LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB; in that case, the structure memory layout looks like the following.




### 2.2.7.18 TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_SUPPORTED\_ENCRYPTION\_TYPES

The TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_SUPPORTED\_ENCRYPTION\_TYPES structure is used to present the encryption types that are allowed through a trust.

```
typedef struct _TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES {
    unsigned long SupportedEncryptionTypes;
} TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES,
*PTRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES;
```

**SupportedEncryptionTypes:** This field contains bitmapped values that define the encryption types supported by this trust relationship. The flags can be set in any combination.



**C:** Supports CRC32, as specified in [RFC3961] page 31.

**M:** Supports RSA-MD5, as specified in [RFC3961] page 31.

**R:** Supports RC4-HMAC-MD5, as specified in [RFC4757].

**A:** Supports HMAC-SHA1-96-AES128, as specified in [RFC3961] page 31.

**S:** Supports HMAC-SHA1-96-AES256, as specified in [RFC3961] page 31.

All other bits SHOULD be 0 and ignored upon receipt.

### 2.2.7.19 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_ENUM\_BUFFER

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_ENUM\_BUFFER structure specifies a collection of trust information structures of type LSAPR\_TRUST\_INFORMATION.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER {
    unsigned long EntriesRead;
    [size_is(EntriesRead)] PLSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION Information;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER;
```

**EntriesRead:** This field contains the number of trust information structures.

**Information:** This field contains a set of structures that define the trust information, as specified in section 2.2.7.1. If the **EntriesRead** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.7.20 LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_ENUM\_BUFFER\_EX

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_ENUM\_BUFFER\_EX structure specifies a collection of trust information structures of type LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_EX.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX {
    unsigned long EntriesRead;
    [size_is(EntriesRead)] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX EnumerationBuffer;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX;
```

**EntriesRead:** This field contains the number of trust information structures.

**EnumerationBuffer:** This field contains a set of structures that define the trust information, as specified in section 2.2.7.9. If the **EntriesRead** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.7.21 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD structure is used to communicate the type, creation time, and data for a forest trust record. The data is determined by the trust type as follows in the definition of the contained union.

```
typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD {
    unsigned long Flags;
    LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE ForestTrustType;
    LARGE_INTEGER Time;
    [switch_type(LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE), switch_is(ForestTrustType)]
    union {
        [case(ForestTrustTopLevelName, ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx)]
        LSA_UNICODE_STRING TopLevelName;
        [case(ForestTrustDomainInfo)]
    }
```

```

    LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO DomainInfo;
    [default] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA Data;
} ForestTrustData;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD;

```

**Flags:** The following table specifies the possible flags.

**Note** Some flag values are reused for different forest record types. See the Meaning column for more information.

Value	Meaning
LSA_TLN_DISABLED_NEW 0x00000001	The top-level name trust record is disabled during initial creation. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with forest trust record types of ForestTrustTopLevelName and ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx.
LSA_TLN_DISABLED_ADMIN 0x00000002	The top-level name trust record is disabled by the domain administrator. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with forest trust record types of ForestTrustTopLevelName and ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx.
LSA_TLN_DISABLED_CONFLICT 0x00000004	The top-level name trust record is disabled due to a conflict. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with forest trust record types of ForestTrustTopLevelName and ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx.
LSA_SID_DISABLED_ADMIN 0x00000001	The domain information trust record is disabled by the domain administrator. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with a forest trust record type of ForestTrustDomainInfo.
LSA_SID_DISABLED_CONFLICT 0x00000002	The domain information trust record is disabled due to a conflict. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with a forest trust record type of ForestTrustDomainInfo.
LSA_NB_DISABLED_ADMIN 0x00000004	The domain information trust record is disabled by the domain administrator. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with a forest trust record type of ForestTrustDomainInfo.
LSA_NB_DISABLED_CONFLICT 0x00000008	The domain information trust record is disabled due to a conflict. <b>Note</b> This flag MUST be used only with a forest trust record type of ForestTrustDomainInfo.
LSA_FTRECORD_DISABLED_REASONS 0x0000FFFF	The domain information trust record is disabled. <b>Note</b> This set of flags is reserved; for current and future reasons, the trust is disabled.

**ForestTrustType:** This value is one of LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD\_TYPE.

**Time:** The date and time when this entry was created. It is a 64-bit value that represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals since January 1, 1601, UTC.

**ForestTrustData:** An LSA\_UNICODE\_STRING or LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_DOMAIN\_INFO structure, depending on the value ForestTrustType as specified in the structure definition for LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD.

### 2.2.7.22 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD\_TYPE

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD\_TYPE enumeration specifies a type of forest trust record.

```
typedef enum _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE
{
    ForestTrustTopLevelName = 0,
    ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx = 1,
    ForestTrustDomainInfo = 2
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE;
```

**ForestTrustTopLevelName:** The DNS name of the **trusted forest**. The structure used for this record type is equivalent to LSA\_UNICODE\_STRING (section 2.2.2.3).

**ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx:** The DNS name of the trusted forest. This is the same as **ForestTrustTopLevelName**. The structure used for this record type is equivalent to LSA\_UNICODE\_STRING.

**ForestTrustDomainInfo:** This field specifies a record containing identification and name information.

### 2.2.7.23 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_BINARY\_DATA

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_BINARY\_DATA structure is used to communicate a forest trust record. This structure is not used in the current version of the protocol.

```
typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA {
    [range(0,131072)] unsigned long Length;
    [size_is(Length)] unsigned char* Buffer;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA;
```

**Length:** The count of bytes in **Buffer**. <~~31~~32>

**Buffer:** The trust record. If the **Length** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.7.24 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_DOMAIN\_INFO

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_DOMAIN\_INFO structure is used to communicate a forest trust record corresponding to the LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_DOMAIN\_INFO value of ForestTrustDomainInfo.

```
typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO {
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    LSA_UNICODE_STRING DnsName;
    LSA_UNICODE_STRING NetbiosName;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO;
```

**Sid:** Domain SID for the trusted domain.

**DnsName:** The DNS name of the trusted domain.

**NetbiosName:** The NetBIOS name of the trusted domain, as specified in [RFC1088].

### 2.2.7.25 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_INFORMATION structure is a collection of LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD (section 2.2.7.21) structures.

```
typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION {
    [range(0,4000)] unsigned long RecordCount;
    [size_is(RecordCount)] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD* Entries;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION;
```

**RecordCount:** A count of elements in the Entries array. <3233>

**Entries:** An array of LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD structures. If the **RecordCount** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

### 2.2.7.26 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD\_TYPE

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD\_TYPE type specifies the type of a collision record in the message.

```
typedef enum _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE
{
    CollisionTdo = 0,
    CollisionXref,
    CollisionOther
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE;
```

**CollisionTdo:** A forest trust record that a caller attempted to set on a trusted domain object has suffered a collision with another trusted domain object in Active Directory, as specified in [MS-ADTS], section 6.1.6.

**CollisionXref:** A forest trust record that a caller attempted to set on a trusted domain object has suffered a collision with a cross-reference object belonging to the forest to which the server belongs, as specified in [MS-ADTS], section 6.1.6.

**CollisionOther:** A forest trust record that a caller attempted to set on a trusted domain object has suffered a collision for an unknown reason.

### 2.2.7.27 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD structure is used to communicate forest trust collision information. For more information about trusted domain objects, see [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.

```
typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD {
    unsigned long Index;
    LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE Type;
    unsigned long Flags;
    LSA_UNICODE_STRING Name;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD;
```

**Index:** An ordinal number of a forest trust record in the **forest trust information** supplied by the caller that suffered a collision. For rules about collisions, see sections 3.1.4.7.16 and 3.1.4.7.16.1.

**Type:** The type of collision record, as specified in section 2.2.7.26.



**Flags:** A set of bits specifying the nature of the collision. These flags and the rules for generating them are specified in sections 3.1.4.7.16 and 3.1.4.7.16.1.

**Name:** The name of the existing entity (a top-level name entry, a domain information entry, or a top-level name exclusion entry) that caused the collision.

### 2.2.7.28 LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_INFORMATION

The LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_INFORMATION structure is used to communicate a set of LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD structures.

```
typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION {
    unsigned long RecordCount;
    [size_is(RecordCount)] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD* Entries;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION;
```

**RecordCount:** The count of elements in the Entries array.

**Entries:** An array of LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_COLLISION\_RECORD (section 2.2.7.27) structures. If the **RecordCount** field has a value other than zero, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

## 2.2.8 Privilege Data Types

### 2.2.8.1 LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIVILEGE\_DEF

The LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIVILEGE\_DEF structure specifies a privilege definition, which consists of a pairing of a human-readable name with a locally unique identifier (LUID).

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    LUID LocalValue;
} LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF,
*PLSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF;
```

**Name:** An RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING that contains the privilege name.

**LocalValue:** This field contains the LUID value assigned locally for efficient representation of the privilege. This value is meaningful only on the system where it was assigned.

### 2.2.8.2 LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_ENUM\_BUFFER

The LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_ENUM\_BUFFER structure specifies a collection of privilege definitions of type LSAPR\_POLICY\_PRIVILEGE\_DEF.

```
typedef struct _LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER {
    unsigned long Entries;
    [size_is(Entries)] PLSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF Privileges;
} LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER,
*PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER;
```

**Entries:** This field contains the number of privileges in the structure.

**Privileges:** This field contains a set of structures that define the privileges, as specified in section 2.2.8.1. If the **Entries** field has a value other than 0, this field MUST NOT be NULL.

## 2.3 Directory Service Schema Elements

This protocol is part of the Active Directory core family of protocols. In order to be fully compliant with Active Directory, an implementation of this protocol must be used in conjunction with the full Active Directory schema, containing all the schema attributes and classes specified in [MS-ADA1], [MS-ADA2], [MS-ADA3], and [MS-ADSC].

## 3 Protocol Details

The client side of this protocol is a pass-through; that is, the client side requires no additional timers or other state. Calls made by the higher-layer protocol or application are passed directly to the transport, and the results returned by the transport are passed directly back to the higher-layer protocol or application.

### 3.1 Server Details

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol server handles client requests for any of the messages described in section 3.1.4, and operates on the security policy settings stored on the server. For each message, the behavior of the server while processing messages is described in section 3.1.4.

#### 3.1.1 Abstract Data Model

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol defines an abstract data model that contains information about three types of objects: account objects, secret objects, and trusted domain objects. In addition, this abstract data model contains the policy object that holds miscellaneous policy settings that are unrelated to any of these three types of objects, but apply to the operation of the host of the server implementation of the protocol. Each object contains a few fields; operations on these fields MUST satisfy the **ACID** properties [GRAY]. Thus, if fields are defined by structures, it is expected that the entire structure be operated on as a unit.

This data model MUST consist of variables whose values are maintained across system restarts and RPC method invocations and that store those values for retrieval and update, unless otherwise specified.

**Note** The abstract notation (Public) indicates that this Abstract Data Model element can be directly accessed from outside this protocol, for the purpose of documentary convenience. Such direct access MUST NOT be construed as a relaxation of the security constraints specified within this document; rather, the same authorization decisions that are applied when clients access such data elements using protocol primitives MUST also be applied during direct access of the elements. See section 3.1.1.10 for more details.

##### 3.1.1.1 Policy Object Data Model

The policy object contains miscellaneous policy settings. There is one object of this type on the server. This object cannot be deleted, and a new object of this type cannot be created. Its fields, however, can be changed when they adhere to the rules in the specification. The data model is presented here as a collection of structures defined in section 2.2 to ensure that syntax and other consistency rules are met in the data model. <3334>

Name	Type
Auditing Log Information	POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO
Audit Full Information	POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO
Event Auditing Options	LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO
Primary Domain Information	LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO
DNS Domain Information (Public) <3435>	LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO
Account Domain Information	LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO

Name	Type
Server Role Information	POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO
Replica Source Information	LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO
* Kerberos Policy Information< <a href="#">3536</a> >	POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO
Encrypting File System (EFS) Policy Information< <a href="#">3637</a> >	LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO
Quality of Service Information< <a href="#">3738</a> >	POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO
Security Descriptor	LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR

\* The Kerberos Policy Information abstract data contains the following public ADM elements (whose meaning is described in section 2.2.4.19):

- **AuthenticationOptions** (Public): Optional flags that affect validations.
- **MaxServiceTicketAge** (Public): The maximum ticket lifetime for a service ticket.
- **MaxTicketAge** (Public): The maximum ticket lifetime for a ticket-granting ticket.
- **MaxRenewAge** (Public): The maximum renewable lifetime.
- **MaxClockSkew** (Public): The acceptable clock skew.
- **Reserved**: Reserved for future use.

The server MUST notify the Kerberos protocol [MS-KILE] when any field of the Kerberos Policy Information ADM element is changed; see section 3.1.4.4.8 for more details.

The following element also pertains to the Policy Object data model:

- **ComputerNetBIOSName**: This ADM element represents the NetBIOS name of the computer. It is shared with the **ComputerName.NetBIOS** element from [MS-WKST] section 3.2.1.2.

Auditing Log Information is constant information about the state of the auditing system. The server MUST store the following constant information.

- MaximumLogSize = 8192 for non-domain controllers (DCs)
- MaximumLogSize = 20480 for domain controllers
- AuditLogPercentFull = 0
- AuditRetentionPeriod = 8533315
- AuditLogFullShutdownInProgress = FALSE
- TimeToShutdown = 288342
- NextAuditRecordId = 0

Account Domain Information stores information about the local account domain of the machine. Note that Primary Domain Information is returned to clients who issue LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 messages (section 3.1.4.4.3) with PolicyAccountDomainInformation to a domain controller.

For domain-joined machines, Primary Domain Information and DNS Domain Information store information about the domain to which the machine is joined. If the machine is not joined to a domain, these abstract data elements store information about the workgroup the machine is in.

The value of the Server Role Information ADM element is determined by the following series of calls to the local SAM Remote Protocol implementation:

1. Invoke **SamrConnect** ([MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.1.4), specifying SAM\_SERVER\_CONNECT for the *DesiredAccess* parameter.
2. Invoke **SamrLookupDomainInSamServer** ([MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.11.1), specifying the **Name** field of the Primary Domain Information ADM element for the *Name* parameter
3. Invoke **SamrOpenDomain** ([MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.1.5), specifying the *ServerHandle* that was obtained in step 1, DOMAIN\_ALL\_ACCESS for the *DesiredAccess* parameter, and the *DomainId* that was obtained in step 2.
4. Invoke **SamrQueryInformationDomain2** ([MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.5.1), specifying the *DomainHandle* that was obtained in step 3, and DomainServerRoleInformation for the *DomainInformationClass* parameter.
5. The value obtained in step 4 is then used for the Server Role Information ADM element. If DomainServerRolePrimary is returned, then PolicyServerRolePrimary is used; if DomainServerRoleBackup is returned, PolicyServerRoleBackup is used.
6. Call **SamrCloseHandle** ([MS-SAMR] section 3.1.5.13.1) on the handle from step 3.
7. Call **SamrCloseHandle** on the handle from step 1.

Replica Source Information and Encrypting File System (EFS) Policy Information are obsolete abstract data in this version of the protocol. However, an implementation SHOULD support this data for compatibility with previous versions of this protocol.

Audit Full Information and Quality of Service Information are obsolete abstract data in this version of the protocol. An implementation SHOULD choose not to implement this abstract data model.

A security descriptor is used during handle open for access check. The content of this security descriptor is implementation-specific, but a server MUST assign a default security descriptor. <3839>

If the responder for this protocol is a domain controller, the values of the implementation-specific instantiation of Event Auditing Options and Kerberos Policy Information abstract data MUST converge between the domain controllers in the same domain. <3940> There is no requirement on the length of time to reach convergence.

### 3.1.1.2 Accounts Rights Data Model

Account Rights is composed of two submodels, Privilege and System Access Rights. When used with account objects, they can be used separately in messages, as in LsarEnumeratePrivileges and LsarGetSystemAccessAccount, or together, as in LsarAddAccountRights. The **Name** fields in the following data models are used to identify the privilege or system access right uniquely.

#### 3.1.1.2.1 Privilege Data Model

The server MUST maintain a list of privileges that it recognizes. A privilege is defined by a language-independent human-readable name, a locally unique identifier (LUID), and a language-dependent description of the privilege. Two different privileges MUST have different names as well as different LUIDs. The list of privileges known by the server SHOULD NOT change unless a major event, such as an operating system upgrade, takes place. The set of names identifying privileges and their LUIDs MUST be the same across all servers running the same revision of the operating system.

Name	Type
Name	RPC_UNICODE_STRING

Name	Type
Locally Unique Identifier	LUID
Privilege descriptions in different languages	An array of RPC_UNICODE_STRINGS

The Name and Locally Unique Identifier pair are communicated by the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol via the LSAPR\_PRIVILEGE\_ENUM\_BUFFER structure.

Privilege Description is communicated by the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol via the LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName method.

The data model in this version of the protocol defines the privileges described in the table below. The descriptions that are provided are in English. <4041>

Name	LUID	Privilege description
SE_ASSIGNPRIMARYTOKEN_NAME "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege"	{0,3}	Replace a process-level token.
SE_AUDIT_NAME "SeAuditPrivilege"	{0,21}	Generate security audits.
SE_BACKUP_NAME "SeBackupPrivilege"	{0,17}	Back up files and directories.
SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege"	{0,23}	Bypass traverse checking.
SE_CREATE_GLOBAL_NAME "SeCreateGlobalPrivilege"	{0,30}	Create global objects.
SE_CREATE_PAGEFILE_NAME "SeCreatePagefilePrivilege"	{0,15}	Create a page file.
SE_CREATE_PERMANENT_NAME "SeCreatePermanentPrivilege"	{0,16}	Create permanent shared objects.
SE_CREATE_TOKEN_NAME "SeCreateTokenPrivilege"	{0,2}	Create a token object.
SE_DEBUG_NAME "SeDebugPrivilege"	{0,20}	Debug programs.
SE_ENABLE_DELEGATION_NAME "SeEnableDelegationPrivilege"	{0,27}	Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation.
SE_IMPERSONATE_NAME "SeImpersonatePrivilege"	{0,29}	Impersonate a client after authentication.
SE_INC_BASE_PRIORITY_NAME "SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege"	{0,14}	Increase scheduling priority.
SE_INCREASE_QUOTA_NAME "SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege"	{0,5}	Adjust memory quotas for a process.
SE_LOAD_DRIVER_NAME "SeLoadDriverPrivilege"	{0,10}	Load and unload device drivers.

Name	LUID	Privilege description
SE_LOCK_MEMORY_NAME "SeLockMemoryPrivilege"	{0,4}	Lock pages in memory.
SE_MACHINE_ACCOUNT_NAME "SeMachineAccountPrivilege"	{0,6}	Add workstations to domain.
SE_MANAGE_VOLUME_NAME "SeManageVolumePrivilege"	{0,28}	Manage the files on a volume.
SE_PROF_SINGLE_PROCESS_NAME "SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege"	{0,13}	Profile single process.
SE_REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_NAME "SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege"	{0,24}	Force shutdown from a remote system.
SE_RESTORE_NAME "SeRestorePrivilege"	{0,18}	Restore files and directories.
SE_SECURITY_NAME "SeSecurityPrivilege"	{0,8}	Manage auditing and security log.
SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME "SeShutdownPrivilege"	{0,19}	Shut down the system.
SE_SYNC_AGENT_NAME "SeSyncAgentPrivilege"	{0,26}	Synchronize <b>directory service</b> data.
SE_SYSTEM_ENVIRONMENT_NAME "SeSystemEnvironment"	{0,22}	Modify firmware environment values.
SE_SYSTEM_PROFILE_NAME "SeSystemProfilePrivilege"	{0,11}	Profile system performance.
SE_SYSTEMTIME_NAME "SeSystemtimePrivilege"	{0,12}	Change system time.
SE_TAKE_OWNERSHIP_NAME "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege"	{0,9}	Take ownership of files or other objects.
SE_TCB_NAME "SeTcbPrivilege"	{0,7}	Act as part of the operating system.
SE_UNDOCK_NAME "SeUndockPrivilege"	{0,25}	Remove computer from docking station.
SE_CREATE_SYMBOLIC_LINK_NAME "SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege"	{0,35}	Create symbolic links.
SE_INC_WORKING_SET_NAME "SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege"	{0,33}	Increase a process working set.
SE_RELABEL_NAME "SeRelabelPrivilege"	{0,32}	Modify an object label.
SE_TIME_ZONE_NAME "SeTimeZonePrivilege"	{0,34}	Change time zone.

Name	LUID	Privilege description
SE_TRUSTED_CREDMAN_ACCESS_NAME "SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege"	{0,31}	Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller.

### 3.1.1.2.2 System Access Rights Data Model

The server MUST maintain a list of system access rights that it recognizes. A system access right is identified by a bit flag and a name. The name is a human-readable form of a system access right. The flag is a representation of the same system access right for data representation.

Fields:

- Name
- Flag

Two different system accesses MUST have different names and different bit flags.

The list of system access rights that MUST be supported are specified in section 2.2.1.2.<4142>

The following table contains the string name that is associated with each system access right. The string name is used in methods that associate a system access with a particular account and that also specify the system access not by a POLICY\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS\_MODE, but by the string specified in this table.

Name	Flag
SeInteractiveLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_INTERACTIVE 0x00000001
SeNetworkLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_NETWORK 0x00000002
SeBatchLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_BATCH 0x00000004
SeServiceLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_SERVICE 0x00000010
SeDenyInteractiveLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_DENY_INTERACTIVE 0x00000040
SeDenyNetworkLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_DENY_NETWORK 0x00000080
SeDenyBatchLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_DENY_BATCH 0x00000100
SeDenyServiceLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_DENY_SERVICE 0x00000200
SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_REMOTE_INTERACTIVE 0x00000400
SeDenyRemoteInteractiveLogonRight	POLICY_MODE_DENY_REMOTE_INTERACTIVE 0x00000800



### 3.1.1.3 Account Object Data Model

Inside the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol database, the account object MUST be represented by four pieces of data as follows.

Name	Type
Security Identifier (Public)	RPC_SID
Security Descriptor	LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR
Privileges (Public)	LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET
System Access Rights	unsigned int with combination of POLICY_SYSTEM_ACCESS_MODE flags

The **Security Identifier** field identifies the account object and MUST be present. Two different account objects MUST NOT have the same security identifier (SID). The **Security Identifier** field MUST be read-only. Any valid SID can be used to identify an account object.

The **Security Descriptor** field controls access to the account object. Every account object in the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol database MUST have a valid security descriptor. The security descriptor can be queried by calling the LsarQuerySecurityObject method and changed by calling the LsarSetSecurityObject method. The server MUST assign a default security descriptor to every newly created account object, even if the client did not specify a default value. <4243>

The **Privileges** field is a potentially empty set of "global" rights granted to the account by the server. Every "right" in the set is a pair of a LUIDs and a bitmask of attributes. The right can be controlled by calling the LsarAddAccountRights, LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount, LsarRemoveAccountRights, and LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount methods. Because there are no "negative" rights, the order of rights in the set is not relevant and the server MUST NOT associate any special semantics with the order of rights.

The **System Access Rights** field is a bitmask of flags indicating the system access of the account.

This field can be set to 0.

If the responder for this protocol is a domain controller, the values of the implementation-specific instantiation of this abstract data model MUST converge between the domain controller in the same domain. <4344> There is no requirement on the length of time to reach convergence.

### 3.1.1.4 Secret Object Data Model

Inside the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol database, a secret object is represented by the following pieces of data.

Name	Type	Attribute name
Name	RPC_UNICODE_STRING	ldapDisplayName ([MS-ADA1] section 2.356)
Security Descriptor	LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR	securityIdentifier ([MS-ADA3] section 2.237)
Old Set Time	LARGE_INTEGER	priorSetTime ([MS-ADA3] section 2.159)
Old Value	binary data	priorValue ([MS-ADA3] section 2.160)
New Set Time	LARGE_INTEGER	lastSetTime ([MS-ADA1] section 2.353)

Name	Type	Attribute name
New Value	binary data	currentValue ([MS-ADA1] section 2.139)

The **Name** field uniquely identifies the secret by using a Unicode string. Two different secrets MUST have different names (the comparison is case-sensitive). The **Name** field MUST be read-only. To be considered valid, the length of the name in bytes MUST be even; it MUST be greater than 0 and less than 0x101. The secret name MUST NOT contain the "\" character. Special values of the **Name** field indicate secret types. The different secret types are as follows:

- Global
- Local
- Trusted Domain
- System

The following rules govern secret type assignments.

The term "starts with" literally means "must have a nonzero number of characters following the prefix". Names consisting of only a reserved prefix are invalid.

The following table indicates the secret name pattern and the associated secret type.

Secret name or name pattern	Type of secret
Starts with "G\$\$"	Trusted domain
Starts with "G\$"	Global
Starts with "L\$"	Local
Starts with "M\$"	System
Starts with "_sc_"	System
Starts with "NL\$"	System
Starts with "RasDialParams"	Local
Starts with "RasCredentials"	Local
Equal to "\$MACHINE.ACC"	System
Equal to "SAC"	Local
Equal to "SAI"	Local
Equal to "SANSC"	Local

The type of a secret defines the access and availability boundary for a given secret object.

System Secret: Cannot be accessed by any clients.

Local Secret: Can be accessed only by a client that is on the same machine as the server.

Global Secret: Replicates between domain controllers in the same domain, allowing each domain controller to be able to respond to secret requests of this type.

Trusted Domain Secret: Used with trusted domain objects to store trust passwords. Trusted domain secrets also replicate between domain controllers in the same domain. <4445>

The security descriptor field controls access to the secret object. Every secret object in the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol database that has Local Secret type MUST have a valid security descriptor. The security descriptor of Local Secret objects can be queried by calling the LsarQuerySecurityObject (section 3.1.4.9.1) method and changed by calling the LsarSetSecurityObject (section 3.1.4.9.2) method. The server MUST assign a default security descriptor to every newly created secret object, even if the client did not specify a default value. <4546>

The value of a secret is a byte BLOB. Depending on the caller's choices, the server stores 0, 1, or 2 values for the secret, the 2 values being "current" and "previous" and 1 value being either "current" or "previous". Both versions of the secret's value are accompanied by a 64-bit time stamp in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), sometimes referred to as Greenwich Mean Time, in units of 100 nanoseconds since January 1, 1601.

### 3.1.1.5 Trusted Domain Object Data Model

An implementer must read [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6 to understand the role of trusts in Active Directory and to understand the data model in this specification.

Inside the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol database, a trusted domain object (TDO) is represented by the following table. Each abstract data field listed in the Name column of the table contains a link to the appropriate section in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7. See these sections for detailed information, including how each abstract data field is mapped to an Active Directory attribute. The Type column lists the data type for its corresponding abstract data field. The Attribute Name column lists the ldapDisplayName and a link to the appropriate section in [MS-ADA1], [MS-ADA2], or [MS-ADA3] for the corresponding abstract data field stored in Active Directory.

Name	Type	Attribute name
Name ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.13)	RPC_UNICODE_STRING	trustPartner ([MS-ADA3] section 2.325)
Flat Name ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.1)	RPC_UNICODE_STRING	flatName ([MS-ADA1] section 2.232)
Security Identifier ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.8)	RPC_SID	securityIdentifier ([MS-ADA3] section 2.237)
Trust Type ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.15)	unsigned int (as specified in section 2.2.7.9 TrustType)	trustType ([MS-ADA3] section 2.327)
Trust Direction ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.12)	unsigned int (as specified in section 2.2.7.9 TrustDirection)	trustDirection ([MS-ADA3] section 2.323)
Trust Attributes ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.9)	unsigned int (as specified in section 2.2.7.9 TrustAttributes)	trustAttributes ([MS-ADA3] section 2.320)
Posix Offset ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.14)	TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO	trustPosixOffset ([MS-ADA3] section 2.326)
Trust Incoming Passwords ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.10)	Array of LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION	trustAuthIncoming ([MS-ADA3] section 2.321)

Name	Type	Attribute name
Trust Outgoing Passwords ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.11)	Array of LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION	trustAuthOutgoing ([MS-ADA3] section 2.322)
Supported Encryption Types ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.3)	TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES	msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes ([MS-ADA2] section 2.458463)
Forest Trust Information ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.4)	LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION	msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo ([MS-ADA2] section 2.470478)
Security Descriptor ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.7.5)	LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR	nTSecurityDescriptor ([MS-ADA3] section 2.37)

The following citation contains a timeline of when each information value was introduced. <4647>

### 3.1.1.6 Configuration Settings

#### 3.1.1.6.1 Block Anonymous Access to Objects

Name	Type
LsaRestrictAnonymous	Boolean

The LsaRestrictAnonymous setting is used to restrict the ability of anonymous requestors to query or modify security-sensitive data. <4748> See sections 3.1.4.4.1, 3.1.4.5.1, 3.1.4.5.2, 3.1.4.5.3, 3.1.4.5.10, 3.1.4.5.12, 3.1.4.6.1, 3.1.4.6.2, and 3.1.4.6.6 for information on how message processing is affected with this setting. The server message-processing behavior MUST always reflect the current value of this setting.

This setting MUST be persisted across protocol and system restarts.

#### 3.1.1.7 LsaContextHandle Data Model

This protocol is based largely on the use of RPC context handles to maintain session state between the client and the server. The basic context-handle programming model is described in [C706] section 6.1.6. Also see sections 3.2.3.1.9 and 3.3.1.4.1 in [MS-RPCE].

The server MUST maintain the following data elements for each context handle that is returned to a client.

Name	Type
GrantedAccess	ACCESS_MASK
HandleType	HandleType MUST be one of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Policy</li> <li>▪ Account</li> <li>▪ Secret</li> </ul>

Name	Type
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="391 201 613 226">▪ Trusted Domain</li> </ul>
Object	A reference to an object in the database that has the type specified in HandleType.

### 3.1.1.8 Attribute Listing

The following attributes are referenced by this protocol (listed by ldapDisplayName). For a normative description of the syntax, see [MS-ADA1], [MS-ADA2], and [MS-ADA3].

- currentValue
- flatName
- lastSetTime
- ldapDisplayName
- msDS-AllUsersTrustQuota
- msDS-PerUserTrustQuota
- msDS-PerUserTrustTombstonesQuota
- msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
- msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo
- priorSetTime
- priorValue
- securityIdentifier
- trustAuthIncoming
- trustAuthOutgoing
- trustDirection
- trustPartner
- trustPosixOffset
- trustType
- unicodePwd

### 3.1.1.9 Object Class Listing

The following classes are referenced by this protocol (listed by ldapDisplayName). For a normative description of these classes, see [MS-ADSC].

- secret
- trustedDomain

### 3.1.1.10 Access for Public Abstract Data Model Elements

As described in section 3.1.1, direct access (query or set) of data elements tagged as "(Public)" MUST use the same authorization policies, enforced as if the elements were being accessed via the RPC-based protocol methods in this document. The calling patterns described in section 1.3 provide an overview for understanding the basic flow of the query and set patterns. Section 3.1.1.10.1 provides detailed examples for the Policy Object Data Model (section 3.1.1.1); the other object types use similar patterns.

The following table describes the level of access that MUST be enforced during direct access of the described public ADM elements.

Object type	DesiredAccess required for Query pattern	DesiredAccess required for Set pattern
Policy (section 3.1.1.1)	POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION   POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION   POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION   READ_CONTROL	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN   POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT   POLICY_CREATE_SECRET   POLICY_CREATE_PRIVILEGE   POLICY_SET_DEFAULT_QUOTA_LIMITS   POLICY_SET_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS   POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_ADMIN   POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN   READ_CONTROL
Account (section 3.1.1.3)	ACCOUNT_VIEW   READ_CONTROL	ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_QUOTAS   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_SYSTEM_ACCESS   READ_CONTROL
Secret (section 3.1.1.4)	SECRET_QUERY_VALUE   READ_CONTROL	SECRET_SET_VALUE   READ_CONTROL
TrustedDomain (section 3.1.1.5)	TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME   READ_CONTROL	TRUSTED_SET_CONTROLLERS   TRUSTED_SET_POSIX   READ_CONTROL

#### 3.1.1.10.1 Example Patterns for Direct Access of Policy Object ADM Elements

##### 3.1.1.10.1.1 Query Pattern for Policy Object ADM

Direct querying of any of the (Public) ADM elements listed in section 3.1.1 MUST be performed as follows:

1. The client MUST invoke LsarOpenPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.1), specifying NULL for the *SystemName* parameter and POLICY\_VIEW\_AUDIT\_INFORMATION | POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION | POLICY\_GET\_PRIVATE\_INFORMATION | READ\_CONTROL for the *DesiredAccess* parameter.
2. The client MUST invoke LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.3), specifying the policy handle obtained in step 1 for the *PolicyHandle* parameter and PolicyDnsDomainInformation for the *InformationClass* parameter.
3. The client MUST invoke LsarClose (section 3.1.4.9.4), specifying the policy handle obtained in step 1 for the *ObjectHandle* parameter.
4. The ADM elements of interest are then read from the **LSAPR\_POLICY\_INFORMATION.PolicyDnsDomainInfo** structure (section 2.2.4.14) that was returned in step 2.

### 3.1.1.10.1.2 Set Pattern for Policy Object ADM

Direct setting of any of the (Public) ADM elements listed in section 3.1.1 MUST be performed as follows:

1. The client MUST invoke LsarOpenPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.1), specifying NULL for the *SystemName* parameter and POLICY\_TRUST\_ADMIN | POLICY\_CREATE\_ACCOUNT | POLICY\_CREATE\_SECRET | POLICY\_CREATE\_PRIVILEGE | POLICY\_SET\_DEFAULT\_QUOTA\_LIMITS | POLICY\_SET\_AUDIT\_REQUIREMENTS | POLICY\_AUDIT\_LOG\_ADMIN | POLICY\_SERVER\_ADMIN | READ\_CONTROL for the *DesiredAccess* parameter.
2. The client MUST invoke LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.3), specifying the policy handle obtained in step 1 for the *PolicyHandle* parameter and PolicyDnsDomainInformation for the *InformationClass* parameter.
3. The client MUST set the ADM elements of interest in the **LSAPR\_POLICY\_INFORMATION.PolicyDnsDomainInfo** structure (section 2.2.4.14) that was returned in step 2 to the desired new values, leaving the remaining elements unmodified.
4. The client MUST invoke LsarSetInformationPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.5), specifying the policy handle obtained in step 1 for the *PolicyHandle* parameter.
5. The client MUST invoke LsarClose (section 3.1.4.9.4), specifying the policy handle obtained in step 1 for the *ObjectHandle* parameter.

### 3.1.2 Timers

No protocol timers are required other than those internal ones used in RPC to implement resiliency to network outages, as specified in [MS-RPCE].

### 3.1.3 Initialization

The server MUST start listening on the well-known named pipe for the RPC interface, as specified in section 2.1.

The **ComputerNetBIOSName** element (specified in section 3.1.1.1) MUST be copied into the **DomainName** field in Account Domain Information (also specified in section 3.1.1.1).

### 3.1.4 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

This section contains detailed information about each protocol message and the steps taken by the server to process caller requests. <48><49><50><51>

Methods in RPC Opnum Order

Method	Description
LsarClose	This method closes an open handle. Opnum: 0
Opnum1NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 1
LsarEnumeratePrivileges	This method is invoked to enumerate all privileges known to the system. Opnum: 2
LsarQuerySecurityObject	This method is invoked to query security information that is assigned to a database object. It returns the security descriptor of the object. Opnum: 3

<b>Method</b>	<b>Description</b>
LsarSetSecurityObject	This method is invoked to set a security descriptor on an object. Opnum: 4
Opnum5NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 5
LsarOpenPolicy	This method is exactly the same as LsarOpenPolicy2, except that the <i>SystemName</i> parameter in this function, because of its syntactic definition, contains only one character instead of a full string. Opnum: 6
LsarQueryInformationPolicy	This method is invoked to query values representing the server's information policy. Opnum: 7
LsarSetInformationPolicy	This method is invoked to set some policy on the server. Opnum: 8
Opnum9NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 9
LsarCreateAccount	This method is invoked to create a new account object in the server's database. Opnum: 10
LsarEnumerateAccounts	This method is invoked to request a list of account objects in the server's database. Opnum: 11
LsarCreateTrustedDomain	This method is invoked to create an object of type trusted domain in the server's database. Opnum: 12
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains	This method is invoked to request a list of TDOs in the server's database. Opnum: 13
Lsar_LSA_TM_14	Opnum: 14
Lsar_LSA_TM_15	Opnum: 15
LsarCreateSecret	This method is invoked to create a new secret object in the server's database. Opnum: 16
LsarOpenAccount	This method is invoked to obtain a handle to an account object. Opnum: 17
LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount	This method is invoked to retrieve a list of privileges granted to an account on the server. Opnum: 18
LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount	This method is invoked to add new privileges to an existing account object. Opnum: 19
LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount	This method is invoked to remove privileges from an account object. Opnum: 20
Opnum21NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 21



<b>Method</b>	<b>Description</b>
Opnum22NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 22
LsarGetSystemAccessAccount	This method is invoked to retrieve system access account flags for an account object. Opnum: 23
LsarSetSystemAccessAccount	This method is invoked to set system access account flags for an account object. Opnum: 24
LsarOpenTrustedDomain	This method is invoked to obtain a handle to a TDO. Opnum: 25
LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain	This method is invoked to retrieve information on a TDO. Opnum: 26
LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain	This method is invoked to set information on a TDO. Opnum: 27
LsarOpenSecret	This method is invoked to obtain a handle to an existing secret object. Opnum: 28
LsarSetSecret	This method is invoked to set the current and old values of the secret object. Opnum: 29
LsarQuerySecret	This method is invoked to retrieve the current and old (or previous) value of the secret object. Opnum: 30
LsarLookupPrivilegeValue	This method is invoked to map the name of a privilege into the LUID by which the privilege is known on the server. Opnum: 31
LsarLookupPrivilegeName	This method is invoked to map the LUID of a privilege into the string name by which the privilege is known on the server. Opnum: 32
LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName	This method is invoked to map the name of a privilege into a display text string in the caller's language. Opnum: 33
LsarDeleteObject	This method is invoked to delete an open account, secret, or TDO. Opnum: 34
LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight	This method is invoked to return a list of account objects that have the user right equal to the passed-in value. Opnum: 35
LsarEnumerateAccountRights	This method is invoked to retrieve a list of rights that are associated with an existing account. Opnum: 36
LsarAddAccountRights	This method is invoked to add new rights to an account object. Opnum: 37
LsarRemoveAccountRights	This method is invoked to remove rights from an account object. Opnum: 38

<b>Method</b>	<b>Description</b>
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo	This method is invoked to retrieve information on a TDO. Opnum: 39
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo	This method is invoked to set information on a TDO. Opnum: 40
LsarDeleteTrustedDomain	This method is invoked to delete a TDO. Opnum: 41
LsarStorePrivateData	This method is invoked to store a secret value. Opnum: 42
LsarRetrievePrivateData	This method is invoked to retrieve a secret value. Opnum: 43
LsarOpenPolicy2	This method opens a context handle to the RPC server. Opnum: 44
Lsar_LSA_TM_45	Opnum: 45
LsarQueryInformationPolicy2	This method is identical to LsarQueryInformationPolicy. Opnum: 46
LsarSetInformationPolicy2	This method is identical to LsarSetInformationPolicy. Opnum: 47
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName	This method is invoked to retrieve information on a TDO by its string name. Opnum: 48
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName	This method is invoked to set information on a TDO by its string name. Opnum: 49
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	This method is invoked to enumerate TDOs in the server's database. Opnum: 50
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx	This method is invoked to create a new TDO. Opnum: 51
Opnum52NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 52
LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy	This method is invoked to retrieve policy settings pertaining to the current domain. Opnum: 53
LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy	This method is invoked to change policy settings pertaining to the current domain. Opnum: 54
LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName	This method is invoked to open a TDO handle by supplying the name of the trusted domain. Opnum: 55
Opnum56NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 56
Lsar_LSA_TM_57	Opnum: 57
Lsar_LSA_TM_58	Opnum: 58

Method	Description
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2	This method is invoked to create a new TDO. Opnum: 59
Opnum60NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 60
Opnum61NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 61
Opnum62NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 62
Opnum63NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 63
Opnum64NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 64
Opnum65NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 65
Opnum66NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 66
Opnum67NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 67
Lsar_LSA_TM_68	Opnum: 68
Opnum69NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 69
Opnum70NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 70
Opnum71NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 71
Opnum72NotUsedOnWire	Opnum: 72
LsarQueryForestTrustInformation	This method is invoked to retrieve information on a trust relationship with another forest. Opnum: 73
LsarSetForestTrustInformation	This method is invoked to establish a trust relationship with another forest by attaching a set of records called the forest trust information to the TDO. Opnum: 74

The following citation contains a timeline of when each method value was introduced. <[5152](#)>

**Note** Gaps in the opnum numbering sequence represent opnums of methods that are specified in [MS-LSAT], or opnums that MUST NOT be used over the wire. <[5253](#)>

**Note** Exceptions MUST NOT be thrown beyond those thrown by the underlying RPC protocol (as specified in [MS-RPCE]), unless otherwise specified.

The return values of all methods MUST conform to the specification of NTSTATUS, as specified in [MS-ERREF] section 2.3. Specific return values for normative processing conditions are specified in this document in the subsections of this section.

Unless otherwise specified, all negative values returned by an implementation are treated equivalently by the client as a message processing error. Unless otherwise specified, all non-negative values returned by an implementation are treated equivalently by the client as a success (of message processing).

Return values for implementation-specific conditions are left to the implementer's discretion, subject to the constraints specified in [MS-ERREF]. For example, an implementation [may](#) re-use an existing value in [MS-ERREF], such as 0xC0000017 (no memory).

All methods in this protocol MUST perform data validation (as specified in section 3.1.4.10) for all parameters that are specified as input parameters. If data validation fails for some reason, processing MUST end, and the server MUST respond back with a failure.

In the following sections, the first general idea behind the common operations is explained in sections 3.1.4.1, 3.1.4.2, and 3.1.4.3. The methods are grouped by functionality: policies, accounts, secrets, trusted domains, privileges, and common object methods. Section 3.1.4.10 explains the data validation rules.

### 3.1.4.1 Obtaining Handles

The Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol recognizes four types of handles: Policy, Account, Secret, and Trusted Domain. A handle of each type can be obtained only by calling one of a well-defined set of methods. These handles are listed in the following table.

Handle type	Methods that return this type of handle
Policy	LsarOpenPolicy LsarOpenPolicy2
Account	LsarCreateAccount LsarOpenAccount
Secret	LsarCreateSecret LsarOpenSecret
Trusted Domain	LsarCreateTrustedDomain LsarOpenTrustedDomain LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2

The server MUST keep track of all handles of each type that every caller opens, from the moment of creation until the handle has been closed (by calling LsarClose or LsarDeleteObject) or until the client disconnects.

Upon receipt of a handle parameter, the server MUST check to see that the handle is one of the valid handles of a type relevant for that operation; if the handle is not valid, the server MUST fail the request by returning STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE.

The RPC protocol provides a mechanism to clean up any resources related to a context handle if a client that is holding the context handle exits, dies, disconnects, or reboots. See section 3.1.6.1 for this protocol's context handle rundown specification.

### 3.1.4.2 Access Rights and Access Checks

Methods in this protocol perform one or more of the access checks that are specified in the following sections.

Access check (section)	Methods that use it
3.1.4.2.1	<b>LsarOpenPolicy</b> <b>LsarOpenPolicy2</b> <b>LsarCreateAccount</b> <b>LsarOpenAccount</b> <b>LsarCreateSecret</b>

Access check (section)	Methods that use it
	<b>LsarOpenSecret</b> <b>LsarCreateTrustedDomain</b> <b>LsarOpenTrustedDomain</b> <b>LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx</b> <b>LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName</b> <b>LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2</b>
3.1.4.2.2	<b>LsarQueryInformationPolicy2</b> <b>LsarQueryInformationPolicy</b> <b>LsarSetInformationPolicy2</b> <b>LsarSetInformationPolicy</b> <b>LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy</b> <b>LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy</b> <b>LsarCreateAccount</b> <b>LsarEnumerateAccounts</b> <b>LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount</b> <b>LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount</b> <b>LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount</b> <b>LsarGetSystemAccessAccount</b> <b>LsarSetSystemAccessAccount</b> <b>LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight</b> <b>LsarEnumerateAccountRights</b> <b>LsarAddAccountRights</b> <b>LsarRemoveAccountRights</b> <b>LsarCreateSecret</b> <b>LsarSetSecret</b> <b>LsarQuerySecret</b> <b>LsarStorePrivateData</b> <b>LsarRetrievePrivateData</b> <b>LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo</b> <b>LsarDeleteTrustedDomain</b> <b>LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName</b> <b>LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx</b> <b>LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains</b> <b>LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain</b> <b>LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain</b> <b>LsarEnumeratePrivileges</b> <b>LsarLookupPrivilegeValue</b> <b>LsarLookupPrivilegeName</b> <b>LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName</b> <b>LsarQuerySecurityObject</b> <b>LsarSetSecurityObject</b> <b>LsarDeleteObject</b>
3.1.4.2.3	<b>LsarOpenPolicy2</b> <b>LsarOpenPolicy</b> <b>LsarCreateAccount</b> <b>LsarEnumerateAccounts</b> <b>LsarOpenAccount</b>

Access check (section)	Methods that use it
	<b>LsarEnumerateAccountRights</b> <b>LsarRemoveAccountRights</b> <b>LsarCreateSecret</b> <b>LsarOpenSecret</b> <b>LsarRetrievePrivateData</b>

### 3.1.4.2.1 Access Checks Applied on Handle Open

When opening a handle, the server MUST associate with it a set of ACCESS\_MASK bits, as defined in section 2.2.1.1. These access bits control which type of subsequent operations the caller can perform with this handle.

All methods that open handles (as specified in section 3.1.4.1) allow the caller to specify a "desired access" bitmask. The meaning of the bits within this bitmask depends on the type of object. The bits are documented in sections 2.2.1.1.1, 2.2.1.1.2, 2.2.1.1.3, 2.2.1.1.4, and 2.2.1.1.5. All methods that open handles (as specified in section 3.1.4.1) perform an access check based on the desired access mask, whose general form is:

```

IF (method specific check fails) THEN
    Return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
END IF
IF (security descriptor check fails) THEN
    Return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
END IF

```

The method-specific checks are detailed in the sections for individual methods that open handles. The security-descriptor check is performed by using the Access Check Algorithm Pseudocode ([MS-DTYP] section 2.5.3.2). For this protocol, the input parameters of that algorithm are mapped as follows:

- *SecurityDescriptor*: The security descriptor of the object to which the handle is being opened, as specified in section 3.1.1.
- *Token*: This MUST be the token ([MS-DTYP] section 2.5.2) of the client, obtained by invoking GetRpcImpersonationAccessToken(NULL). The **GetRpcImpersonationAccessToken** interface is specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3.3.3.4.3.1.
- *Access Request mask*: The *DesiredAccess* parameter of the method being invoked, or the *DesiredAccess* value specified in the method description.
- *Object Tree*: This parameter MUST be NULL.
- *PrincipalSelfSubst SID*: This parameter MUST be NULL.
- *GrantedAccess*: The value returned by this parameter MUST be stored in a local variable *LocalGrantedAccess* (of type ACCESS\_MASK).

In the case that the access check is successful, the server MUST NOT grant more access bits than the caller has asked for, but MUST grant only those access bits that the client has explicitly requested. The caller is permitted to request the maximum access permitted by the server by specifying the special constant MAXIMUM\_ALLOWED, as specified in section 2.2.1.1.1.

If *DesiredAccess* contains the MAXIMUM\_ALLOWED bit, the server MUST create and return an LsaContextHandle (section 3.1.1.7) via the method's LSAPR\_HANDLE\* output parameter, with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Policy", "Account", "Secret", or "Trusted Domain", depending on the type of the database object
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the database object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = *LocalGrantedAccess*

If *DesiredAccess* does not contain the MAXIMUM\_ALLOWED bit, the following constraint MUST be satisfied:

- If *DesiredAccess* contains bits that are not in *GrantedAccess*, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED. Otherwise, the server MUST create and return an LsaContextHandle (section 3.1.1.7) via the method's LSAPR\_HANDLE\* output parameter, with its fields initialized as follows:
  - LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Policy", "Account", "Secret", or "Trusted Domain", depending on the type of the database object
  - LsaContextHandle.Object = the database object
  - LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = *DesiredAccess*

The server MUST NOT allow the caller to add more access bits to the handle in a subsequent operation. In order to obtain more access, a new handle must be obtained.

### 3.1.4.2.2 Access Checks Applied for Object Operations

Each method that consumes a handle requires that certain access bits be set on the handle, which is defined as *RequiredAccess* for the purposes of this specification, and returns STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED according to the pseudocode shown below, if necessary. The required bits vary on a per-method basis and might depend on method arguments. Therefore, the value of *RequiredAccess* is specified on a per-method basis in sections 3.1.4.4, 3.1.4.5, 3.1.4.6, 3.1.4.7, 3.1.4.8, and 3.1.4.9.

```
IF (any bit set in RequiredAccess is not set in LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess) THEN
    Return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
END IF
```

For example, if a method-processing rule specifies a required access bit of POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION, the server MUST check that this bit is set in the granted access field on the context handle. If the check is unsuccessful, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

### 3.1.4.2.3 Determining If Requestors Are Anonymous

```
procedure IsRequestorAnonymous() : boolean
```

The IsRequestorAnonymous procedure returns TRUE if the requestor is anonymous. On entrance:

- AnonymousSid: This MUST be the ANONYMOUS SID as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.2.4.
- RpcImpersonationAccessToken: This MUST be the token ([MS-DTYP] section 2.5.2) of the client, obtained by invoking the **GetRpcImpersonationAccessToken** interface as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3.3.3.4.3.1, specifying NULL for *Input Parameter*.

```
Return RpcImpersonationAccessToken.Sids[RpcImpersonationAccessToken.UserIndex] equals
AnonymousSid
```

### 3.1.4.3 Closing Handles

A handle of any type can be closed by calling LsarClose. Successful calls to LsarDeleteObject, which deletes an object to which the caller has an open handle, MUST also close the handle. The fact that a handle is closed is communicated to the **RPC transport** by returning a NULL value in the handle parameter, as specified in [C706] section 5.1.6.

Closing one handle MUST NOT affect any other handle on the server; that is, handles obtained using a policy handle MUST continue to be valid after that policy handle is closed.

### 3.1.4.4 Policy Object Methods

The message processing of methods in this section MUST use the abstract data model defined in section 3.1.1.1.

Method (opnum)	Summary
LsarOpenPolicy2 (opnum 44)	Opens a context handle to the RPC server.
LsarOpenPolicy (opnum 6)	Superseded by LsarOpenPolicy2.
LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 (opnum 46)	Obtains information from the policy object.
LsarQueryInformationPolicy (opnum 7)	Obtains information from the policy object.
LsarSetInformationPolicy2 (opnum 47)	Sets information on the policy object.
LsarSetInformationPolicy (opnum 8)	Sets information on the policy object.
LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy (opnum 53)	Obtains information from the policy object pertaining to the domain.
LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy (opnum 54)	Sets information on the policy object pertaining to the domain.

#### 3.1.4.4.1 LsarOpenPolicy2 (Opnum 44)

The LsarOpenPolicy2 method opens a context handle to the RPC server. This is the first function that MUST be called to contact the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol database.

```
NTSTATUS LsarOpenPolicy2(  
    [in, unique, string] wchar_t* SystemName,  
    [in] PLSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,  
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,  
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* PolicyHandle  
);
```

**SystemName:** This parameter does not have any effect on message processing in any environment. It MUST be ignored on receipt.

**ObjectAttributes:** This parameter does not have any effect on message processing in any environment. All fields MUST [5354](#) be ignored except **RootDirectory** which MUST be NULL.

**DesiredAccess:** An ACCESS\_MASK value that specifies the requested access rights that MUST be granted on the returned PolicyHandle if the request is successful.

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle (as specified in section 2.2.2.1) that represents a reference to the abstract data model of a policy object, as specified in section 3.1.1.1.



**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing below.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied parameters is incorrect. For example, this can happen when <i>ObjectAttributes</i> is NULL or <i>DesiredAccess</i> is zero.

Processing:

*DesiredAccess*: A bitmask specifying the access that the caller attempts to obtain on the policy object, which is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.1. The method-specific portion of the check is the following:

```
LET serverInfo be a SERVER_INFO_101 structure
CALL ServerGetInfo(101, &serverInfo)
LET isDomainController be a boolean initialized to FALSE
IF (serverInfo.svl01_version_type & (SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL | SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL)) THEN
    Set isDomainController equal to TRUE
END IF

IF ((isDomainController equals FALSE) and (IsRequestorAnonymous() and LsaRestrictAnonymous is
set to TRUE)) THEN
    Return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
END IF
```

SERVER\_INFO\_101, SV\_TYPE\_DOMAIN\_CTRL, and SV\_TYPE\_DOMAIN\_BACKCTRL are specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.3.12. The ServerGetInfo procedure is specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.6. The valid account-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.2, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.1. The IsRequestorAnonymous procedure is specified in section 3.1.4.2.3.

*PolicyHandle*: If the request is successful, the server MUST create and return a context handle (section 3.1.1.7) via *PolicyHandle*, with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Policy"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the policy object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

The return value MUST be set to STATUS\_SUCCESS in this case.

### 3.1.4.4.2 LsarOpenPolicy (Opnum 6)

The LsarOpenPolicy method is exactly the same as LsarOpenPolicy2, except that the *SystemName* parameter in this function, because of its syntactic definition, contains only one character instead of a full string. This *SystemName* parameter does not have any effect on message processing in any environment. It MUST be ignored.

```
NTSTATUS LsarOpenPolicy(
    [in, unique] wchar_t* SystemName,
    [in] PLSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* PolicyHandle
```

);

**SystemName:** This parameter does not have any effect on message processing in any environment. It MUST be ignored on receipt.

**ObjectAttributes:** This parameter does not have any effect on message processing in any environment. All fields MUST<5455> be ignored except **RootDirectory**, which MUST be NULL.

**DesiredAccess:** An ACCESS\_MASK value that specifies the requested access rights that MUST be granted on the returned PolicyHandle, if the request is successful.

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle (as specified in section 2.2.2.1) that represents a reference to the abstract data model of a policy object, as specified in section 3.1.1.1.

Processing:

The processing is the same as for LsarOpenPolicy2. LsarOpenPolicy2 supersedes this message and MUST be used when possible.

### 3.1.4.4.3 LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 (Opnum 46)

The LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 method is invoked to query values that represent the server's security policy.

```
NTSTATUS LsarQueryInformationPolicy2(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,  
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]  
        PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION* PolicyInformation  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**InformationClass:** A parameter that specifies what type of information the caller is requesting.

**PolicyInformation:** A parameter that references policy information structure on return.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing below.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC000009A STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	There are insufficient resources to complete the request.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform the operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters is incorrect. For instance, this can happen if <i>InformationClass</i> is out of range or if <i>PolicyInformation</i> is NULL.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

*PolicyHandle* MUST be a handle to an open policy object, and *PolicyHandle.HandleType* MUST equal "Policy"; otherwise, STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE MUST be returned.

The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following table specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check for each *InformationClass* value or indicates if no processing is supported, regardless of access granted.

InformationClass value	RequiredAccess value
PolicyAuditLogInformation	POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION
PolicyAuditEventsInformation	POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION
PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyPdAccountInformation	POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION
PolicyAccountDomainInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyReplicaSourceInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyModificationInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be queried. The request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyAuditFullSetInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be queried. The request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation	POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION
PolicyDnsDomainInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION

The *InformationClass* parameter can take on any value in the POLICY\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration range. For all values outside this range, the server MUST return a STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER error code.

*PolicyInformation* is an output parameter. The server MUST fill it in with the information requested by the client, based on the value of the *InformationClass* parameter and the abstract data model specified in section 3.1.1.1, as follows.

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information returned to caller from abstract data model
PolicyAuditLogInformation	Auditing Log Information
PolicyAuditEventsInformation	Event Auditing Options
PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation	Primary Domain Information
PolicyPdAccountInformation	MUST return an LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO information structure, its <b>Name</b> member being an RPC_UNICODE_STRING with <b>Length</b> set to 0 and <b>Buffer</b> initialized to NULL.
PolicyAccountDomainInformation	On non-domain controllers: Account Domain On domain controller: Primary Domain Information
PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation	Server Role Information

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information returned to caller from abstract data model
PolicyReplicaSourceInformation	Replica Source Information
PolicyModificationInformation	MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
PolicyAuditFullSetInformation	MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation	Audit Full Information< <a href="#">5556</a> >
PolicyDnsDomainInformation	DNS Domain Information< <a href="#">5657</a> >
PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt	DNS Domain Information
PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation	AccountDomainInformation

### 3.1.4.4.4 LsarQueryInformationPolicy (Opnum 7)

The LsarQueryInformationPolicy method is invoked to query values that represent the server's information policy.

```

NTSTATUS LsarQueryInformationPolicy(
[in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
[in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
[out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
    PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION* PolicyInformation
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**InformationClass:** A parameter that specifies what type of information the caller is requesting.

**PolicyInformation:** A parameter that references policy information structure on return.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing below.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC000009A STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	There are insufficient resources to complete the request.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform the operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters is incorrect. For instance, this can happen if <i>InformationClass</i> is out of range or if <i>PolicyInformation</i> is NULL.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message MUST be processed in an identical manner to LsarQueryInformationPolicy2.

### 3.1.4.4.5 LsarSetInformationPolicy2 (Opnum 47)

The LsarSetInformationPolicy2 method is invoked to set a policy on the server.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetInformationPolicy2(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,  
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]  
        PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION PolicyInformation  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**InformationClass:** A parameter that specifies what type of information the caller is setting.

**PolicyInformation:** Data that represents policy being set.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters is incorrect. For instance, this can happen if <i>InformationClass</i> is not supported or some of the supplied policy data is invalid.
0xC0000002 STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED	This information class cannot be set.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

*PolicyHandle* MUST reference a context that was granted an access commensurate with the *InformationClass* value requested. If *PolicyHandle* is not a valid context handle or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. If the context does not have sufficient access, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following table specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check for each *InformationClass* value or indicates if no processing is supported, regardless of access granted.

InformationClass value	RequiredAccess value
PolicyAuditLogInformation	POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_ADMIN
PolicyAuditEventsInformation	POLICY_SET_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS
PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN

InformationClass value	RequiredAccess value
PolicyPdAccountInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be set; the request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyAccountDomainInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be set; the request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation	POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN
PolicyReplicaSourceInformation	POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN
PolicyModificationInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be set; the request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyAuditFullSetInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be set; the request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation	Not applicable: This information class cannot be set; the request MUST fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
PolicyDnsDomainInformation	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN
PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN
PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN

The *InformationClass* parameter can take on any value in the POLICY\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration range. For all values outside this range, the server MUST return the STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER error code.

The *PolicyInformation* parameter contains the data that the caller wishes to set, based on the value of the *InformationClass* parameter. The server MUST update its abstract data model, specified in section 3.1.1.1, as follows.

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information updated in abstract data model
PolicyAuditLogInformation	Server MUST return the STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED error code because this is not a policy element that can be set.
PolicyAuditEventsInformation	Event Auditing Options.
PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation	Primary Domain Information.
PolicyPdAccountInformation	Server MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER because this is not a policy element that can be set.
PolicyAccountDomainInformation	On a domain controller, the server MUST fail this request with the STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER. On non-domain controllers: Account Domain Information.
PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation	Server Role Information.
PolicyReplicaSourceInformation	Replica Source Information.
PolicyModificationInformation	Server MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER because this is not a policy element that can be set.
PolicyAuditFullSetInformation	<b>ShutDownOnFull</b> field of Audit Full Information. <5758>
PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation	Server MUST record STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER because this is not a policy element that can be set.

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information updated in abstract data model
PolicyDnsDomainInformation	DNS Domain Information.< <a href="#">5859</a> >
PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt	DNS Domain Information.
PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation	Account Domain Information.

### 3.1.4.4.6 LsarSetInformationPolicy (Opnum 8)

The LsarSetInformationPolicy method is invoked to set a policy on the server.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
    PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION PolicyInformation
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**InformationClass:** A parameter that specifies what type of information the caller is setting.

**PolicyInformation:** Data that represents the policy being set.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters is incorrect. For instance, this can happen if <i>InformationClass</i> is not supported or some of the supplied policy data is invalid.
0xC0000002 STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED	This information class cannot be set.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message MUST be processed in an identical manner to LsarSetInformationPolicy2.

### 3.1.4.4.7 LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy (Opnum 53)

The LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy method is invoked to retrieve policy settings in addition to those exposed through LsarQueryInformationPolicy and LsarSetInformationPolicy2. Despite the term "Domain" in the name of the method, processing of this message occurs with local data, and

furthermore, there is no requirement that this data have any relationship with the LSA information in the domain to which the machine is joined.

```

NTSTATUS LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION* PolicyDomainInformation
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**InformationClass:** A parameter that specifies what type of information the caller is requesting.

**PolicyDomainInformation:** A parameter that references policy information structure on return.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments was invalid.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	No value has been set for this policy.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

If the *InformationClass* parameter is PolicyDomainEfsInformation, and the responder does not support Encrypting File System (EFS) Policy Information as specified in section 3.1.1.1, the request MUST fail with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND.

If the *InformationClass* parameter is PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation, and the responder implementation does not support Quality Of Service Information as specified in section 3.1.1.1, the request MUST fail with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.

If *PolicyHandle* is not a valid context handle or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE.

The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following table specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check for each *InformationClass* value.

InformationClass value	RequiredAccess value
PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation	POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION
PolicyDomainEfsInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION
PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION



The *InformationClass* parameter can take on any value in the POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration range. For all values outside this range, the server MUST return the STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER error code.

*PolicyDomainInformation* is an output parameter. The server MUST fill it with the information requested by the client, based on the value of the *InformationClass* parameter and the abstract data model specified in section 3.1.1.1. If the information has not been set before, the request MUST fail with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND.

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information returned to caller from abstract data model
PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation	Quality Of Service Information
PolicyDomainEfsInformation	EFS Policy Information
PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation	Kerberos Policy Information

### 3.1.4.4.8 LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy (Opnum 54)

The LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy method is invoked to change policy settings in addition to those exposed through LsarQueryInformationPolicy and LsarSetInformationPolicy2. Despite the term "Domain" in the name of the method, processing of this message occurs with local data. Also, there is no requirement that this data have any relationship with the LSA information in the domain in which the machine is joined.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, unique, switch_is(InformationClass)]
    PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION PolicyDomainInformation
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**InformationClass:** A parameter that specifies what type of information the caller is setting.

**PolicyDomainInformation:** Data representing policy being set.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the following message processing.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

If the *InformationClass* parameter is *PolicyDomainEfsInformation*, and the responder implementation does not support Encrypting File System (EFS) Policy Information as specified in section 3.1.1.1, the request MUST fail with *STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER*.

If the *InformationClass* parameter is *PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation*, and the responder implementation does not support Quality Of Service Information as specified in section 3.1.1.1, the request MUST fail with an RPC exception *RPC\_S\_INVALID\_TAG*.

If *PolicyHandle* is not a valid context handle or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return *STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE*.

The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following table specifies the *RequiredAccess* value to use in this access check for each *InformationClass* value.

<b>InformationClass value</b>	<b>RequiredAccess value</b>
<i>PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation</i>	<i>POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN</i>
<i>PolicyDomainEfsInformation</i>	<i>POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN</i>
<i>PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation</i>	<i>POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN</i>

The *InformationClass* parameter can take on any value in the *POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION\_CLASS* enumeration range. For all values outside this range, the server MUST return the *STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER* error code.

The *PolicyDomainInformation* parameter contains the data that the caller needs to set, based on the value of the *InformationClass* parameter. The server MUST update its abstract data model, specified in section 3.1.1.1, as follows.

<b>Value of InformationClass parameter</b>	<b>Information returned to caller from abstract data model</b>
<i>PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation</i>	Quality Of Service Information
<i>PolicyDomainEfsInformation</i>	EFS Policy Information
<i>PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation</i>	Kerberos Policy Information

If the abstract data model update succeeds and the *InformationClass* parameter is *PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation*, the server MUST invoke the KDC ConfigurationChange event (see [MS-KILE] section 3.3.4.1) and MUST ignore any errors that are returned.

### 3.1.4.5 Account Object Methods

The message processing of methods in this section MUST use the abstract data model, as specified in section 3.1.1.3.

<b>Method (opnum)</b>	<b>Summary</b>
<i>LsarCreateAccount</i> (opnum 10)	Creates a new account object in the policy database.
<i>LsarEnumerateAccounts</i> (opnum 11)	Enumerates all account objects in the policy database.
<i>LsarOpenAccount</i> (opnum 17)	Opens a handle to an existing account object.
<i>LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount</i> (opnum 18)	Enumerates all rights and privileges of an account.
<i>LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount</i> (opnum 19)	Adds new privileges to an existing account object.
<i>LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount</i> (opnum)	Removes privileges from an existing account object.

Method (opnum)	Summary
20)	
LsarGetSystemAccessAccount (opnum 23)	Retrieves system access flags from the account object.
LsarSetSystemAccessAccount (opnum 24)	Sets system access flags on the account object.
LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight (opnum 35)	Enumerates all account objects in the server's policy database that match a given user right.
LsarEnumerateAccountRights (opnum 36)	Enumerates all rights of an account object in the server's policy database.
LsarAddAccountRights (opnum 37)	Adds new rights to an account object in the server's policy database.
LsarRemoveAccountRights (opnum 38)	Removes rights from an account object in the server's policy database.

### 3.1.4.5.1 LsarCreateAccount (Opnum 10)

The LsarCreateAccount method is invoked to create a new account object in the server's database.

```
NTSTATUS LsarCreateAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* AccountHandle
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**AccountSid:** The security identifier (SID) of the account to be created.

**DesiredAccess:** A bitmask specifying accesses to be granted to the newly created and opened account at this time.

**AccountHandle:** Used to return a handle to the newly created account object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000035 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION	An account with this SID already exists.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC000000D	Some of the parameters supplied were invalid.

Return value/code	Description
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: A handle to an open policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_CREATE\_ACCOUNT.

*AccountSid*: The SID of the account to be created. The server MUST validate that *AccountSid* represents a valid SID and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if it is not. <5960>

*DesiredAccess*: A set of access bits that the caller attempts to receive from the account object after it has been created, which is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.2. The method-specific portion of the check is the following.

```
IF (IsRequestorAnonymous() and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE) THEN
    Return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
END IF
```

The valid account-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.3, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.3. The IsRequestorAnonymous procedure is specified in section 3.1.4.2.3.

*AccountHandle*: If the request is successful, the server MUST create and return a context handle (section 3.1.1.7) via *AccountHandle*, with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Account"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the account object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

This mechanism allows the caller to skip the additional step of opening the account object after creating it.

The server MUST check whether another account object already exists in its policy database with the same SID, and fail the request with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_COLLISION if it does.

The server MUST associate a security descriptor with a newly created account object. See section 3.1.1.3 for the data model of this object type.

### 3.1.4.5.2 LsarEnumerateAccounts (Opnum 11)

The LsarEnumerateAccounts method is invoked to request a list of account objects in the server's database. The method can be called multiple times to return its output in fragments.

```
NTSTATUS LsarEnumerateAccounts(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in, out] unsigned long* EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);
```

**PolicyHandle**: An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**EnumerationContext:** A pointer to a context value that is used to resume enumeration, if necessary.

**EnumerationBuffer:** A pointer to a structure that will contain the results of the enumeration.

**PreferredMaximumLength:** A value that indicates the approximate size of the data to return.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0x00000105 STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES	More information is available to successive calls.
0x8000001A STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES	No more entries are available from the enumeration.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION. If IsRequestorAnonymous() returns TRUE (section 3.1.4.2.3) and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE, the call MUST fail with STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

*EnumerationContext*: A number that indicates a starting index at which to begin the enumeration. The server MUST always return all account objects in the same order, starting at the object whose index is *EnumerationContext*. To initiate a new enumeration, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to zero; otherwise, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to a value returned by a previous call to the method.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the *EnumerationContext* parameter is NULL.

*EnumerationBuffer*: Used to return the results of enumeration. The server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with as many account objects as possible, as determined by *PreferredMaximumLength*. If the size of all remaining objects is less than or equal to *PreferredMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with all objects. If the size of all remaining objects is greater than *PreferredMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with objects such that the size of the account objects returned is greater than or equal to *PreferredMaximumLength*, but would be less than *PreferredMaximumLength* if the last object had not been added to *EnumerationBuffer*. If there are no more objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_MORE\_ENTRIES. If there are more database objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST set the *EnumerationContext* value to the index value that would allow it to resume enumeration correctly when this method is called again, and the server MUST return STATUS\_MORE\_ENTRIES. Note that this return value is not an error status.

*PreferredMaximumLength*: An indication about the approximate size, in bytes, of the data to return. Any unsigned 32-bit value is valid for the *PreferredMaximumLength* parameter.

### 3.1.4.5.3 LsarOpenAccount (Opnum 17)

The LsarOpenAccount method is invoked to obtain a handle to an account object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarOpenAccount(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,  
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,  
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* AccountHandle  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**AccountSid:** A SID of the account to be opened.

**DesiredAccess:** A bitmask specifying accesses to be granted to the opened account at this time.

**AccountHandle:** Used to return a handle to the opened account object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	Some of the parameters supplied are incorrect. For instance, this can happen when <i>AccountSid</i> is NULL.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	An account with this SID does not exist in the server's database.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call, because the access check MUST happen on the account object.

*AccountSid*: The SID of the account to be opened. The server MUST verify that the SID is valid and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. The server MUST verify that the account object with this SID exists in its policy database and fail the request with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND otherwise.

*DesiredAccess*: A bitmask specifying the type of access the caller attempts to obtain from the account object, which is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.1. The method-specific portion of the check is the following.

```
IF (IsRequestorAnonymous() and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE) THEN  
    Return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
```

END IF

The valid account rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.3, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.3. The IsRequestorAnonymous procedure is specified in section 3.1.4.2.3.

*AccountHandle*: If the request is successful, this parameter is used to return a handle (section 3.1.1.7) to the opened account object with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Account"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the account object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

#### 3.1.4.5.4 LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount (Opnum 18)

The LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount method is invoked to retrieve a list of privileges granted to an account on the server.

```
NTSTATUS LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,  
    [out] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET* Privileges  
);
```

**AccountHandle**: An open account object handle obtained from either LsarCreateAccount (section 3.1.4.5.1) or LsarOpenAccount (section 3.1.4.5.3).

**Privileges**: Used to return a list of privileges granted to the account.

**Return Values**: The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC000009A STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	There are insufficient resources to complete the request.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>AccountHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes two arguments:

*AccountHandle*: An open handle to an account object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an account object or *AccountHandle*.HandleType does not equal "Account", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *AccountHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_VIEW.

*Privileges*: Used to return a set of privileges associated with the account. It is valid for the set of privileges to be empty.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INSUFFICIENT\_RESOURCES if it runs out of memory while processing this request.

### 3.1.4.5.5 LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount (Opnum 19)

The LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount method is invoked to add new privileges to an existing account object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,  
    [in] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET Privileges  
);
```

**AccountHandle:** An open account object handle obtained from either LsarCreateAccount (section 3.1.4.5.1) or LsarOpenAccount (section 3.1.4.5.3).

**Privileges:** Contains a list of privileges to add to the account.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	Some of the parameters supplied were invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>AccountHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes two arguments:

**AccountHandle:** An open handle to an account object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an account object or *AccountHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Account", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *AccountHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_ADJUST\_PRIVILEGES.

**Privileges:** A set of privileges to add to an account. Each privilege is a LUID-Attributes pair where the **LUID** field MUST match a LUID of a privilege on the server. The attributes replace any attributes of the privilege if one was associated with the account previously. Any LUID not recognized as valid by the server SHOULD cause the message to be rejected with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. <6061>

### 3.1.4.5.6 LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount (Opnum 20)

The LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount method is invoked to remove privileges from an account object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,  
    [in] unsigned char AllPrivileges,  
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET Privileges
```



);

**AccountHandle:** An open account object handle obtained from either `LsarCreateAccount` (section 3.1.4.5.1) or `LsarOpenAccount` (section 3.1.4.5.3).

**AllPrivileges:** If this parameter is not `FALSE` (0), all privileges will be stripped from the account object.

**Privileges:** Contains a (possibly empty) list of privileges to remove from the account object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation **MUST** return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	Some of the parameters supplied were invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>AccountHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

**AccountHandle:** An open handle to an account object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an account object or *AccountHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Account", the server **MUST** return `STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE`. The server **MUST** verify that *AccountHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with *RequiredAccess* set to `ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES`.

**AllPrivileges:** A Boolean value; if not `FALSE` (0), all privileges associated with the account are removed. In this case, the server **MUST** check that the *Privileges* parameter is `NULL`, and fail the request with `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER` otherwise.

**Privileges:** If *AllPrivileges* is `FALSE` (0), this parameter cannot be `NULL`. It will be used to remove *Privileges* from the account object. The server **MUST** verify that *Privileges* is not `NULL` and fail the request with `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER` otherwise. <6162>

### 3.1.4.5.7 LsarGetSystemAccessAccount (Opnum 23)

The `LsarGetSystemAccessAccount` method is invoked to retrieve system access account flags for an account object. System access account flags are described as part of the account object data model, as specified in section 3.1.1.3.

```
NTSTATUS LsarGetSystemAccessAccount(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,  
    [out] unsigned long* SystemAccess  
);
```

**AccountHandle:** An open account object handle obtained from either `LsarCreateAccount` (section 3.1.4.5.1) or `LsarOpenAccount` (section 3.1.4.5.3).

**SystemAccess:** Used to return a bitmask of access flags associated with the account.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>AccountHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes two arguments:

*AccountHandle*: An open handle to an account object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an account object or *AccountHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Account", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *AccountHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_VIEW.

*SystemAccess*: Used to return a bitmask of system access bits.

### 3.1.4.5.8 LsarSetSystemAccessAccount (Opnum 24)

The LsarSetSystemAccessAccount method is invoked to set system access account flags for an account object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetSystemAccessAccount(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,  
    [in] unsigned long SystemAccess  
);
```

**AccountHandle:** An open account object handle obtained from either LsarCreateAccount (section 3.1.4.5.1) or LsarOpenAccount (section 3.1.4.5.3).

**SystemAccess:** A bitmask containing the account flags to be set on the account.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>AccountHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes two arguments:

**AccountHandle:** An open handle to an account object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an account object or *AccountHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Account", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that AccountHandle grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_ADJUST\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS.

**SystemAccess:** Specifies the set of access bits to be added to account's system access. The server MUST verify that the bits do not fall outside the set of system access rights defined on the system, and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. The new system access bits replace the old ones.

### 3.1.4.5.9 LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight (Opnum 35)

The LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight method is invoked to return a list of account objects that have the user right equal to the passed-in value.

```
NTSTATUS LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in, unique] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING UserRight,  
    [out] PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**UserRight:** The name of the right to use in enumeration.

**EnumerationBuffer:** Used to return the list of account objects that have the specified right.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC0000060 STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE	The supplied name is not recognized by the server.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments is invalid.
0x8000001A STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES	No account was found with the specified privilege.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION. <6263>

*UserRight*: A string representation of an account right. If the server does not recognize the account right, it MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_PRIVILEGE.

The server executes the request by going through all accounts in its policy database and returning a set of all account object SIDs that have that right or privilege.

*EnumerationBuffer*: Used to return a set of account SIDs that have the specified UserRight.

### 3.1.4.5.10 LsarEnumerateAccountRights (Opnum 36)

The LsarEnumerateAccountRights method is invoked to retrieve a list of rights associated with an existing account.

```
NTSTATUS LsarEnumerateAccountRights(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [out] PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET UserRights
);
```

**PolicyHandle**: An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**AccountSid**: A SID of the account object that the caller is inquiring about.

**UserRights**: Used to return a list of right names associated with the account.

**Return Values**: The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	The specified account object does not exist.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes two arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_VIEW.

*AccountSid*: A SID of the account to query. The server MUST verify that the SID pointed to by *AccountSid* is valid and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. If IsRequestorAnonymous() returns TRUE (section 3.1.4.2.3) and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE, the call MUST fail with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND. The server MUST verify that such an account exists in its database and fail the request with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND otherwise.

The server MUST return the string names of all the system access rights and privileges associated with the account. It is valid for the server to return an empty set if the account object does not contain any rights.

### 3.1.4.5.11 LsarAddAccountRights (Opnum 37)

The LsarAddAccountRights method is invoked to add new rights to an account object. If the account object does not exist, the system will attempt to create one.

```
NTSTATUS LsarAddAccountRights(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET UserRights
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**AccountSid:** A security identifier of an account to add the rights to.

**UserRights:** A set of right names to add to the account.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000060 STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE	The rights supplied were not recognized.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with:

- RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_CREATE\_ACCOUNT if the account identified by the *AccountSid* parameter does not exist in the server's database, or

- RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_ADJUST\_PRIVILEGES | ACCOUNT\_ADJUST\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS | ACCOUNT\_VIEW if the account identified by the *AccountSid* parameter exists in the server's database

*AccountSid*: A security identifier of the account object. The server MUST create the account object if one does not exist.

*UserRights*: A set of system access rights and privileges to be added to the account. If the server does not recognize any of the rights, it MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_PRIVILEGE.

### 3.1.4.5.12 LsarRemoveAccountRights (Opnum 38)

The LsarRemoveAccountRights method is invoked to remove rights from an account object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarRemoveAccountRights(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] unsigned char AllRights,
    [in] PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET UserRights
);
```

**PolicyHandle**: An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**AccountSid**: A security descriptor of an account object.

**AllRights**: If this field is not set to 0, all rights will be removed.

**UserRights**: A set of rights to remove from the account.

**Return Values**: The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000060 STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE	The rights supplied were not recognized.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	An account with this SID does not exist.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC00000BB STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED	The operation is not supported by the server.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to ACCOUNT\_ADJUST\_PRIVILEGES | ACCOUNT\_ADJUST\_SYSTEM\_ACCESS | ACCOUNT\_VIEW | DELETE.

If IsRequestorAnonymous() returns TRUE (section 3.1.4.2.3) and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE, the call MUST fail with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND.

*AccountSid*: The security identifier of the account to modify. The server MUST verify that such an account exists in its database and fail the request with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND otherwise.

*AllRights*: If nonzero, all system access rights and privileges will be stripped from the account.

*UserRights*: A set of rights and privileges to remove from the account. If the server does not recognize any of the rights, server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_PRIVILEGE.

The server MUST NOT allow removal of "SeAuditPrivilege", "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege", "SeImpersonatePrivilege", and "SeCreateGlobalPrivilege" from accounts represented with SIDs "S-1-5-19" and "S-1-5-20". The request MUST be rejected with STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED. <6364>

If the resulting set of access rights and privileges is empty, the server MUST delete the account object from its database.

### 3.1.4.6 Secret Object Methods

The message processing of methods in this section MUST use the abstract data model defined in section 3.1.1.4.

Method (opnum)	Summary
LsarCreateSecret (opnum 16)	Creates a new secret object in the policy database.
LsarOpenSecret (opnum 28)	Opens a handle to an existing secret object.
LsarSetSecret (opnum 29)	Sets the value of the secret object.
LsarQuerySecret (opnum 30)	Retrieves the value of the secret object.
LsarStorePrivateData (opnum 42)	Stores private data in the server's policy database as a secret object.
LsarRetrievePrivateData (opnum 43)	Retrieves private data from a secret object in the server's policy database.

The server ~~MAY NOT SHOULD~~<65> support the following methods:<64>:

- LsarSetSecret
- LsarQuerySecret
- LsarStorePrivateData
- LsarRetrievePrivateData

If the server does not support these methods, the server MUST respond with an RPC exception. If the server supports these methods, the server MUST perform the operations in the message processing section for each method.

#### 3.1.4.6.1 LsarCreateSecret (Opnum 16)

The LsarCreateSecret method is invoked to create a new secret object in the server's database.

```
NTSTATUS LsarCreateSecret(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SecretName,  
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,  
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* SecretHandle  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**SecretName:** The name of the secret object to be created.

**DesiredAccess:** A bitmask that specifies accesses to be granted to the newly created and opened secret object at this time.

**SecretHandle:** Used to return a handle to the newly created secret object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied parameters is invalid. This can happen, for example, if <i>SecretHandle</i> is NULL or if <i>SecretName</i> is not a valid name for a secret object. Secret naming rules are specified in the processing rules shown below for the <i>SecretName</i> parameter.
0xC0000035 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION	The secret object by the specified name already exists.
0xC0000106 STATUS_NAME_TOO_LONG	The length of specified secret name exceeds the maximum set by the server.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_CREATE\_SECRET.

*SecretName*: Name of the secret object to be created. The server MUST verify that the string satisfies the RPC\_UNICODE\_STRING syntax restrictions specified in section 3.1.4.10, and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. The server MUST also check that the following constraints are satisfied by *SecretName*, and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the name does not check out:

- Must not be empty.



- Must not contain the "\" character. <65><66><67><68>

**DesiredAccess:** Contains the access bits that the caller is asking to receive for the handle returned in *SecretHandle*. *DesiredAccess* is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.1. The method-specific portion of the check is the following.

```
IF (IsRequestorAnonymous() and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE) THEN
    Return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
END IF
```

The valid secret-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.4, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.4. The *IsRequestorAnonymous* procedure is specified in section 3.1.4.2.3.

**SecretHandle:** If the request is successful, this parameter is used to return a handle (section 3.1.1.7) to the newly created secret object with its fields initialized as follows:

- *LsaContextHandle.HandleType* = "Secret"
- *LsaContextHandle.Object* = the secret object
- *LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess* = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

Both "current time" and "old time" attributes of a secret will be set to the server's current time at the instance of creation. Both "old value" and "current value" will be set to NULL until they are modified by the *LsarSetSecret* message.

The server MUST check that the secret by the name *SecretName* does not already exist and fail the request with *STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_COLLISION* otherwise. <6869>

### 3.1.4.6.2 LsarOpenSecret (Opnum 28)

The *LsarOpenSecret* method is invoked to obtain a handle to an existing secret object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarOpenSecret (
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SecretName,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* SecretHandle
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either *LsarOpenPolicy* or *LsarOpenPolicy2*.

**SecretName:** The name of the secret object to open.

**DesiredAccess:** The requested type of access.

**SecretHandle:** Used to return the handle to the opened secret object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.

Return value/code	Description
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	The secret with the specified name was not found.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	Some of the parameters supplied were invalid.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the secret object.

*SecretName*: The name of the secret to be opened. The server MUST verify that the name syntax restrictions on secrets specified in section 3.1.4.6.1 are satisfied, and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. The server MUST verify that the secret object with this name exists in its policy database and fail the request with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND otherwise. <6970>

*DesiredAccess*: A bitmask specifying the type of access that the caller attempts to obtain from the secret object, which is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.1. The method-specific portion of the check is as follows:

```
IF (IsRequestorAnonymous() and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE) THEN
    Return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
END IF
```

The valid secret-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.4 and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.4. The IsRequestorAnonymous procedure is specified in section 3.1.4.2.3.

*SecretHandle*: If the request is successful, this parameter is used to return a handle (section 3.1.1.7) to the opened secret object with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Secret"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the secret object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

### 3.1.4.6.3 LsarSetSecret (Opnum 29)

The LsarSetSecret method is invoked to set the current and old values of the secret object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetSecret(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE SecretHandle,
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE EncryptedCurrentValue,
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE EncryptedOldValue
);
```

**SecretHandle**: An open secret object handle.

**EncryptedCurrentValue:** A binary large object (BLOB) representing a new encrypted cipher value. It is valid for this parameter to be NULL, in which case the value is deleted from the server's policy database.

**EncryptedOldValue:** A BLOB representing the encrypted old value. It is valid for this parameter to be NULL, in which case the current value in the policy database is copied.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>SecretHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message contains three input parameters:

*SecretHandle:* An open handle to a secret object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to a secret object or *SecretHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Secret", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *SecretHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to SECRET\_SET\_VALUE. <7071>

*EncryptedCurrentValue:* The version of the new secret value that is being set, encrypted as specified in section 5.1.2. It is valid for this parameter to be NULL, in which case the server MUST delete the current value in its database. If decryption fails, the server must return an implementation-specific error. <7172>

*EncryptedOldValue:* The version of the old secret value that is being set, encrypted as specified in section 5.1.2. It is valid for this parameter to be NULL, in which case the server MUST delete the old value in its database and replace it with the previous version of "CurrentValue". If decryption fails, the server must return an implementation-specific error. <7273>

The server MUST also maintain "time stamp" values for current and old values of the secret object. The following table lists the rules by which the time stamps are computed.

Old secret value	New secret value	Effect on old time	Effect on new time
NULL	NULL	Old value of "new secret time"	Current server time
NULL	Non-NULL	Old value of "new secret time"	Current server time
Non-NULL	NULL	Current server time	Current server time
Non-NULL	Non-NULL	Current server time	Current server time

### 3.1.4.6.4 LsarQuerySecret (Opnum 30)

The LsarQuerySecret method is invoked to retrieve the current and old (or previous) value of the secret object.

```

NTSTATUS LsarQuerySecret(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE SecretHandle,
    [in, out, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE* EncryptedCurrentValue,
    [in, out, unique] PLARGE_INTEGER CurrentValueSetTime,
    [in, out, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE* EncryptedOldValue,
    [in, out, unique] PLARGE_INTEGER OldValueSetTime
);

```

**SecretHandle:** An open secret object handle.

**EncryptedCurrentValue:** Used to return the encrypted current value of the secret object.

**CurrentValueSetTime:** Used to return the time when the current value was set.

**EncryptedOldValue:** A BLOB representing the encrypted old value. It is valid for this parameter to be NULL, in which case the current value in the policy database is copied.

**OldValueSetTime:** The time corresponding to the instant that the old value was last changed.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>SecretHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes five arguments:

*SecretHandle:* An open handle to a secret object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to a secret object or *SecretHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Secret", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *SecretHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to SECRET\_QUERY\_VALUE. <7374>

*EncryptedCurrentValue:* Used to return the current value of the secret, encrypted as specified in section 5.1.2. This parameter can be NULL if the caller is not interested in this information. <7475>

*CurrentValueSetTime:* The time corresponding to the instant that the current value was last changed. This parameter can be NULL if the caller is not interested in this information.

*EncryptedOldValue:* Used to return the old value of the secret, encrypted as specified in section 5.1.2. This parameter can be NULL if the caller is not interested in this information. <7576>

*OldValueSetTime:* The time corresponding to the instance that the old value was last changed. This parameter can be NULL if the caller is not interested in this information.

### 3.1.4.6.5 LsarStorePrivateData (Opnum 42)

The LsarStorePrivateData method is invoked to store a secret value.

```
NTSTATUS LsarStorePrivateData(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING KeyName,  
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE EncryptedData  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**KeyName:** The name under which private data will be stored.

**EncryptedData:** The secret value to be stored.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_CREATE\_SECRET.

*KeyName:* A string identifying the name of the secret object under which the private data would be stored. The server MUST verify that *KeyName* is syntactically valid and reject the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. If a secret object by this name does not exist and the *EncryptedData* parameter is not NULL, the server MUST verify that the caller has POLICY\_CREATE\_SECRET access. If the secret does exist and the *EncryptedData* parameter is not NULL, the access check is performed for the SECRET\_SET\_VALUE right against the secret's security descriptor. If the access check fails, the server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED. If the *EncryptedData* parameter is NULL, the server MUST check that the caller has DELETE access to the secret object and, if so, delete the secret object from the policy database.

*EncryptedData:* The value of the secret to be stored. This value is encrypted as specified in section 5.1.2. As mentioned already, a caller that wants the secret to be deleted simply passes NULL for this value. If decryption fails, the server must return an implementation-specific error.<7677>

### 3.1.4.6.6 LsarRetrievePrivateData (Opnum 43)

The LsarRetrievePrivateData method is invoked to retrieve a secret value.

```

NTSTATUS LsarRetrievePrivateData(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING KeyName,
    [in, out] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE* EncryptedData
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**KeyName:** The name identifying the secret value to be retrieved.

**EncryptedData:** Receives the encrypted value of the secret object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	The key with the specified name was not found.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to SECRET\_QUERY\_VALUE.

*KeyName:* A string identifying the name of the secret object to be queried. If IsRequestorAnonymous() returns TRUE (section 3.1.4.2.3) and LsaRestrictAnonymous is set to TRUE, the call MUST fail with STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND. If a secret object by this name does not exist, the server MUST return STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND.

*EncryptedData:* Used to return an encrypted version of the secret value. This value is encrypted as specified in section 5.1.2.

### 3.1.4.7 Trusted Domain Object Methods

Trusted domain objects SHOULD be created only on a server implementation that is in the domain controller configuration. <7778>

The message processing of methods in this section MUST use the abstract data model as specified in section 3.1.1.5.

Method (opnum)	Summary
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2 (opnum 59)	Creates a new trusted domain object in the server's policy database.
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx (opnum 51)	Superseded by LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2.
LsarCreateTrustedDomain (opnum 12)	Superseded by LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2.
LsarOpenTrustedDomain (opnum 25)	Opens a handle to an existing trusted domain object that matches the given domain security identifier.
LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName (opnum 55)	Opens a handle to an existing trusted domain object that matches the given DNS or NetBIOS name.
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo (opnum 39)	Obtains information about a trusted domain object.
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo (opnum 40)	Sets information on a trusted domain object.
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName (opnum 49)	Sets information on a trusted domain object without having to first open a handle to it.
LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain (opnum 27)	Sets information on a trusted domain object.
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName (opnum 48)	Obtains information about a trusted domain object without having to first open a handle to it.
LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain (opnum 26)	Obtains information about a trusted domain object.
LsarDeleteTrustedDomain (opnum 41)	Removes a trusted domain object from the server's policy database.
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (opnum 50)	Enumerates all trusted domain objects in the server's policy database.
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains (opnum 13)	Enumerates trusted domain objects in the server's policy database.
LsarQueryForestTrustInformation (opnum 73)	Obtains information from a trusted domain object corresponding to a forest trust relationship.
LsarSetForestTrustInformation (opnum 74)	Sets information on a trusted domain object corresponding to a cross-forest trust relationship.

### 3.1.4.7.1 LsarOpenTrustedDomain (Opnum 25)

The LsarOpenTrustedDomain method is invoked to obtain a handle to a trusted domain object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarOpenTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* TrustedDomainHandle
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainSid:** A security identifier of the trusted domain that is being opened.

**DesiredAccess:** A bitmask of access rights to open the object with.

**TrustedDomainHandle:** Used to return the trusted domain object handle.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied parameters is invalid. For instance, this can happen if the security identifier <i>TrustedDomainSid</i> is not a valid domain security identifier. Section 3.1.4.10 specifies data validation rules, including what constitutes a valid domain security identifier.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC00000DF STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN	The specified trusted domain object does not exist.
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.

Processing:

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server MUST return STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED.

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the trusted domain object.

*TrustedDomainSid*: A SID of the trusted domain object. The server MUST verify that the SID is a valid domain SID and reject the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER otherwise. If the trusted domain object with this SID does not exist, the server MUST fail the request with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN error code.

*DesiredAccess*: A bitmask specifying the type of access the caller attempts to obtain from the trusted domain object, which is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.1. There is no method-specific portion of the check. The valid trusted-domain-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.5, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.5.

*TrustedDomainHandle*: If the request is successful, this parameter is used to return a handle (section 3.1.1.7) to the opened trusted domain object with its fields initialized as follows: <78><79><80>

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Trusted Domain"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the trusted domain object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

### 3.1.4.7.2 LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo (Opnum 39)



The LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo method is invoked to retrieve information on a trusted domain object.

```

NTSTATUS LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO* TrustedDomainInformation
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainSid:** A security descriptor of the trusted domain object.

**InformationClass:** Identifies the type of information the caller is interested in.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Used to return the information on the trusted domain object to the caller.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000002 STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED	The specified information class is not supported.
0xC0000003 STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS	The <i>InformationClass</i> argument is outside the allowed range.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC00000DF STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN	The specified trusted domain object does not exist.
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.

Processing:

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server MUST return STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED.

This message takes four arguments:

**PolicyHandle:** An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return

STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with *RequiredAccess* set as specified in section 3.1.4.7.13.

*TrustedDomainSid*: The SID of the trusted domain object to query. The server MUST verify that the caller has supplied a valid domain SID for this parameter and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the check fails. The server MUST verify that a trusted domain object with this SID exists in its policy database and fail the request with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN otherwise.

*InformationClass*: A value from the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration that specifies which type of information the caller is requesting. Not all values are valid. For values outside the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration range, the server MUST reject the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. For *InformationClass* values TrustedControllersInformation, TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal, TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal, and for any values that would be rejected by an LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain call, the server MUST reject the request with an implementation-specific error. For all other *InformationClass* values, the server MUST behave as if it is processing an LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain call with a trusted domain handle to the trusted domain identified by the *TrustedDomainSid* parameter.

*TrustedDomainInformation*: Used to return the requested information.

### 3.1.4.7.3 LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo (Opnum 40)

The LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo method is invoked to set information on a trusted domain object. In some cases, if the trusted domain object does not exist, it will be created.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid,  
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,  
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]  
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomainInformation  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainSid:** A SID of the trusted domain object to be modified.

**InformationClass:** Identifies the type of information to be set on the trusted domain object.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Information to be set on the trusted domain object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Return value/code	Description
0xC00000DF STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN	The specified trusted domain object does not exist.
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.

Processing:

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server MUST return STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED.

This method is similar to the LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain method, with some important differences. For one, this method takes a policy object handle instead of a trusted domain object handle. Another important distinction is that for some information classes this method, unlike LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain, will create a trusted domain object if one does not exist already.

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. The access rights required to perform the operation depend on the value of the *InformationClass* parameter. The access bits required for each information class are specified in section 3.1.4.7.14. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the trusted domain object. If the server is a read-only domain controller, it MUST return an error. <8081>

*TrustedDomainSid*: A SID of the trusted domain object to modify. The server MUST verify that the caller has supplied a valid domain SID for this parameter and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the check fails.

*InformationClass*: A value from the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration that specifies which type of information the caller is setting. Not all *InformationClass* values are valid. The valid *InformationClass* values for this method are as follows:

- *TrustedDomainNameInformation*: The server MUST act as if an LsarCreateTrustedDomain message came in with its *TrustedDomainInformation.Name* parameter as the name passed in the *TrustedDomainInformation* parameter, its *TrustedDomainInformation.Sid* parameter as the SID passed in the *TrustedDomainSid* parameter, and its *DesiredAccess* parameter set to zero.
- *TrustedPosixOffsetInformation*: The server MUST verify that a trusted domain object with this SID exists in its policy database. If the object does not exist, the call MUST fail with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN. Otherwise, the server MUST verify that the caller has access to the trusted domain object as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1 with *DesiredAccess* set to TRUSTED\_SET\_POSIX. There is no method-specific portion of this check.

Then the server MUST act as if an LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain message is being processed.

The server MAY support the following *InformationClass* values. <8182> If the server does not support these values, it MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. If the server supports these values, it MUST perform the corresponding operations:

- *TrustedDomainInformationEx*: The server MUST check that a trusted domain object with this SID exists in its policy database. If the object does not exist, the server MUST create a new trusted domain object using the same processing rules as LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2, and using the following parameters for the LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2 processing rules:
  - *PolicyHandle* set to the same *PolicyHandle* in the original message.

- *TrustedDomainInformation* set to the same *TrustedDomainInformation* in the original message.
- *AuthenticationInformation* set to NULL.
- *DesiredAccess* set to zero.

If the object does exist, the server MUST set the trusted domain information using the same processing rules as *LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain*, and using the following parameters for the *LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain* processing rules:

- *TrustDomainHandle* set to the handle to the trusted domain object.
- *InformationClass* set to the same *InformationClass* in the original message.
- *TrustedDomainInformation* set to the same *TrustedDomainInformation* in the original message.
- **TrustedPasswordInformation:** The server MUST verify that a trusted domain object with this SID exists in its policy database. If the object does not exist, the call MUST fail with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN. Otherwise, the server MUST open the secret object, as defined in section 3.1.1.4, (or create a secret object, if one does not already exist) with "Name" set to "G\$\$<Trusted Domain Name>". The server MUST then set "Old Value" of the secret object to the "OldPassword" value in *TrustedDomainInformation* and set "New Value" of the secret object to the "Password" value in *TrustedDomainInformation*, similar to the processing when an *LsarSetSecret* request has been made.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER for all other *InformationClass* arguments.

*TrustedDomainInformation:* Contains the data supplied by the caller to be set on the trusted domain object.

#### 3.1.4.7.4 LsarDeleteTrustedDomain (Opnum 41)

The *LsarDeleteTrustedDomain* method is invoked to delete a trusted domain object (TDO).

```
NTSTATUS LsarDeleteTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either *LsarOpenPolicy* or *LsarOpenPolicy2*.

**TrustedDomainSid:** A security descriptor of the TDO to be deleted.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC00000DF STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN	The specified TDO does not exist.

Return value/code	Description
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.
0xC0000403 STATUS_USER_DELETE_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The caller's quota for the maximum allowed number of deleted TDOs is exceeded.

Processing:

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server MUST return STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED.

If the number of deleted TDOs that were created by the caller through the control access right Create-Inbound-Trust (defined in [MS-ADTS] section 5.1.3.2.1) exceeds the value in the msDS-PerUserTrustTombstonesQuota attribute of the **domain naming context (domain NC)** root object (defined in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.1.1.4), the server MUST return STATUS\_USER\_DELETE\_TRUST\_QUOTA\_EXCEEDED. For the syntax of the msDS-PerUserTrustTombstonesQuota attribute, refer to [MS-ADA2] section 2.408410. The server MUST enforce the quota check only for the TDOs created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust and if the caller is the creator of that TDO.

This message takes two arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to TRUSTED\_QUERY\_DOMAIN\_NAME | DELETE.

*TrustedDomainSid*: The SID of a TDO to be deleted. The server MUST verify that the caller has supplied a valid domain SID for this parameter and fail the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the check fails. The server MUST verify that a TDO with this SID exists in its policy database and fail the request with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN otherwise.

If the server is a read-only domain controller, it MUST return an error.<8283>

The server MUST also check whether a secret with name "G\$\$<Trusted Domain Name>" exists or not. If it exists, the server MUST delete that secret along with the trusted domain.

The server MUST also check whether an **interdomain trust account** with name "<Trusted Domain NetBIOS Name>\$" exists. If it exists, the server MUST delete that account along with the trusted domain.

### 3.1.4.7.5 LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName (Opnum 48)

The LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName method is invoked to retrieve information about a trusted domain object by its string name.

```
NTSTATUS LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName (
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
```

```

        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO* TrustedDomainInformation
    );

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainName:** The name of the trusted domain object to query.

**InformationClass:** One of the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS values identifying the type of information the caller is interested in.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Used to return the information requested by the caller.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	The trusted domain object with the specified name could not be found.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message is identical in its operation to LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain; the only exception is that the *TrustedDomainName* parameter is used to locate the trusted domain object, rather than having the caller supply the trusted domain object handle.

The trusted domain object is located by matching the *TrustedDomainName* parameter against the trusted domain object in the server's policy database. The trailing period on DNS names is ignored for the purposes of comparison.

### 3.1.4.7.6 LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName (Opnum 49)

The LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName method is invoked to set information about a trusted domain object by its string name.

```

NTSTATUS LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomainInformation
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainName:** The name of the trusted domain object to set information on.

**InformationClass:** One of the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS values indicating the type of information the caller is trying to set.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** The data being set.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments is invalid.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	The trusted domain object with the specified name could not be found.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message is identical in its operation to LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain; the only exception is that the *TrustedDomainName* parameter is used to locate the trusted domain object, rather than having the caller supply the trusted domain object handle.

The trusted domain object is located by matching the *TrustedDomainName* parameter against the trusted domain object in the server's policy database. The trailing period on DNS names is ignored for the purposes of comparison.

### 3.1.4.7.7 LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (Opnum 50)

The LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx method is invoked to enumerate trusted domain objects in the server's database. The method is designed to be invoked multiple times to retrieve the data in fragments.

```
NTSTATUS LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in, out] unsigned long* EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**EnumerationContext:** Used to keep track of the state of the enumeration in cases where the caller obtains its information in several fragments.

**EnumerationBuffer:** Contains a fragment of requested information.

**PreferredMaximumLength:** A value that indicates the approximate size of the data to be returned.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0x8000001A STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES	No more information is available.
0x00000105 STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES	More information is available by calling this method again.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION.

*EnumerationContext*: A number that indicates a starting index at which to begin the enumeration. The server MUST always return all trusted domain objects in the same order, starting at the object whose index is *EnumerationContext*. To initiate a new enumeration, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to zero; otherwise, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to a value returned by a previous call to the method.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the *EnumerationContext* parameter is NULL.

*EnumerationBuffer*: Used to return the results of enumeration. The server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with as many trusted domain objects as possible, as determined by *PreferedMaximumLength*. If the size of all remaining objects is less than or equal to *PreferedMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with all objects. If the size of all remaining objects is greater than *PreferedMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with objects such that the size of the trusted domain objects returned is greater than or equal to *PreferedMaximumLength*, but would be less than *PreferedMaximumLength* if the last object had not been added to *EnumerationBuffer*. If there are no more objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_MORE\_ENTRIES. If there are more database objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST set the *EnumerationContext* value to the index value that would allow it to resume enumeration correctly when this method is called again, and the server MUST return STATUS\_MORE\_ENTRIES. Note that this return value is not an error status.

*PreferedMaximumLength*: An indication about the approximate size, in bytes, of the data to be returned. Any unsigned 32-bit value is valid for the *PreferedMaximumLength* parameter.

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server MUST fill 0 objects in *EnumerationBuffer*, and return STATUS\_NO\_MORE\_ENTRIES.

### 3.1.4.7.8 LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains (Opnum 13)

The LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains method is invoked to request a list of trusted domain objects in the server's database. The method can be called multiple times to return its output in fragments.



```

NTSTATUS LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in, ] [out] unsigned long* EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**EnumerationContext:** A pointer to a context value that is used to resume enumeration, if necessary.

**EnumerationBuffer:** A pointer to a structure that will contain the results of the enumeration.

**PreferredMaximumLength:** A value that indicates the approximate size of the data to be returned.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000105 STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES	More information is available to successive calls.
0xC000001A STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES	No more entries are available from the enumeration.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION.

*EnumerationContext:* A number that indicates a starting index at which to begin the enumeration. The server MUST always return all trusted domain objects in the same order, starting at the object whose index is *EnumerationContext*. To initiate a new enumeration, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to zero; otherwise, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to a value returned by a previous call to the method.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the *EnumerationContext* parameter is NULL.

This method differs from the LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx method in one significant way—in mixed-mode forests, this method returns to the caller an entire set of domains within the forest by enumerating all the cross-referenced objects in Active Directory in addition to domains that are trusted explicitly.

*EnumerationBuffer:* Used to return the results of enumeration. The server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with as many trusted domain objects as possible, as determined by *PreferredMaximumLength*. If the

size of all remaining objects is less than or equal to *PreferredMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with all objects. If the size of all remaining objects is greater than *PreferredMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with objects such that the size of the trusted domain objects returned is greater than or equal to *PreferredMaximumLength*, but would be less than *PreferredMaximumLength* if the last object had not been added to *EnumerationBuffer*. If there are no more objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_MORE\_ENTRIES. If there are more database objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST set the *EnumerationContext* value to the index value that would allow it to resume enumeration correctly when this method is called again, and the server MUST return STATUS\_MORE\_ENTRIES. Note that this return value is not an error status.

When enumerating trusted domain objects for this message, the server MUST limit the trusted domain objects returned to the following subset only:

- Outbound Trusts: The trust direction has the TRUST\_DIRECTION\_OUTBOUND bit set.
- Uplevel or Downlevel Trusts: The trust type is TRUST\_TYPE\_DOWNLEVEL or TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL.
- Non-uplevel-only Trusts: The Trust Attributes field does not have the TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_UPLEVEL\_ONLY bit set.

Trust types and attributes are specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.

*PreferredMaximumLength*: An indication about the approximate size, in bytes, of the data to be returned. Any unsigned 32-bit value is valid for the *PreferredMaximumLength* parameter.

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server MUST fill 0 objects in *EnumerationBuffer*, and return STATUS\_NO\_MORE\_ENTRIES.

### 3.1.4.7.9 LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName (Opnum 55)

The LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName method is invoked to open a trusted domain object handle by supplying the name of the trusted domain.

```
NTSTATUS LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName (
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* TrustedDomainHandle
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainName:** The name of the trusted domain object.

**DesiredAccess:** The type of access requested by the caller.

**TrustedDomainHandle:** Used to return the opened trusted domain handle.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.

Return value/code	Description
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments was invalid.
0xC0000034 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND	A trusted domain object by this name was not found.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the trusted domain object.

*TrustedDomainName*: Contains the name of the trusted domain to be opened. This can be a DNS or a NetBIOS name. If the server cannot locate a trusted domain object by this name in its policy database, the server MUST return STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND. The same status code MUST be returned by the server if Active Directory is not running on this machine.

*DesiredAccess*: The set of rights that the caller attempts to obtain from the trusted domain object, which is access-checked according to section 3.1.4.2.1. There is no method-specific portion of the check. The valid trusted-domain-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.5, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.5.

*TrustedDomainHandle*: If the request is successful, this parameter is used to return a handle (section 3.1.1.7) to the opened trusted domain object with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Trusted Domain"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the trusted domain object
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

### 3.1.4.7.10 LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2 (Opnum 59)

The LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2 method is invoked to create a new trusted domain object (TDO).<[8384](#)>

```
NTSTATUS LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX TrustedDomainInformation,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL AuthenticationInformation,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* TrustedDomainHandle
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Information about the new TDO to be created.

**AuthenticationInformation:** Encrypted authentication information for the new TDO.

**DesiredAccess:** An access mask specifying desired access to the TDO handle.

**TrustedDomainHandle:** Used to return the handle for the newly created TDO.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation **MUST** return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments is invalid.
0xC0000300 STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_SBS	The operation is not supported on a particular product. <8485>
0xC00000DD STATUS_INVALID_DOMAIN_STATE	The operation cannot complete in the current state of the domain.
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.
0xC0000078 STATUS_INVALID_SID	The security identifier of the trusted domain is not valid.
0xC00002E9 STATUS_CURRENT_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED	Trust cannot be established with the current domain.
0xC0000035 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION	Another TDO already exists that matches some of the identifying information of the supplied information.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC0000401 STATUS_PER_USER_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The caller's quota for maximum number of TDOs that can be created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust is exceeded.
0xC0000402 STATUS_ALL_USER_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The combined users' quota for maximum number of TDOs that can be created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust is exceeded.

Processing:

If Active Directory is not running on this machine, the server **MUST** return STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED. <8586> If the server is a read-only domain controller, it **MUST** return an error. <8687>

If the caller is not a member of the Domain Admins group, the server **MUST** return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED for policy handle access checking.

If the TDO creation failed due to the caller not having standard access rights to create the TDO, then the server **MUST** check the caller's control access right (defined in [MS-ADTS] section 5.1.3.2.1). The TDO creation by control access right ~~should be~~ allowed if:

- The trust is an inbound-only forest trust. The server MUST return STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED if the trust to be created is not an inbound-only forest trust.
- The caller has the control access right to create an inbound trust on the domain object.
- The caller's quota for trust object creations has not been exceeded. If the number of TDOs that have been created by the caller through control access right Create-Inbound-Trust exceeds the value in the msDS-PerUserTrustQuota attribute of the domain NC root object, then the server MUST return STATUS\_PER\_USER\_TRUST\_QUOTA\_EXCEEDED. For the syntax of the msDS-PerUserTrustQuota attribute, refer to [MS-ADA2] section 2.407409.
- The combined users' quota for trust object creations has not been exceeded. If the number of TDOs that have been created through control access right Create-Inbound-Trust exceeds the value in the msDS-AllUsersTrustQuota attribute of the domain NC root object (defined in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.1.1.4), then the server MUST return STATUS\_ALL\_USER\_TRUST\_QUOTA\_EXCEEDED. For the syntax of the msDS-AllUsersTrustQuota attribute, refer to [MS-ADA2] section 2.212.

This message takes five arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the TDO.

*TrustedDomainInformation*: A structure containing most components of a TDO makeup. The data provided in this parameter MUST be checked for validity in accordance with rules for TDO consistency specified in "Trust Objects" in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6. The server MUST reject invalid input with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_STATE in the following cases:

- The TrustAttributes TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE flag is set and the forestFunctionality specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.27 is DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 or higher.
- The TrustAttributes TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE flag is set and the **DnsForestName** and **DnsDomainName** fields in DNS Domain Information (see section 3.1.1.1) do not contain the same value.
- The TrustAttributes TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_CROSS\_ORGANIZATION flag is set and the forestFunctionality specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.27 is DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 or higher.

If one or more properties in *TrustedDomainInformation* points to the current domain (such as the domain that the server is a part of), the server MUST return STATUS\_CURRENT\_DOMAIN\_NOT\_ALLOWED. If there is another domain that claims the same properties, the server MUST return STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_COLLISION. Each field in this structure maps to a field in the TDO model, as specified in section 3.1.1.5. If the operation succeeds, the server MUST update its database with a new TDO field populated from this input parameter.

*AuthenticationInformation*: A structure containing authentication information for the trusted domain. The server first MUST decrypt this data structure using an algorithm (as specified in section 5.1.1) with the key being the session key negotiated by the transport. The server then MUST unmarshal the data inside this structure and then store it into a structure whose format is specified in section 2.2.7.11. This structure MUST then be stored on Trust Incoming and Outgoing Password properties.

*DesiredAccess*: A bitmask containing a set of access rights that the caller attempts to obtain from the TDO, which is access-checked as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1. Whatever the set of access rights requested by the caller, the server MUST also set the TRUSTED\_SET\_AUTH bit inside *DesiredAccess* before performing the security descriptor check. There is no method-specific portion of the check.

The valid trusted-domain-rights bits are specified in section 2.2.1.1.5, and the security descriptor is specified in section 3.1.1.5.

*TrustedDomainHandle*: If the request is successful, this parameter is used to return a handle (section 3.1.1.7) to the newly created TDO with its fields initialized as follows:

- LsaContextHandle.HandleType = "Trusted Domain"
- LsaContextHandle.Object = the TDO
- LsaContextHandle.GrantedAccess = as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1

New TDOs are always created without forest trust information. The **ForestTrustInfo** and **ForestTrustLength** fields of the TDO are thus set to NULL and 0, respectively.

If the trust being created is inbound or bidirectional as defined in the **TrustDirection** field of the *TrustedDomainInformation* parameter, then the server MUST also update its database with a new interdomain trust account populated as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.8.

### 3.1.4.7.11 LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx (Opnum 51)

The LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx method is invoked to create a new trusted domain object (TDO).

```

NTSTATUS LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX TrustedDomainInformation,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION AuthenticationInformation,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* TrustedDomainHandle
);

```

**PolicyHandle**: An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainInformation**: Information about the new TDO to be created.

**AuthenticationInformation**: Encrypted authentication information for the new TDO.

**DesiredAccess**: An access mask that specifies desired access to the TDO handle.

**TrustedDomainHandle**: Used to return the handle for the newly created TDO.

**Return Values**: The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments is invalid.
0xC0000300 STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_SBS	The operation is not supported on a particular product.<8788>
0xC00000DD	The operation cannot complete in the current state of the domain.

Return value/code	Description
STATUS_INVALID_DOMAIN_STATE	
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.
0xC0000078 STATUS_INVALID_SID	The security identifier of the trusted domain is not valid.
0xC00002E9 STATUS_CURRENT_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED	Trust cannot be established with the current domain.
0xC0000035 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION	Another TDO already exists that matches some of the identifying information of the supplied information.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC0000401 STATUS_PER_USER_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The caller's quota for the maximum number of TDOs that can be created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust is exceeded.
0xC0000402 STATUS_ALL_USER_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The combined users' quota for the maximum number of TDOs that can be created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust is exceeded.

Processing:

This message MUST be processed in an identical manner to LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2, with the following exceptions.

*AuthenticationInformation* is a structure containing authentication information for the trusted domain. The authentication information is not encrypted, which makes this an insecure message to call. As a result, callers SHOULD NOT invoke this message and SHOULD instead call LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2.

### 3.1.4.7.12 LsarCreateTrustedDomain (Opnum 12)

The LsarCreateTrustedDomain method is invoked to create an object of type trusted domain in the server's database.

```

NTSTATUS LsarCreateTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION TrustedDomainInformation,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE* TrustedDomainHandle
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Information about the new trusted domain object (TDO) to be created.

**DesiredAccess:** An access mask that specifies the desired access to the TDO handle.

**TrustedDomainHandle:** Used to return the handle for the newly created TDO.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments is invalid.
0xC0000300 STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ON_SBS	The operation is not supported on a particular product. <8889>
0xC00002B1 STATUS_DIRECTORY_SERVICE_REQUIRED	The Active Directory service was not available on the server.
0xC0000078 STATUS_INVALID_SID	The security identifier of the trusted domain is not valid.
0xC00002E9 STATUS_CURRENT_DOMAIN_NOT_ALLOWED	Trust cannot be established with the current domain.
0xC0000035 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION	Another TDO already exists that matches some of the identifying information of the supplied information.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC0000401 STATUS_PER_USER_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The caller's quota for the maximum number of TDOs that can be created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust is exceeded.
0xC0000402 STATUS_ALL_USER_TRUST_QUOTA_EXCEEDED	The combined users' quota for the maximum number of TDOs that can be created by control access right Create-Inbound-Trust is exceeded.

Processing:

This message MUST be processed in an identical manner to LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx with the following mapping as input parameters.

*PolicyHandle*: Same.

*TrustedDomainInformation*:

- **Name**: Comes from *TrustedDomainInformation*. Name input parameter.
- **FlatName**: Comes from *TrustedDomainInformation*. Name input parameter.
- **SID**: Comes from *TrustedDomainInformation*. Security identifier (SID) input parameter.
- **TrustDirection**: TRUST\_DIRECTION\_OUTBOUND.
- **TrustType**: TRUST\_TYPE\_DOWNLEVEL.
- **TrustAttributes**: 0.

*AuthenticationInformation*: NULL.

*DesiredAccess*: Same.



*TrustedDomainHandle*: Same.

### 3.1.4.7.13 LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain (Opnum 26)

The LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain method is invoked to retrieve information about the trusted domain object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE TrustedDomainHandle,  
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,  
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]  
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO* TrustedDomainInformation  
);
```

**TrustedDomainHandle:** An open trusted domain object handle.

**InformationClass:** One of the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS values indicating the type of information the caller is interested in.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Used to return requested information about the trusted domain object.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the arguments supplied to the function was invalid.
0xC0000003 STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS	The <i>InformationClass</i> argument is outside the allowed range.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>TrustedDomainHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*TrustedDomainHandle*: An open handle to a trusted domain object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to a trusted domain object or *TrustedDomainHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Trusted Domain", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *TrustedDomainHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following table specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check for each *InformationClass* value, or indicates if no processing is supported, regardless of access granted. There are several methods in the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol that query trusted domain information. All of them enforce the same rights assignments based on information class as described in the following table.

Value of InformationClass parameter	RequiredAccess value
TrustedDomainNameInformation TrustedDomainInformationBasic	TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME

Value of InformationClass parameter	RequiredAccess value
TrustedDomainInformationEx TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal	
TrustedControllersInformation	Does not apply: This information class is obsolete and cannot be set or queried. The server MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
TrustedPosixOffsetInformation TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes	TRUSTED_QUERY_POSIX
TrustedPasswordInformation TrustedDomainAuthInformation TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal	TRUSTED_QUERY_AUTH
TrustedDomainFullInformation TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal	TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME   TRUSTED_QUERY_POSIX   TRUSTED_QUERY_AUTH

**InformationClass:** A value from the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration specifying what type of information the caller is requesting. Not all values are valid. For values outside the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS range, the server MUST reject the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. Information class values TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal and TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal MUST be rejected with STATUS\_INVALID\_INFO\_CLASS.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Used to return the data requested by the caller, in a structure form corresponding to the InformationClass parameter. Information MUST be collected from the abstract data model specified in section 3.1.1.5.

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information to return
TrustedDomainNameInformation	Flat Name
TrustedPosixOffsetInformation	Posix Offset
TrustedDomainInformationEx	Name Flat Name Security Identifier Posix Offset Trust Type Trust Direction Trust Attributes
TrustedDomainAuthInformation TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal	Not applicable: This information class cannot be queried. Server MUST return STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS.
TrustedDomainFullInformation	Name Flat Name Security Identifier Posix Offset Trust Type Trust Direction Trust Attributes Trust Incoming and Outgoing Password values MUST be set to 0.

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information to return
TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internall	Name Flat Name Security Identifier Posix Offset Trust Type Trust Direction Trust Attributes Forest Trust Attributes, as stored in Active Directory under the msDs-TrustForestTrustInfo attribute ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.3). Trust Incoming and Outgoing Password values MUST be set to 0.
TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes	Supported Encryption Types
Other values	Server MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.

If the server is not at DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 forest functional level, the presence of the TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE bit in the **Trust Attributes** field of a trusted domain object MUST NOT be returned by the server. <8990>

### 3.1.4.7.14 LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain (Opnum 27)

The LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain method is invoked to set information on a trusted domain object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE TrustedDomainHandle,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomainInformation
);
```

**TrustedDomainHandle:** A handle to a trusted domain object.

**InformationClass:** A value indicating the type of information requested by the caller.

**TrustedDomainInformation:** Used to supply the information to be set.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the arguments supplied to the function was invalid.
0xC00000DD STATUS_INVALID_DOMAIN_STATE	The domain is in the wrong state to perform the stated operation.
0xC0000008	<i>TrustedDomainHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Return value/code	Description
STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*TrustedDomainHandle*: An open handle to a trusted domain object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to a trusted domain object or *TrustedDomainHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Trusted Domain", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *TrustedDomainHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following table specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check for each *InformationClass* value, or indicates if no processing is supported, regardless of access granted. There are several methods in the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol that set trusted domain information. All of them enforce the same rights assignments based on information class.

Value of InformationClass parameter	RequiredAccess value
TrustedPosixOffsetInformation TrustedDomainInformationEx	TRUSTED_SET_POSIX
TrustedDomainFullInformation TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal	TRUSTED_SET_POSIX   TRUSTED_SET_AUTH
TrustedDomainAuthInformation TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal	TRUSTED_SET_AUTH
TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes	TRUSTED_SET_POSIX

*InformationClass*: A value from the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS enumeration specifying what type of information the caller is setting. Not all values are valid. For values outside the TRUSTED\_INFORMATION\_CLASS range, the server MUST reject the request with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. Information class values other than the following set SHOULD ~~<9091>~~ be rejected with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. The set of allowed information class values is:

- TrustedPosixOffsetInformation
- TrustedDomainInformationEx
- TrustedDomainAuthInformation
- TrustedDomainFullInformation
- TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal
- TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal
- TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes

*TrustedDomainInformation*: Contains information to be set, appropriate for the *InformationClass* parameter. The server MUST validate the *TrustedDomainInformation* parameter according to information class-specific rules. The rules for internal consistency checking of trusted domain objects are specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.

Information in the abstract data model specified in section 3.1.1.5 MUST be updated using *TrustedDomainInformation* and *InformationClass* parameters as follows:

Value of InformationClass parameter	Information to set
TrustedPosixOffsetInformation	Posix Offset
TrustedDomainInformationEx	Trust Type Trust Direction Trust Attributes Forest Trust Attributes MUST be set to 0 if new trust attributes do not contain TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE flag.
TrustedDomainAuthInformation TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal	Trust Incoming Password Trust Outgoing Password
TrustedDomainFullInformation TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal	Posix Offset Trust Type Trust Direction Trust Attributes Trust Incoming Password Trust Outgoing Password Forest Trust Attributes MUST be set to 0 if new trust attributes do not contain TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE flag.
TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes	Supported Encryption Types
Other values	Server MUST return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_STATE in the following cases:

- The TrustAttributes TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE flag is set and the forestFunctionality specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.27 is DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 or higher.
- The TrustAttributes TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE flag is set and the **DnsForestName** and **DnsDomainName** fields in DNS Domain Information (see section 3.1.1.1) do not contain the same value.
- The TrustAttributes TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_CROSS\_ORGANIZATION flag is set and the forestFunctionality specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.27 is DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 or higher.

If the server is a read-only domain controller, it MUST return an error. <9192>

If the trust direction is being set to incoming or bidirectional, then the server MUST create an interdomain trust account for this trust, if such an account does not yet exist, and populate it as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.8. The unicodePwd attribute of the account is updated (as specified in [MS-SAMR] section 3.1.1.8.7) with the clear text password (that is, the password value with AuthType being equal to 0x2) in the "Trust Incoming Passwords" information provided.

### 3.1.4.7.15 LsarQueryForestTrustInformation (Opnum 73)

The LsarQueryForestTrustInformation method is invoked to retrieve information about a trust relationship with another forest.

```
NTSTATUS LsarQueryForestTrustInformation(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSA_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE HighestRecordType,
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION* ForestTrustInfo
```

);

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**TrustedDomainName:** The name of the trusted domain to query.

**HighestRecordType:** The highest ordinal number of forest trust record type that the caller understands.

**ForestTrustInfo:** Used to return the forest trust information.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the supplied arguments was invalid.
0xC00000DD STATUS_INVALID_DOMAIN_STATE	The domain is in the wrong state of this operation.
0xC00000DF STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN	The <i>TrustedDomainName</i> is not a recognized domain name.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC0000225 STATUS_NOT_FOUND	Forest trust information does not exist for this trusted domain object.

Processing:

This message takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the trusted domain object.

*TrustedDomainName:* The name of the trusted domain object to query.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_STATE if any of the following conditions is TRUE:

- The **DnsForestName** and **DnsDomainName** fields in DNS Domain Information (see section 3.1.1.1) do not contain the same value.
- The forestFunctionality specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.3.2.27 is not DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 or higher.
- Active Directory is not running on this machine.

If a trusted domain object by the name `TrustedDomainName` does not exist, the server MUST return `STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN`.

**HighestRecordType:** The caller sets this argument to the highest `LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE` enum value recognized by the caller. This parameter is ignored by the server.

**ForestTrustInfo:** Used to return the forest trust information associated with the trusted domain object. This corresponds to the Forest Trust Information abstract data model specified in section 3.1.1.5.

If the trusted domain object is not of the type that supports a forest trust (as determined by the presence or absence of the `TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE` attribute), the server MUST return `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER`. If the forest trust information does not exist on a trusted domain object that otherwise can support a forest trust, the server MUST return `STATUS_NOT_FOUND`.

The server MUST verify that the caller has access to the trusted domain object as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1 with *DesiredAccess* set to `TRUSTED_QUERY_AUTH`. There is no method-specific portion of this check.

### 3.1.4.7.16 LsarSetForestTrustInformation (Opnum 74)

The `LsarSetForestTrustInformation` method is invoked to establish a trust relationship with another forest by attaching a set of records called the forest trust information to the trusted domain object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarSetForestTrustInformation(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] PLSA_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,  
    [in] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE HighestRecordType,  
    [in] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION ForestTrustInfo,  
    [in] unsigned char CheckOnly,  
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION* CollisionInfo  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either `LsarOpenPolicy` or `LsarOpenPolicy2`.

**TrustedDomainName:** The name of the trusted domain object on which to set the forest trust information.

**HighestRecordType:** The highest ordinal forest trust record type that the caller understands.

**ForestTrustInfo:** The forest trust information that the caller is trying to set on the trusted domain object.

**CheckOnly:** If not 0, the operation is read-only and does not alter the state of the server's database.

**CollisionInfo:** Used to return information about collisions between different sets of forest trust information in the server's database.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.

Return value/code	Description
0xC00000DD STATUS_INVALID_DOMAIN_STATE	The domain is not the <b>root domain</b> of the forest, or the forest is not at DS_BEHAVIOR_WIN2003 forest functional level.
0xC00000DE STATUS_INVALID_DOMAIN_ROLE	The server is not the primary domain controller.
0xC00000DF STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN	The trusted domain object with the name in the <i>TrustedDomainName</i> parameter does not exist.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	Some of the parameters supplied were invalid.

Processing:

This message takes six arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: Open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. *PolicyHandle.GrantedAccess* MUST NOT be considered for this call because the access check MUST happen on the trusted domain object.

*TrustedDomainName*: The name of the trusted domain object to set forest trust information on.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_STATE if any of the following conditions is TRUE.

- The **DnsForestName** and **DnsDomainName** fields in DNS Domain Information (see section 3.1.1.1) do not contain the same value.
- Active Directory is not running on this machine.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_ROLE if the *IsEffectiveRoleOwner* function specified in [MS-ADTS] section 3.1.1.5.1.8 returns FALSE with the *roleObject* parameter set to default NC.

If a trusted domain object by the name *TrustedDomainName* does not exist, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_DOMAIN.

The server MUST verify that the caller has access to the trusted domain object as specified in section 3.1.4.2.1 with *DesiredAccess* set to TRUSTED\_SET\_AUTH. There is no method-specific portion of this check.

The server MUST also make sure that the trust attributes associated with the trusted domain object referenced by the *TrustedDomainName* parameter has the TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE set. If the attribute is not present, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.

*HighestRecordType*: The caller sets this argument to the highest LSA\_FOREST\_TRUST\_RECORD\_TYPE enumeration value recognized by the caller. If this argument is greater in value than the highest record type recognized by the server, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.

*ForestTrustInfo*: A collection of forest trust records identifying the topology of the trusted forest. The server MUST verify that the forest trust information supplied by the caller is valid by performing a consistency check, as specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6. Note that "consistent" does not necessarily mean "collision-free". The method for determining collisions is specified in section 3.1.4.7.16.1.



*CheckOnly*: Perform a read-only probing operation. The results will not be persisted in the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) database, but the set of collision records returned in *CollisionInfo* will be accurate as though the information was persisted.

*CollisionInfo*: A list of collision records. The request is considered successful even if a non-empty set of collisions is returned. The rules for generating collision information are specified in section 3.1.4.7.16.1.

The server MUST store the generated *ForestTrustInfo* in the Forest Trust Information attribute specified in section 3.1.1.5.

### 3.1.4.7.16.1 Forest Trust Collision Generation

This section describes the rules that the server MUST follow to compute a set of collisions when setting forest trust information on a trusted domain object.

Forest trust information across all trusted forests is always internally consistent. This is an invariant that the server MUST enforce. When new forest trust information is added to the server's policy database, the server MUST ensure that the overall forest trust information remains consistent. The server does so by disabling the entries in the new forest trust information structure that would violate this internal consistency. The server communicates the entries that are inconsistent with existing forest trust information back to the client by computing and returning a set of "collision entries".

The rules that govern consistency of forest trust information are specified in [MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6 and are listed here for convenience. To be exact, there are two sets of rules, one for top-level name entries, and one for domain information entries.

The rules for top-level name entries are as follows:

- An enabled (that is, non-conflict) top-level name record must not be equal to an enabled top-level name for another trusted domain object or to any of the DNS tree names within the current forest. Equality is computed using case-insensitive string comparison. If the strings differ only by one trailing '.' character, the difference is ignored.
- The top-level name must not be subordinate to an enabled top-level name for another trusted domain object, unless the other trusted domain object has a corresponding exclusion record.
- A top-level name must not be superior to an enabled top-level name for another trusted domain object, unless the current trusted domain object has a corresponding exclusion record.

If any of these rules are violated, a top-level name is considered in conflict. In this case, a collision record is generated with the following values:

**Index**: Ordinal number of a forest trust record supplied by the caller that generated the collision.

**Type**: CollisionTdo or CollisionXref, depending on whether the collision was caused by an external-to-forest domain or an internal-to-forest domain.

**Flags**: LSA\_TLN\_DISABLED\_CONFLICT

**Name**: DNS name of the TDO that contained the forest trust information with which this entry has collided.

The rules for domain information entries are as follows:

- The security identifier of this entry must not be equal to that of an enabled domain information entry belonging to a different forest or any of the domains that comprise the current forest.
- The NetBIOS name of this entry must not be claimed by any other forest with which this forest has a trust relationship or by any domain within the current forest.

- The DNS name of this entry must not be claimed by any other forest with which this forest has a trust relationship or by the current forest.

If any of these rules are violated, a domain information entry is considered to be in conflict. In this case, a collision record is generated with the following values:

**Index:** Ordinal number of a forest trust record supplied by the caller that generated the collision.

**Type:** CollisionTdo or CollisionXref, depending on whether the collision was caused by an external-to-forest or internal-to-forest domain.

**Flags:** LSA\_SID\_DISABLED\_CONFLICT if the collision was caused by a security identifier component of the record. LSA\_NB\_DISABLED\_CONFLICT if the collision was caused by a NetBIOS name component of the record.

Entries that have been disabled by administrative action or through conflict are not considered in computing consistency checks.

### 3.1.4.8 Privilege Methods

The message processing of methods in this section MUST use the abstract data model specified in section 3.1.1.2.1.

Method (opnum)	Summary
LsarEnumeratePrivileges (opnum 2)	Enumerates all privileges known to the server.
LsarLookupPrivilegeValue (opnum 31)	Maps the well-known name of a privilege into the server-specific locally unique identifier (LUID).
LsarLookupPrivilegeName (opnum 32)	Maps the server-specific LUID of a privilege into a well-known privilege name.
LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName (opnum 33)	Maps the well-known name of a privilege into a human-readable name in the caller's language.

#### 3.1.4.8.1 LsarEnumeratePrivileges (Opnum 2)

The LsarEnumeratePrivileges method is invoked to enumerate all privileges known to the system. This method can be called multiple times to return its output in fragments.

```
NTSTATUS LsarEnumeratePrivileges(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in, out] unsigned long* EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**EnumerationContext:** A pointer to a context value that is used to resume enumeration, if necessary.

**EnumerationBuffer:** A pointer to a structure that will contain the results of the enumeration.

**PreferredMaximumLength:** A value that indicates the approximate size of the data to be returned.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0x00000105 STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES	More information is available to successive calls.
0x8000001A STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES	No more entries are available from the enumeration.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters supplied was invalid. This can happen if <i>EnumerationBuffer</i> is NULL or <i>EnumerationContext</i> is NULL.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This method takes four arguments:

*PolicyHandle*: Open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_VIEW\_LOCAL\_INFORMATION.

*EnumerationContext*: A number that indicates a starting index at which to begin the enumeration. The server MUST always return all privileges in the same order, starting at the object whose index is *EnumerationContext*. To initiate a new enumeration, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to zero; otherwise, the client sets *EnumerationContext* to a value returned by a previous call to the method.

The server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if the *EnumerationContext* parameter is NULL.

*EnumerationBuffer*: Used to return the results of enumeration. The server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with as many privilege objects as possible, as determined by *PreferredMaximumLength*. If the size of all remaining objects is less than or equal to *PreferredMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with all objects. If the size of all remaining objects is greater than *PreferredMaximumLength*, the server MUST fill *EnumerationBuffer* with objects such that the size of the privilege objects returned is greater than or equal to *PreferredMaximumLength*, but would be less than *PreferredMaximumLength* if the last object had not been added to *EnumerationBuffer*. If there are no more objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_MORE\_ENTRIES. If there are more database objects than are returned in *EnumerationBuffer*, the server MUST set the *EnumerationContext* value to the index value that would allow it to resume enumeration correctly when this method is called again, and the server MUST return STATUS\_MORE\_ENTRIES. Note that this return value is not an error status.

*PreferredMaximumLength*: An indication about the approximate size, in bytes, of the data to return. Any unsigned 32-bit value is valid for the *PreferredMaximumLength* parameter.

### 3.1.4.8.2 LsarLookupPrivilegeValue (Opnum 31)

The LsarLookupPrivilegeValue method is invoked to map the name of a privilege into a locally unique identifier (LUID) by which the privilege is known on the server. The locally unique value of the privilege can then be used in subsequent calls to other methods, such as LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount.

```

NTSTATUS LsarLookupPrivilegeValue (
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING Name,
    [out] PLUID Value
);

```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**Name:** A string containing the name of a privilege.

**Value:** Used to return a LUID assigned by the server to the privilege by this name.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000060 STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE	The privilege name is not recognized by the server.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_LOOKUP\_NAMES.

*Name:* The string name of the privilege.

*Value:* Used to return the LUID corresponding to the *Name* argument.

If the value in the *Name* argument is not recognized by the server, the server MUST fail the request with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_PRIVILEGE. The privileges recognized by the server are specified in section 3.1.1.2.1.

### 3.1.4.8.3 LsarLookupPrivilegeName (Opnum 32)

The LsarLookupPrivilegeName method is invoked to map the LUID of a privilege into a string name by which the privilege is known on the server.

```

NTSTATUS LsarLookupPrivilegeName (
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLUID Value,
    [out] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING* Name
);

```

);

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**Value:** A LUID that the caller wishes to map to a string name.

**Name:** Used to return the string name corresponding to the supplied LUID.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000060 STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE	The supplied LUID is not recognized by the server.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_LOOKUP\_NAMES.

*Value:* The LUID of the privilege.

*Name:* Used to return the name corresponding to the LUID contained in the *Value* argument.

If the LUID in the *Value* argument is not recognized by the server, the server MUST fail the request with STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_PRIVILEGE. The privileges recognized by the server are specified in section 3.1.1.2.1.

#### 3.1.4.8.4 LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName (Opnum 33)

The LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName method is invoked to map the name of a privilege into a display text string in the caller's language.

```
NTSTATUS LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,  
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING Name,  
    [in] short ClientLanguage,  
    [in] short ClientSystemDefaultLanguage,  
    [out] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING* DisplayName,  
    [out] unsigned short* LanguageReturned  
);
```

**PolicyHandle:** An RPC context handle obtained from either LsarOpenPolicy or LsarOpenPolicy2.

**Name:** A string containing the name of a privilege.

**ClientLanguage:** An identifier of the client's language.

**ClientSystemDefaultLanguage:** An identifier of the default language of the caller's machine.

**DisplayName:** Used to return the display name of the privilege in the language pointed to by the *LanguageReturned* value.

**LanguageReturned:** An identifier of the language in which *DisplayName* was returned.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000060 STATUS_NO_SUCH_PRIVILEGE	The supplied LUID is not recognized by the server.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>PolicyHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This method takes six arguments:

*PolicyHandle:* An open handle to the policy object. If the handle is not a valid context handle to the policy object or *PolicyHandle.HandleType* does not equal "Policy", the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The server MUST verify that *PolicyHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to POLICY\_LOOKUP\_NAMES.

*Name:* A string name of the privilege. The server MUST attempt to locate the entry with the same name in the data store specified in section 3.1.1.2.1. If the entry cannot be located, the server MUST return STATUS\_NO\_SUCH\_PRIVILEGE.

*ClientLanguage:* A numerical identifier of the language in which the caller wishes to receive the display name. The server MUST try to locate the privilege description in the language that is identified by this parameter. If the data store does not have this language, the server MUST try the next parameter.

*ClientSystemDefaultLanguage:* An identifier of the default language of the caller. This **maymight** be different than the *ClientLanguage* parameter. If the data store does not have the description in the previous language, the server MUST try to find the description in this language.

*DisplayName:* Used to return the description of the privilege. If neither *ClientLanguage* nor *ClientSystemDefaultLanguage* can be found, the server MUST return the description in the server's own language.

*LanguageReturned:* Used to return the language ID of *DisplayName*. This **maymight** be different from the language ID that was requested.

### 3.1.4.9 Common Object Methods

The message processing of methods in this section MUST use the abstract data model defined in section 3.1.1.

Method (Opnum)	Summary
LsarQuerySecurityObject (opnum 3)	Retrieves the security descriptor associated with an object.
LsarSetSecurityObject (opnum 4)	Sets a security descriptor on an object.
LsarDeleteObject (opnum 34)	Deletes an object from the policy database.
LsarClose (opnum 0)	Closes an open handle.

#### 3.1.4.9.1 LsarQuerySecurityObject (Opnum 3)

The LsarQuerySecurityObject method is invoked to query security information that is assigned to a database object. It returns the security descriptor of the object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarQuerySecurityObject(  
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE ObjectHandle,  
    [in] SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,  
    [out] PLSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR* SecurityDescriptor  
);
```

**ObjectHandle:** An open object handle of any type.

**SecurityInformation:** A bitmask specifying which portions of the security descriptor the caller is interested in.

**SecurityDescriptor:** Used to return the security descriptor containing the elements requested by the caller.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC00000BB STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED	The request is not supported.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>ObjectHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*ObjectHandle*: Can be an open handle of any type. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an object or *ObjectHandle.PolicyType* is not one of the following:

- "Policy" for handles to policy objects
- "Account" for handles to account objects
- "Secret" for handles to secret objects
- "Trusted Domain" for handles to trusted domain objects

the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The access required for a successful completion of this request depends on the *SecurityInformation* parameter. The server MUST verify that *ObjectHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following pseudocode specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check.

```

Set RequiredAccess equal to 0
IF ((SecurityInformation & OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION) || (SecurityInformation &
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION) || (SecurityInformation & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION)) THEN
    RequiredAccess |= READ_CONTROL
END IF
IF (SecurityInformation & SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) THEN
    RequiredAccess |= ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY
END IF

```

**SecurityInformation:** A set of bits specifying which portions of the security descriptor the caller is interested in retrieving. The various bits and the associated access rights are specified in section 2.2.1.3.

**SecurityDescriptor:** An output parameter. If access checks pass, the server MUST fill this information with a valid self-relative security descriptor containing only the fields requested by the caller. The server MUST NOT put information into the security descriptor that the caller did not request.

It is valid for the server to not support this method for all object types. If an object does not support this method, the server MUST return STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.<9293>

### 3.1.4.9.2 LsarSetSecurityObject (Opnum 4)

The LsarSetSecurityObject method is invoked to set a security descriptor on an object.

```

NTSTATUS LsarSetSecurityObject(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE ObjectHandle,
    [in] SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,
    [in] PLSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor
);

```

**ObjectHandle:** An open handle to an existing object.

**SecurityInformation:** A bitmask specifying which portions of the security descriptor are to be set.

**SecurityDescriptor:** The security descriptor to be set.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC000009A STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES	There are insufficient resources to complete the request.



Return value/code	Description
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC0000079 STATUS_INVALID_SECURITY_DESCR	The supplied security descriptor is invalid.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One of the parameters supplied was invalid. For instance, <i>SecurityDescriptor</i> is NULL.
0xC00000BB STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED	The operation is not supported for this object.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>ObjectHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes three arguments:

*ObjectHandle*: Can be an open handle of any type. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an object or *ObjectHandle.PolicyType* is not one of the following:

- "Policy" for handles to policy objects
- "Account" for handles to account objects
- "Secret" for handles to secret objects
- "Trusted Domain" for handles to trusted domain objects

the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The access required for a successful completion of this request depends on the *SecurityInformation* parameter. The server MUST verify that *ObjectHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2. The following pseudocode specifies the RequiredAccess value to use in this access check.

```

Set RequiredAccess equal to 0
IF ((SecurityInformation & OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION) || (SecurityInformation &
GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION) || (SecurityInformation & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION)) THEN
    RequiredAccess |= READ_CONTROL
END IF
IF (SecurityInformation & SACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) THEN
    RequiredAccess |= ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY
END IF

```

*SecurityInformation*: A set of bits specifying which portions of the security descriptor the caller is interested in setting. The various bits and the associated access rights are specified in section 2.2.1.3.

*SecurityDescriptor*: Expects a valid self-relative security descriptor that the caller is trying to set. If this security descriptor is invalid, the server MUST return the STATUS\_INVALID\_SECURITY\_DESCR status code. If the security descriptor is NULL, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.

It is valid for the server to not support this method for all object types. <9394>

The server MUST return STATUS\_INSUFFICIENT\_RESOURCES if it runs out of memory while servicing the request.

### 3.1.4.9.3 LsarDeleteObject (Opnum 34)

The LsarDeleteObject method is invoked to delete an open account object, secret object, or trusted domain object.

```
NTSTATUS LsarDeleteObject(  
    [in, out] LSAPR_HANDLE* ObjectHandle  
);
```

**ObjectHandle:** A handle to an open object of the correct type to be deleted. After successful completion of the call, the handle value cannot be reused.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000022 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED	The caller does not have the permissions to perform this operation.
0xC000000D STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER	One or more of the supplied parameters was invalid.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>ObjectHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

This message takes one input parameter.

*ObjectHandle*: An open handle to an object that is to be deleted. If the handle is not a valid context handle to an object or *ObjectHandle*.PolicyType is not one of the following:

- "Policy" for handles to policy objects
- "Account" for handles to account objects
- "Secret" for handles to secret objects
- "Trusted Domain" for handles to trusted domain objects

the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. Policy objects cannot be deleted. Attempts to delete policy objects MUST fail with STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER. For other object types, the server MUST verify that *ObjectHandle* grants access as specified in section 3.1.4.2.2 with RequiredAccess set to DELETE.

The server MUST make all subsequent requests to deleted objects through already opened handles fail with STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE. The deleted handle MUST be automatically closed by the server; the caller need not close it.

If the object being deleted is a trusted domain, then the server MUST also check whether an interdomain trust account with name "<Trusted Domain NetBIOS Name>\$" exists. If it exists, the server MUST delete that account along with the trusted domain.

The server MUST free any resources associated with the LsaContextHandle element (section 3.1.1.7) that is represented by *ObjectHandle*, as specified in section 3.1.6.1, LSAPR\_HANDLE\_rundown.

The fact that a handle is no longer usable is communicated to the RPC transport by returning a NULL value in the handle parameter, as specified in [C706] section 5.1.6.

### 3.1.4.9.4 LsarClose (Opnum 0)

The LsarClose method frees the resources held by a context handle that was opened earlier. After response, the context handle will no longer be usable, and any subsequent uses of this handle will fail.

```
NTSTATUS LsarClose(
    [in, out] LSAPR_HANDLE* ObjectHandle
);
```

**ObjectHandle:** The context handle to be freed. On response, it MUST be set to 0.

**Return Values:** The following is a summary of the return values that an implementation MUST return, as specified by the message processing that follows.

Return value/code	Description
0x00000000 STATUS_SUCCESS	The request was successfully completed.
0xC0000008 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE	<i>ObjectHandle</i> is not a valid handle.

Processing:

A handle of any type can be closed by calling LsarClose. Successful calls to LsarDeleteObject, which deletes an object to which the caller has an open handle, will also close the handle.

If *ObjectHandle* is invalid, the server MUST return STATUS\_INVALID\_HANDLE.

The server MUST free any resources associated with the LsaContextHandle element (section 3.1.1.7) that is represented by *ObjectHandle*, as specified in section 3.1.6.1, LSAPR\_HANDLE\_rundown.

The fact that a handle is closed is communicated to the RPC transport by returning a NULL value in the handle parameter, as specified in [C706] section 5.1.6.

Closing one handle MUST NOT affect any other handle on the server; that is, handles obtained using a policy handle MUST continue to be valid after that policy handle is closed.

### 3.1.4.10 Data Validation

Data types defined in section 2.2 are subject to a set of validation rules, in addition to any already noted. For structures that contain other structures or sets of other structures, the validation for those structures MUST be enforced when validating the containing structure. All constraints in the following tables MUST be satisfied; on failure, an error NTSTATUS code MUST be returned.

Data type	Validations
LSA_UNICODE_STRING RPC_UNICODE_STRING LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Length MUST be a multiple of 2. &lt;9495&gt;</li> <li>▪ Length MUST be less than or equal to MaximumLength.</li> <li>▪ If Length is not 0, Buffer MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ The <b>Buffer</b> field MUST NOT contain any NULL Unicode</li> </ul>

Data type	Validations
	characters in the first <b>Length</b> bytes. <9596>
RPC_SID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revision MUST be 1.</li> <li>▪ SubAuthorityCount MUST be less than or equal to 15.</li> </ul> Additionally, if the security identifier (SID) is a domain SID: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ IdentifierAuthority MUST be {0,0,0,0,0,5}.</li> <li>▪ SubAuthorityCount MUST be greater than 3.</li> <li>▪ SubAuthority[0] MUST be 0x15.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revision MUST be 1.</li> <li>▪ The security descriptor must conform to the definition for self-relative security descriptor in [MS-DTYP] section 2.4.6.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Luid.HighPart SHOULD NOT be 0. &lt;9697&gt;</li> <li>▪ Luid.LowPart SHOULD be less than or equal to 35. &lt;9798&gt;</li> <li>▪ Attributes SHOULD have only combinations of bits (0x00000001 &amp; 0x00000002) set. &lt;9899&gt;</li> </ul>
LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If PrivilegeCount is not 0, Privilege MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each Privilege MUST pass validation for LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES.</li> <li>▪ There MUST be no duplicate elements in the Privilege array.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES	RootDirectory MUST be NULL.
ACCESS_MASK	SHOULD conform to the defined bits for ACCESS_MASK.
POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS	MUST be greater than or equal to one and MUST be less than or equal to 14, which corresponds to the value: PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation.
POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO	No additional validation.
LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ MaximumAuditEventCount MUST NOT be 0.</li> <li>▪ MaximumAuditEventCount MUST be less than or equal to 8.</li> <li>▪ EventAuditingOptions MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ EventAuditingOptions and 0xFFFFFFFF8 MUST be 0.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DomainName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING</li> </ul>

Data type	Validations
	validations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ DomainSid MUST satisfy RPC_SID validations, including those for domain SIDs.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validations.</li> <li>▪ Name.Length MUST be less than or equal 30.</li> <li>▪ SID MUST either be NULL or satisfy RPC_SID validations, including those for domain SIDs.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Name MUST pass RPC_UNICODE_STRING validations.</li> <li>▪ Name.Length MUST be less than or equal to 30.</li> <li>▪ DnsDomainName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validations.</li> <li>▪ DnsForestName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validations.</li> <li>▪ SID MUST either be NULL or satisfy RPC_SID validations, including those for domain SID.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO	Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validations.
POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO	LsaServerRole MUST be 2 OR 3.
LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE	MaximumLength MUST be greater than or equal to Length.
LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ReplicaSource MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ ReplicaAccountName must satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> </ul>
POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO	ModifiedId MUST not be 0.
POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO	No validation.
LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO	If InfoLength is not 0, EfsBlob MUST NOT be NULL.
TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS	MUST be greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 13.
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If IncomingAuthInfos is not 0, IncomingAuthenticationInformation MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ IncomingAuthInfos MUST be 0 or 1.</li> <li>▪ If OutgoingAuthInfos is not 0, OutgoingAuthenticationInformation MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ OutgoingAuthInfos MUST be 0 or 1.</li> <li>▪ Each IncomingPreviousAuthenticationInformation MUST satisfy validation for LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION.</li> </ul>

Data type	Validations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Each IncomingAuthenticationInformation MUST satisfy validation for LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION.</li> <li>▪ Each OutgoingPreviousAuthenticationInformation MUST satisfy validation for LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION.</li> <li>▪ Each OutgoingAuthenticationInformation MUST satisfy validation for LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Information MUST satisfy LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX validation.</li> <li>▪ AuthInformation MUST satisfy LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Information MUST satisfy LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 validation.</li> <li>▪ FlatName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ SID MUST be NULL or satisfy RPC_SID validation, including domain SID validation.</li> <li>▪ If ForestTrustLength is not 0, ForestTrustInfo MUST NOT be NULL.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION	If AuthInfoLength is not 0, AuthInfo MUST NOT be NULL.
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ SID MUST satisfy RPC_SID validation, including domain SID validation.</li> <li>▪ DnsName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ NetbiosName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> </ul>
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA	If Length is not 0, Buffer MUST NOT be NULL.
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ For ForestTrustType = ForestTrustTopLevelName or ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx, ForestTrustData.TopLevelName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ For ForestTrustType = ForestTrustDomainInfo, ForestTrustData.DomainInfo MUST satisfy LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO validation.</li> </ul>
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If RecordCount is not 0, Entries MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each one of Entries MUST satisfy LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD validation.</li> </ul>

Data type	Validations
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD	Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If RecordCount is not 0, Entries MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each one of Entries MUST satisfy LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_HANDLE	MUST not be NULL.
LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION	SID MUST satisfy RPC_SID validation.
LSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If EntriesRead is not 0, Information MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each Information element MUST satisfy LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF	Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.
LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If Entries is not 0, Privileges MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each element in Entries MUST satisfy LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_BASIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ SID MUST be NULL or MUST satisfy RPC_SID validation including domain SID validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If EntriesRead is not 0, Information MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each element in Information MUST satisfy LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO	OldPassword and Password MUST satisfy LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE validation.
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO	Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.
LSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If Entries is not 0, UserRights MUST NOT be NULL.</li> <li>▪ Each element in UserRights MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> </ul>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Name MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ FlatName MUST satisfy RPC_UNICODE_STRING validation.</li> <li>▪ SID MUST be NULL or MUST satisfy RPC_SID validation including domain SID validation.</li> </ul>

### **3.1.5 Timer Events**

No protocol timer events are required on the RPC server other than the timers required in the underlying RPC transport.

### **3.1.6 Other Local Events**

No additional local events are used on the RPC server other than the events maintained in the underlying RPC transport.

#### **3.1.6.1 LSAPR\_HANDLE\_rundown**

This function implements the RPC context handle rundown routine for the LsaContextHandle context handle type (section 3.1.1.7). When invoked, the LSAPR\_HANDLE\_rundown procedure **MUST** free all server resources associated with LsaContextHandle.Object. The server **MUST** then set LsaContextHandle.Object to 0.

For more information, see [C706] section 5.1.6. An implementation of this protocol **SHOULD** use this functionality.



## 4 Protocol Examples

The following sections describe several common scenarios from the client's perspective to illustrate the function of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol. "Send" implies that the direction is from client to server, and "Receive" implies the opposite direction.

### 4.1 Manipulating Account Objects

This section illustrates a message exchange pertaining to account objects.

1. Message 1: Open the policy object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	SystemName	"Arbitrary String"
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	ObjectAttributes	Ignored, except for the <b>RootDirectory</b> field, which is NULL.
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	DesiredAccess	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION   POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT   POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES

2. Message 2: Success; return the policy object handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarOpenPolicy2	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarOpenPolicy2	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value]

3. Message 3: Attempt to create an account object with security identifier (SID) S-1-5-21-123-123-123-1005.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarCreateAccount	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarCreateAccount	AccountSid	"S-1-5-21-123-123-123-1005"
Send LsarCreateAccount	DesiredAccess	READ_CONTROL   WRITE_DAC   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_SYSTEM_ACCESS   ACCOUNT_VIEW

4. Message 4: Failure: Account already exists.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarCreateAccount	Status	STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarCreateAccount	AccountHandle	NULL

5. Message 5: Attempt to open the account object with SID S-1-5-21-123-123-123-1005.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarOpenAccount	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value]
Send LsarOpenAccount	AccountSid	"S-1-5-21-123-123-123-1005"
Send LsarOpenAccount	DesiredAccess	READ_CONTROL   WRITE_DAC   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES   ACCOUNT_ADJUST_SYSTEM_ACCESS   ACCOUNT_VIEW

6. Message 6: Success: Return the account object handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarOpenAccount	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarOpenAccount	AccountHandle	[Implementation-specific value]

7. Message 7: Retrieve the security descriptor of the account object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarQuerySecurityObject	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]
Send LsarQuerySecurityObject	SecurityInformation	DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION

8. Message 8: Success: Return the security descriptor.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarQuerySecurityObject	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarQuerySecurityObject	SecurityDescriptor	Security descriptor of the account object in self-relative form.

9. Message 9: Update the discretionary access control list (DACL) on the account object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarSetSecurityObject	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarSetSecurityObject	SecurityInformation	DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION
Send LsarSetSecurityObject	SecurityDescriptor	Security descriptor representation of the DACL in self-relative form.

10. Message 10: Success: Security descriptor of the account object has been updated.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarSetSecurityObject	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

11. Message 11: Retrieve the Locally Unique Identifier (LUID) that the server assigns to the "SeTcbPrivilege" privilege.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarLookupPrivilegeValue	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarLookupPrivilegeValue	Name	"SeTcbPrivilege"

12. Message 12: Success: Return the LUID of SeTcbPrivilege.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarLookupPrivilegeValue	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarLookupPrivilegeValue	Value	The LUID assigned by the server to SeTcbPrivilege.

13. Message 13: Add a privilege to the account object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount	AccountHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]
Send LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount	Privileges	A LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET structure containing one privilege (the LUID of which was returned in Step 12).

14. Message 14: Success: Privilege has been added to the account object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

15. Message 15: Add a system access right to the account object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarSetSystemAccessAccount	AccountHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]
Send LsarSetSystemAccessAccount	SystemAccess	An unsigned long value with the POLICY_MODE_NETWORK flag set

16. Message 16: Success: Access right has been recorded.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarSetSystemAccessAccount	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

17. Message 17: Done with this account object: Close the handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarClose	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]

18. Message 18: Success: Account objects handle has been closed.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarClose	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

19. Message 19: Done with the policy object: Close the handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarClose	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]

20. Message 20: Success: Policy object has been closed.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarClose	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

## 4.2 Manipulating Secret Objects

This section illustrates a message exchange pertaining to secret objects.

1. Message 1: Open the policy object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send	SystemName	"Arbitrary String"

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
LsarOpenPolicy2		
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	ObjectAttributes	Ignored, except for the <b>RootDirectory</b> field, which is NULL.
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	DesiredAccess	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION   POLICY_CREATE_SECRET

2. Message 2: Success: Policy object opened successfully.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarOpenPolicy2	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarOpenPolicy2	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value]

3. Message 3: Attempt to create a secret objects with name "NL\$".

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarCreateSecret	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarCreateSecret	Secretname	"NL\$"
Send LsarCreateSecret	DesiredAccess	SECRET_SET_VALUE

4. Message 4: Failure: Secret name "NL\$" is a reserved prefix name and cannot be used.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarCreateSecret	Status	STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
Receive LsarCreateSecret	SecretHandle	NULL

5. Message 5: Attempt to create a secret object with name "MyBigSecret".

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarCreateSecret	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarCreateSecret	Secretname	"MyBigSecret"
Send LsarCreateSecret	DesiredAccess	SECRET_SET_VALUE

6. Message 6: Success: Secret created.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarCreateSecret	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarCreateSecret	SecretHandle	[Implementation-specific value]

7. Message 7: Set the value of the secret object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarSetSecret	SecretHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]
Send LsarSetSecret	EncryptedCurrentValue	Byte BLOB value encrypted with session key.
Send LsarSetSecret	EncryptedOldValue	NULL

8. Message 8: Success: Secret value set.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarSetSecret	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

9. Message 9: Done with this secret; close the handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarClose	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 6.]

10. Message 10: Success: Secret handle has been closed.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarClose	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

11. Message 11: Done with the policy handle; close the handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarClose	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]

12. Message 12: Success: Policy handle has been closed.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarClose	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

### 4.3 Manipulating Trusted Domain Objects

This section illustrates a message exchange pertaining to trusted domain objects.

1. Message 1: Open the policy object.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	SystemName	"Arbitrary String"
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	ObjectAttributes	Ignored, except for the <b>RootDirectory</b> field, which is NULL.
Send LsarOpenPolicy2	DesiredAccess	POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION

2. Message 2: Success; return the policy object handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarOpenPolicy2	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarOpenPolicy2	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value]

3. Message 3: Enumerate trusted domain objects.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	EnumerationContext	0
Send LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	PreferredMaximumLength	0x100

4. Message 4: Success; return some trusted domain objects, with more to come.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	Status	STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES
Receive LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	EnumerationContext	[Implementation-specific value]
Receive LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	TrustedDomainInformation	EntriesRead: 2 EnumerationBuffer: Contains information about two different trusted domain objects.

5. Message 5: Finish enumerating the trusted domain objects.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	EnumerationContext	[Value returned in Step 4.]
Send LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	PreferredMaximumLength	0x10000

6. Message 6: Success; all trusted domain objects have been enumerated.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	Status	STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES
Receive LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	EnumerationContext	[Implementation-specific value]
Receive LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx	TrustedDomainInformation	EntriesRead: 3 EnumerationBuffer: Contains information about three different trusted domain objects.

7. Message 7: Open a trusted domain object by name.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName	PolicyHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]
Send LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName	TrustedDomainName	[One of the DNS names returned in Step 4 or Step 6.]
Send LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName	DesiredAccess	POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN

8. Message 8: Success; the trusted domain object has been opened successfully.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS
Receive LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName	TrustedDomainHandle	[Implementation-specific value]

9. Message 9: Done with this trusted domain object: Close the handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarClose	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 8.]

10. Message 10: Success: Trusted domain object has been closed.



Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarClose	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

11. Message 11: Done with the policy object: Close the handle.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Send LsarClose	ObjectHandle	[Implementation-specific value returned in Step 2.]

12. Message 12: Success: Policy object has been closed.

Direction and method	Parameter field	Parameter value
Receive LsarClose	Status	STATUS_SUCCESS

#### 4.4 Structure Example of LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB

The following is an annotated dump of LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB.

```

00000000 93 1e 54 57 83 78 c6 c1 15 f1 13 85 3d 93 18 1d ..TW.x.....=...
00000010 b4 eb ee 6b fa 79 f5 2e 8d cb b4 e3 e3 54 8a 81 ...k.y.....T..
00000020 b6 38 0f 6c 4d 6b 2b 36 4f a5 ce d8 82 44 52 23 .8.lMk+6O....DR#
00000030 fc 40 b4 fd e2 71 78 95 f4 d5 29 e1 11 7a 8c 67 .@...qx...)..z.g
00000040 2f 3d 69 a3 54 cd 47 79 ca 3f a8 a9 4f 08 85 9d /=i.T.Gy.?..O...
00000050 93 fb 56 0b db 84 9e bb da c4 fd 58 3d 88 55 c7 ..V.....X=.U.
00000060 bb 5a 2d aa e3 26 23 a5 12 b1 1c 23 1a aa 72 26 .Z-...&#....#..r&
00000070 9f 57 b2 89 be 37 ec 32 83 25 6c fe 7c ae 09 2b .W...7.2.%l.|..+
00000080 27 15 20 01 c2 7a d3 2a e1 e5 5e 0c 16 17 10 4d '. ..z.*...^....M
00000090 6a dc 9b 3e 09 43 5a 66 8e 17 4c 27 d1 40 9b 19 j...>.CZf..L'..@..
000000a0 82 ab d4 81 07 83 78 98 78 a1 f8 2a b2 9b 7c 5f .....x.x.*...|
000000b0 81 6f 11 37 e1 e5 90 4b 47 b4 0d 9a ac 3b 35 40 .o.7...KG....;5@
000000c0 79 45 04 0e 59 07 67 ea f2 ea 57 c2 5d 25 03 94 yE..Y.g...W.]%..
000000d0 46 35 7c 1f 01 e4 89 d9 1b 9d fe 94 e8 9e 3f 4e F5|.....?N
000000e0 b1 18 43 2f 27 a7 f1 0a ff 1d 42 e2 ce 54 f9 2a ..C/'.....B..T.*
000000f0 b9 b2 43 81 f0 ed 22 2d e0 a0 37 2a c1 19 67 f0 ..C..."-..7*.g.
00000100 fa 5f 37 0a 9f 58 90 77 eb 0a 95 1c fe 5f a0 e7 ..7..X.w....._..
00000110 dc 4f 28 fa 18 d7 22 23 9b 54 e7 fd e5 ed 67 a2 .O(..."#.T....g.
00000120 da a4 3d cb 0b f3 5a ce e9 dd de 0b d6 e7 e5 91 ..=...Z.....
00000130 92 20 8f ac 2f bc be 11 55 b1 5e 0a 79 ed 00 4a .../...U.^..y..J
00000140 e6 94 34 8e 29 09 ef b5 2e 36 62 73 84 4d 4a 77 ..4.)....6bs.MJw
00000150 3f df 9a 6f 4f 3c 3e 1a 11 e7 1c 8d 84 43 2e 1a ?...oO<>.....C..
00000160 aa 59 88 96 47 0b f0 6d 29 27 7b 68 c2 7b 2e be .Y..G..m)'{h.{..
00000170 03 07 43 bf 8a 96 80 30 b9 1c 1e 36 e4 c0 d1 a6 ..C.....0....6....
00000180 a0 35 75 71 d5 ac f1 a3 1c d4 29 ee 40 50 68 93 .5uq.....).@Ph.
00000190 02 e7 aa 96 43 c2 46 1d cd f3 ba 9c 94 ff f6 74 ....C.F.....t
000001a0 3c 19 5f f6 1d 1c 11 42 ff 3e 34 0b 94 48 dc de <_.....B.>4..H..
000001b0 5d 74 7e 33 d8 cd 58 20 20 38 1a d5 e4 b6 fd 1d ]t~3..X 8.....
000001c0 c3 a7 ef 40 82 11 4c dc 2b 7e b4 ea 1a 85 ce f8 ...@..L.+~.....
000001d0 87 a3 ed 20 ff 50 4f ee 6c c3 b1 4c 2a 17 96 61 ... .PO.l..L*..a
000001e0 bc 5b 5e 17 52 d0 92 9e 11 70 d0 1d 98 a7 56 fa .[^.R....p....V.
000001f0 69 95 6c 78 22 34 70 03 75 77 60 c5 3b 2f 42 e0 i.lx"4p.uw`;/B.
00000200 01 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 49 42 b8 1c .....0....IB..
00000210 b4 55 c9 01 02 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 4f 75 74 67 .U.....Outg
00000220 6f 69 6e 67 41 75 74 68 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 oingAuthInfo....
00000230 49 42 b8 1c b4 55 c9 01 02 00 00 19 00 00 00 IB...U.....
00000240 4f 75 74 67 6f 69 6e 67 50 72 65 76 69 6f 75 73 OutgoingPrevious

```

```

00000250 41 75 74 68 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 AuthInfo.....
00000260 0c 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 49 42 b8 1c b4 55 c9 01 ....0...IB...U..
00000270 02 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 49 6e 63 6f 6d 69 6e 67 .....Incoming
00000280 41 75 74 68 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 49 42 b8 1c AuthInfo...IB..
00000290 b4 55 c9 01 02 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 49 6e 63 6f .U.....Inco
000002a0 6d 69 6e 67 50 72 65 76 69 6f 75 73 41 75 74 68 mingPreviousAuth
000002b0 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 5c 00 00 00 5c 00 00 00 Info....\...\...

```

The LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB leads with 512 bytes of random data:

```

00000000 93 1e 54 57 83 78 c6 c1 15 f1 13 85 3d 93 18 1d ..TW.x.....=...
00000010 b4 eb ee 6b fa 79 f5 2e 8d cb b4 e3 e3 54 8a 81 ...k.y.....T..
00000020 b6 38 0f 6c 4d 6b 2b 36 4f a5 ce d8 82 44 52 23 .8.lMk+6O....DR#
00000030 fc 40 b4 fd e2 71 78 95 f4 d5 29 e1 11 7a 8c 67 .@...qx...)z.g
00000040 2f 3d 69 a3 54 cd 47 79 ca 3f a8 a9 4f 08 85 9d /=i.T.Gy?...O...
00000050 93 fb 56 cb db 84 9e bb da c4 fd 58 3d 88 55 c7 ..V.....X=.U.
00000060 bb 5a 2d aa e3 26 23 a5 12 b1 1c 23 1a aa 72 26 .Z-..&#...#.r&
00000070 9f 57 b2 89 be 37 ec 32 83 25 6c fe 7c ae 09 2b .W...7.2.%l.|.+
00000080 27 15 20 01 c2 7a d3 2a e1 e5 5e 0c 16 17 10 4d '. ..z.*...^....M
00000090 6a dc 9b 3e 09 43 5a 66 8e 17 4c 27 d1 40 9b 19 j..>.CZf..L'.@..
000000a0 82 ab d4 81 07 83 78 98 78 a1 f8 2a b2 9b 7c 5f .....x.x...*..|_
000000b0 81 6f 11 37 e1 e5 90 4b 47 b4 0d 9a ac 3b 35 40 .o.7...KG....;5@
000000c0 79 45 04 0e 59 07 67 ea f2 ea 57 c2 5d 25 03 94 yE..Y.g...W.]%.
000000d0 46 35 7c 1f 01 e4 89 d9 1b 9d fe 94 e8 9e 3f 4e F5|.....?N
000000e0 b1 18 43 2f 27 a7 f1 0a ff 1d 42 e2 ce 54 f9 2a ..C/'.....B..T.*
000000f0 b9 b2 43 81 f0 ed 22 2d e0 a0 37 2a c1 19 67 f0 ..C..."-..7*..g.
00000100 fa 5f 37 0a 9f 58 90 77 eb 0a 95 1c fe 5f a0 e7 .7...X.w....._..
00000110 dc 4f 28 fa 18 d7 22 23 9b 54 e7 fd e5 ed 67 a2 .O(..."#.T....g.
00000120 da a4 3d cb 0b f3 5a ce e9 dd de 0b d6 e7 e5 91 ..=...Z.....
00000130 92 20 8f ac 2f bc be 11 55 b1 5e 0a 79 ed 00 4a . ./...U.^..y..J
00000140 e6 94 34 8e 29 09 ef b5 2e 36 62 73 84 4d 4a 77 .4.)....6bs.MJw
00000150 3f df 9a 6f 4f 3c 3e 1a 11 e7 1c 8d 84 43 2e 1a ?..oO<>.....C..
00000160 aa 59 88 96 47 0b f0 6d 29 27 7b 68 c2 7b 2e be .Y..G..m)'{h.{..
00000170 03 07 43 bf 8a 96 80 30 b9 1c 1e 36 e4 c0 d1 a6 ..C....0...6....
00000180 a0 35 75 71 d5 ac f1 a3 1c d4 29 ee 40 50 68 93 .5uq.....)@Ph.
00000190 02 e7 aa 96 43 c2 46 1d cd f3 ba 9c 94 ff f6 74 ....C.F.....t
000001a0 3c 19 5f f6 1d 1c 11 42 ff 3e 34 0b 94 48 dc de <_.....B.>4..H..
000001b0 5d 74 7e 33 d8 cd 58 20 20 38 1a d5 e4 b6 fd 1d ]t~3..X 8.....
000001c0 c3 a7 ef 40 82 11 4c dc 2b 7e b4 ea 1a 85 ce f8 ...@..L.+~.....
000001d0 87 a3 ed 20 ff 50 4f ee 6c c3 b1 4c 2a 17 96 61 ... .PO.l..L*..a
000001e0 bc 5b 5e 17 52 d0 92 9e 11 70 d0 1d 98 a7 56 fa .[^.R....p....V.
000001f0 69 95 6c 78 22 34 70 03 75 77 60 c5 3b 2f 42 e0 i.lx"4p.uw`.;/B.

```

The data following that is for **CountOutgoingAuthInfos**, in little-endian byte order:

```
00000200 01 00 00 00 ....
```

This indicates that there is one entry present in the **CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos** field.

The data following that is for **ByteOffsetCurrentOutgoingAuthInfo**, in little-endian byte order:

```
00000204 0c 00 00 00 ....
```

This means that the byte offset from the beginning of **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** to the start of the **CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos** field is 0x0000000c.

The data following that is for **ByteOffsetPreviousOutgoingAuthInfo**, in little-endian byte order:

```
00000208 30 00 00 00 0...
```

This means that the byte offset from the beginning of **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** to the start of the **PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos** field is 0x00000030, so the size of **CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos** is 0x30 - 0xc = 0x24 bytes.

The data following that is for **CurrentOutgoingAuthInfos**; the last 3 padding bytes are for data alignment purposes:

```
0000020c                                49 42 b8 1c                                IB..
00000210  b4 55 c9 01 02 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 4f 75 74 67  .U.....Outg
00000220  6f 69 6e 67 41 75 74 68 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00  oingAuthInfo....
```

This is an array of **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.17) entries in self-relative format.

The data following that is for **PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos**; the last 3 padding bytes are for data alignment purposes:

```
00000230  49 42 b8 1c b4 55 c9 01 02 00 00 00 19 00 00 00  IB...U.....
00000240  4f 75 74 67 6f 69 6e 67 50 72 65 76 69 6f 75 73  OutgoingPrevious
00000250  41 75 74 68 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00  AuthInfo....
```

This is an array of **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in self-relative format.

The data following that is for **CountIncomingAuthInfos**, in little-endian byte order:

```
0000025c  01 00 00 00  ....
```

This means there is one entry present in the **CountIncomingAuthInfos** field.

The data following that is for **ByteOffsetCurrentIncomingAuthInfo**, in little-endian byte order:

```
00000260  0c 00 00 00  ....
```

This means that the byte offset from the beginning of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** to the start of the **CurrentIncomingAuthInfos** field is 0x0000000c.

The data following that is for **ByteOffsetPreviousIncomingAuthInfo**, in little-endian byte order:

```
00000264  30 00 00 00  0...
```

This means that the byte offset from the beginning of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** to the start of the **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** field is 0x00000030, so the size of **CurrentIncomingAuthInfos** is 0x30 - 0xc = 0x24 bytes.

The data following that is for **CurrentIncomingAuthInfos**; the last 3 padding bytes are for data alignment purposes:

```
00000268                                49 42 b8 1c b4 55 c9 01                                IB...U..
00000270  02 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 49 6e 63 6f 6d 69 6e 67  .....Incoming
00000280  41 75 74 68 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00  AuthInfo....
```

This is an array of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in self-relative format.

The data following that is for **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos**; the last 3 padding bytes are for data alignment purposes:

```
0000028c          49 42 b8 1c          IB..
00000290 b4 55 c9 01 02 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 49 6e 63 6f .U.....Inco
000002a0 6d 69 6e 67 50 72 65 76 69 6f 75 73 41 75 74 68 mingPreviousAuth
000002b0 49 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00          Info....
```

This is an array of **CountIncomingAuthInfos** of LSAPR\_AUTH\_INFORMATION entries in self-relative format.

The data following that is for **OutgoingAuthInfoSize**, in little-endian byte order:

```
000002b8 5c 00 00 00 \...
```

This means that the size, in bytes, of the sub-portion of the structure from the beginning of the **CountOutgoingAuthInfos** field through the end of the of the **PreviousOutgoingAuthInfos** field is 0x0000005c.

The data following that is for **IncomingAuthInfoSize**, in little-endian byte order:

```
000002bc 5c 00 00 00 \...
```

This means that the size, in bytes, of the sub-portion of the structure from the beginning of the **CountIncomingAuthInfos** field through the end of the of the **PreviousIncomingAuthInfos** field is 0x0000005c.

## 5 Security

### 5.1 Security Considerations for Implementers

Usage of RC4 is specified in section 5.1.1. This protocol employs an implementation that reuses RC4 key stream, which subjects it to XOR and other cryptanalysis attacks. This vulnerability is applicable when multiple RC4-encrypted opnum requests are made over the same transport session, as specified in section 2.1.

Usage of Data Encryption Standard (DES) in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode is specified in section 5.1.2. This algorithm is considered inadequate for maintaining confidentiality considering the efficiency of brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks that are enabled by using year 2006, off-the-shelf computer hardware.

The session key for sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 is obtained from the SMB transport, as specified in section 2.1. The session key is obtained from the SMB transport every time a message that needs encryption is to be sent or a message that needs decryption is to be received.

#### 5.1.1 RC4 Cipher Usage

Implementations of this protocol protect the LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB structure by encrypting the data referenced by that structure's **AuthBlob** field. The RC4 algorithm is used to encrypt the data on request (and reply) and decrypt the data on receipt. The key, required during runtime by the RC4 algorithm, is the 16-byte key specified by the method that uses this structure (for example, see section 3.1.4.7.10). The size of data (the **AuthSize** field of LSAPR\_TRUSTED\_DOMAIN\_AUTH\_BLOB) must remain unencrypted.

#### 5.1.2 Secret Encryption and Decryption

This cipher is used to provide confidentiality of wire traffic for operations that reference this section.

The `encrypt_secret` routine is used to encrypt a cleartext value into ciphertext prior to transmission. The `decrypt_secret` routine is used to decrypt a ciphertext value into cleartext after receipt. The appropriate mode is selected based on the requirements of the interface.

The definitions of **des\_ecb\_lm\_dec** and **des\_ecb\_lm\_enc** are specified in section 5.1.3.

```
encrypt_secret(input : LSA_UNICODE_STRING, sessionkey : byte[16],
output : LSA_UNICODE_STRING)
{
    LET blocklen be 8
    LET keyindex be 0

    // Set version, length
    // temporary buffer.
    LET buffer be an array of blocklen bytes
    DECLEAR Version as ULONG
    SET Version to 1
    SET buffer to input->length
    SET (buffer + 4) to Version

    CALL des_ecb_lm_enc(buffer, sessionkey[keyindex],
        output->buffer)

    INCREMENT output->buffer by blocklen
    INCREMENT output->length by blocklen

    SET keyindex to AdvanceKey(keyindex)

    LET remaining be input->length
```

```

WHILE remaining > blocklen
    CALL des_ecb_lm_enc(input->buffer,
        sessionkey[keyindex], output->buffer)

    INCREMENT input->buffer by blocklen
    INCREMENT output->buffer by blocklen
    INCREMENT output->length by blocklen

    SET keyindex to AdvanceKey(keyindex)

    DECREMENT remaining by blocklen
ENDWHILE

IF (remaining > 0) THEN
    // zero pad the last block.
    SET bytes in buffer to 0
    COPY remaining bytes from input->buffer to buffer

    CALL des_ecb_lm_enc(buffer, sessionkey[keyindex],
        output->buffer)

    INCREMENT output->length by blocklen
ENDIF
}

decrypt_secret(input : LSA_UNICODE_STRING, sessionkey : byte[16],
output : LSA_UNICODE_STRING)
{
    LET keyindex be 0
    LET blocklen be 8

    // Check version, get clear length.
    CALL des_ecb_lm_dec(input->buffer, sessionkey[keyindex],
        output->buffer)

    LET outputlength be output[0]
    LET version be output[1]

    IF (version ≠ 1) THEN // version check
        FAIL
    ENDIF

    INCREMENT input->buffer by blocklen

    SET keyindex to AdvanceKey(keyindex)

    LET remaining be outputlength

    WHILE remaining > blocklen
        CALL des_ecb_lm_dec(input->buffer,
            sessionkey[keyindex], output->buffer)

        INCREMENT input->buffer by blocklen
        INCREMENT output->buffer by blocklen

        SET keyindex to AdvanceKey(keyindex)

        DECREMENT remaining by blocklen
    ENDWHILE

    IF (remaining > 0) THEN
        CALL des_ecb_lm_dec(input->buffer,
            sessionkey[keyindex], output->buffer)
    ENDIF

    SET output->length to outputlength
}

```

```

ULONG AdvanceKey(pos : ULONG)
{
    LET KeyBlockLen be 7;
    DECLARE overrun as ULONG
    DECLARE currpos as ULONG;
    DECLARE nextpos as ULONG;

    LET pos = pos + KeyBlockLen;
    LET currpos = pos;
    LET nextpos = pos + KeyBlockLen;

    IF (nextpos > sizeof(sessionKey)) THEN
        LET overrun = nextpos- sizeof(sessionKey);
        LET currpos = (KeyBlockLen - overrun);
    ENDIF
    RETURN currpos;
}

```

### 5.1.3 DES-ECB-LM Cipher Definition

des\_ecb\_lm\_dec utilizes DES-ECB-LM in cipher-mode decryption.

des\_ecb\_lm\_enc utilizes DES-ECB-LM in cipher-mode encryption.

DES-ECB-LM is defined as follows.

```

des_ecb_lm( input:byte[8], encryptionKey: byte[8],
            output:byte[8])
InputKey:byte[7]
OutputKey:byte[8]
Let InputKey be the first 7 bytes of encryptionKey [0-6]
OutputKey[0] = InputKey[0] >> 0x01;
OutputKey[1] = ((InputKey[0]&0x01)<<6 | (InputKey[1]>>2);
OutputKey[2] = ((InputKey[1]&0x03)<<5 | (InputKey[2]>>3);
OutputKey[3] = ((InputKey[2]&0x07)<<4 | (InputKey[3]>>4);
OutputKey[4] = ((InputKey[3]&0x0F)<<3 | (InputKey[4]>>5);
OutputKey[5] = ((InputKey[4]&0x1F)<<2 | (InputKey[5]>>6);
OutputKey[6] = ((InputKey[5]&0x3F)<<1 | (InputKey[6]>>7);
OutputKey[7] = InputKey[6] & 0x7F;
((unsigned long*)OutputKey)[0] <<= 1;
((unsigned long*)OutputKey)[1] <<= 1;
((unsigned long*)OutputKey)[0] &= 0xfefefefe;
((unsigned long*)OutputKey)[1] &= 0xfefefefe;
Let the left-most bit of OutputKey be the parity bit. That is,
if the sum of the other 7 bits is odd, the parity bit is zero;
otherwise the parity bit is one. The processing starts at the
left-most bit of OutputKey.
des_ecb( input, OutputKey, output )
END

```

The algorithm des\_ecb is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, as specified in [FIPS81].

### 5.1.4 Encryption and Decryption Examples

This section provides an encryption and decryption example of the algorithms specified in section 5.1.2.

### 5.1.4.1 Encryption Example

This section provides an example of how the `encrypt_secret` routine defined in section 5.1.2 encrypts a given cleartext value into a ciphertext using a session key, and given the following parameters:

Parameters	Value
<i>input</i>	50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 31 00 32 00 33 00
<i>sessionkey</i>	4e 98 c9 10 b2 a9 88 d7 92 fb 5a a3 3e 8e f7 86

The following table describes the values *keyindex* (defined in `encrypt_secret`) and *input*, *InputKey*, *OutputKey*, and *output* (defined in `des_ecb_lm`) after successive calls to `des_ecb_lm_enc`.

keyindex	input	InputKey	OutputKey	output
0	16 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	4e 98 c9 10 b2 a9 88	4f 4c 32 23 0b 94 a7 10	af 78 44 03 fb a0 92 27
7	50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00	d7 92 fb 5a a3 3e 8e	d6 c8 bf 6b ab 19 fb 1c	8c 95 fc 7e 88 56 4c cd
2	77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00	c9 10 b2 a9 88 d7 92	c8 89 2c 54 98 46 5e 25	7c d0 c2 41 da 6f 14 41
9	31 00 32 00 33 00 00 00	fb 5a a3 3e 8e f7 86	fb ad a8 67 e9 76 df 0d	56 26 cd a5 81 e9 22 3d

The *output* variable fields are:

Parameters	Value
<i>output-&gt;buffer</i>	af 78 44 03 fb a0 92 27 8c 95 fc 7e 88 56 4c cd 7c d0 c2 41 da 6f 14 41 56 26 cd a5 81 e9 22 3d
<i>output-&gt;length</i>	0x20

### 5.1.4.2 Decryption Example

This section provides an example of how the `decrypt_secret` routine defined in section 5.1.2 decrypts a given ciphertext value into cleartext using a session key, and given the following parameters:

Parameters	Value
<i>Input</i>	af 78 44 03 fb a0 92 27 8c 95 fc 7e 88 56 4c cd 7c d0 c2 41 da 6f 14 41 56 26 cd a5 81 e9 22 3d
<i>sessionkey</i>	4e 98 c9 10 b2 a9 88 d7 92 fb 5a a3 3e 8e f7 86

The following table describes the values *keyindex* (defined in `decrypt_secret`) and *input*, *InputKey*, *OutputKey*, and *output* (defined in `des_ecb_lm`) after successive calls to `des_ecb_lm_dec`.

keyindex	input	InputKey	OutputKey	output
0	af 78 44 03 fb a0 92 27	4e 98 c9 10 b2 a9 88	4f 4c 32 23 0b 94 a7 10	16 00 00 00



keyindex	input	InputKey	OutputKey	output
				01 00 00 00
7	8c 95 fc 7e 88 56 4c cd	d7 92 fb 5a a3 3e 8e	d6 c8 bf 6b ab 19 fb 1c	50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00
2	7c d0 c2 41 da 6f 14 41	c9 10 b2 a9 88 d7 92	c8 89 2c 54 98 46 5e 25	77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00
9	56 26 cd a5 81 e9 22 3d	fb 5a a3 3e 8e f7 86	fb ad a8 67 e9 76 df 0d	31 00 32 00 33 00 00 00

The *output* variable fields are:

Parameters	Value
<i>output-&gt;buffer</i>	50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 31 00 32 00 33 00 00 00
<i>output-&gt;length</i>	0x16

## 5.2 Index of Security Parameters

Security parameter	Section
Usage of RC4 stream cipher	5.1.1
Usage of DES_ECB_LM	5.1.2

## 6 Appendix A: Full IDL

For ease of implementation, the full IDL is provided, where ms-dtyp.idl is the IDL specified in [MS-DTYP] Appendix A.

**Note** The lsarpc interface is shared between this protocol and the Local Security Authority (Translation Methods) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAT]. For convenience, the IDL definitions that appear below and the IDL definitions in [MS-LSAT] section 6 have been merged and are available for download. For more information, see [MSFT-LSA-IDL].

```
import "ms-dtyp.idl";

[
    uuid(12345778-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AB),
    version(0.0),
    ms_union,
    pointer_default(unique)
]

interface lsarpc
{
    //
    // Type definitions.
    //

    //
    // Start of common types.
    //

    typedef [context_handle] void * LSAPR_HANDLE;

    typedef unsigned char SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE,
        *PSECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE;

    typedef unsigned short SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL,
        *PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL;

    typedef struct _STRING {
        unsigned short Length;
        unsigned short MaximumLength;
        [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length)]
        char * Buffer;
    } STRING, *PSTRING;

    typedef struct _LSAPR_ACL {
        unsigned char AclRevision;
        unsigned char Sbz1;
        unsigned short AclSize;
        [size_is(AclSize - 4)] unsigned char Dummy1[*];
    } LSAPR_ACL, *PLSAPR_ACL;

    typedef struct _LSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR {
        unsigned char Revision;
        unsigned char Sbz1;
        SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL Control;
        PRPC_SID Owner;
        PRPC_SID Group;
        PLSAPR_ACL Sacl;
        PLSAPR_ACL Dacl;
    } LSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, *PLSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR;

    typedef enum _SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL {
        SecurityAnonymous = 0,
        SecurityIdentification = 1,
    }
```

```

        SecurityImpersonation = 2,
        SecurityDelegation = 3
    } SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL, * PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL;

typedef struct _SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE {
    unsigned long Length;
    SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel;
    SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE ContextTrackingMode;
    unsigned char EffectiveOnly;
} SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE, * PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE;

typedef struct _LSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
    unsigned long Length;
    unsigned char * RootDirectory;
    PSTRING ObjectName;
    unsigned long Attributes;
    PLSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor;
    PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE SecurityQualityOfService;
} LSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, *PLSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION, *PLSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION;

//
// End of common types.
//

typedef enum _POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS {
    PolicyAuditLogInformation = 1,
    PolicyAuditEventsInformation,
    PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation,
    PolicyPdAccountInformation,
    PolicyAccountDomainInformation,
    PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation,
    PolicyReplicaSourceInformation,
    PolicyInformationNotUsedOnWire,
    PolicyModificationInformation,
    PolicyAuditFullSetInformation,
    PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation,
    PolicyDnsDomainInformation,
    PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt,
    PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation,
    PolicyLastEntry
} POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS, *PPOLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS;

typedef enum _POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE {
    AuditCategorySystem = 0,
    AuditCategoryLogon,
    AuditCategoryObjectAccess,
    AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse,
    AuditCategoryDetailedTracking,
    AuditCategoryPolicyChange,
    AuditCategoryAccountManagement,
    AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess,
    AuditCategoryAccountLogon
} POLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE, *PPOLICY_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPE;

typedef RPC_UNICODE_STRING LSA_UNICODE_STRING,
    *PLSA_UNICODE_STRING;

typedef struct _POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO {
    unsigned long AuditLogPercentFull;
    unsigned long MaximumLogSize;
    LARGE_INTEGER AuditRetentionPeriod;
    unsigned char AuditLogFullShutdownInProgress;
    LARGE_INTEGER TimeToShutdown;
    unsigned long NextAuditRecordId;
}

```

```

} POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO, *PPOLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO;

typedef enum _POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE {
    PolicyServerRoleBackup = 2,
    PolicyServerRolePrimary
} POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE, *PPOLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE;

typedef struct _POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO {
    POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE LsaServerRole;
} POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO, *PPOLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO;

typedef struct _POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO {
    LARGE_INTEGER ModifiedId;
    LARGE_INTEGER DatabaseCreationTime;
} POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO, *PPOLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO;

typedef struct _POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO {
    unsigned char ShutDownOnFull;
} POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO,
*PPOLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO;

typedef struct _POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO {
    unsigned char ShutDownOnFull;
    unsigned char LogIsFull;
} POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO,
*PPOLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO;

typedef enum _POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS {
    PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation = 1,
    PolicyDomainEfsInformation = 2,
    PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation = 3
} POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS,
*PPOLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS;

typedef struct _POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO {
    unsigned long AuthenticationOptions;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxServiceTicketAge;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxTicketAge;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxRenewAge;
    LARGE_INTEGER MaxClockSkew;
    LARGE_INTEGER Reserved;
} POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO,
*PPOLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO;

typedef struct _TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO {
    unsigned long Offset;
} TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO,
*PTRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO;

typedef enum _TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS {
    TrustedDomainNameInformation = 1,
    TrustedControllersInformation,
    TrustedPosixOffsetInformation,
    TrustedPasswordInformation,
    TrustedDomainInformationBasic,
    TrustedDomainInformationEx,
    TrustedDomainAuthInformation,
    TrustedDomainFullInformation,
    TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal,
    TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal,
    TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal,
    TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal,
    TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes
} TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS,
*PTRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS;

typedef enum _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE {
    ForestTrustTopLevelName = 0,
    ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx = 1,
    ForestTrustDomainInfo = 2
}

```

```

} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA {
    [range(0, 131072)] unsigned long Length;
    [size_is( Length )] unsigned char * Buffer;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO {
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    LSA_UNICODE_STRING DnsName;
    LSA_UNICODE_STRING NetbiosName;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD {
    unsigned long Flags;
    LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE ForestTrustType;
    LARGE_INTEGER Time;
    [switch_type( LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE ),
     switch_is( ForestTrustType )]
    union
    {
        [case( ForestTrustTopLevelName,
              ForestTrustTopLevelNameEx )]
            LSA_UNICODE_STRING TopLevelName;
        [case( ForestTrustDomainInfo )]
            LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO DomainInfo;
        [default] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA Data;
    } ForestTrustData;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD, *PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION {
    [range(0,4000)] unsigned long RecordCount;
    [size_is( RecordCount )] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD * Entries;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION, *PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION;

typedef enum _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE {
    CollisionTdo = 0,
    CollisionXref,
    CollisionOther
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD {
    unsigned long Index;
    LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE Type;
    unsigned long Flags;
    LSA_UNICODE_STRING Name;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD;

typedef struct _LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION {
    unsigned long RecordCount;
    [size_is( RecordCount )]
        PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD * Entries;
} LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION,
*PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION;

typedef LSAPR_HANDLE *PLSAPR_HANDLE;

typedef struct _LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION {
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION, *PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _LSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER {
    unsigned long EntriesRead;
    [size_is(EntriesRead)] PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION Information;
} LSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER, *PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER;

typedef struct _LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR {

```

```

    [range(0,262144)] unsigned long Length;
    [size_is(Length)] unsigned char * SecurityDescriptor;
} LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, *PLSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR;

typedef struct _LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES {
    LUID Luid;
    unsigned long Attributes;
} LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES, * PLSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES;

typedef struct _LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET {
    [range(0,1000)] unsigned long PrivilegeCount;
    unsigned long Control;
    [size_is(PrivilegeCount)] LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES Privilege[*];
} LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET, *PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    LUID LocalValue;
} LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF, *PLSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF;

typedef struct _LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER {
    unsigned long Entries;
    [size_is(Entries)] PLSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF Privileges;
} LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER, *PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER;

typedef struct _LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE {
    [range(0, 131088)] unsigned long Length;
    [range(0, 131088)] unsigned long MaximumLength;
    [size_is(MaximumLength), length_is(Length)]
    unsigned char *Buffer;
} LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE, *PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER {
    unsigned long EntriesRead;
    [size_is(EntriesRead)] PLSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION Information;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DomainName;
    PRPC_SID DomainSid;
} LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsDomainName;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING DnsForestName;
    GUID DomainGuid;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
} LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
} LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ReplicaSource;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING ReplicaAccountName;
} LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO {
    unsigned char AuditingMode;
    [size_is(MaximumAuditEventCount)]
    unsigned long *EventAuditingOptions;
    [range(0,1000)] unsigned long MaximumAuditEventCount;
} LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO;

```

```

typedef [switch_type(POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS)]
union _LSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION {
    [case(PolicyAuditLogInformation)]
        POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO PolicyAuditLogInfo;
    [case(PolicyAuditEventsInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO PolicyAuditEventsInfo;
    [case(PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO PolicyPrimaryDomainInfo;
    [case(PolicyAccountDomainInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO PolicyAccountDomainInfo;
    [case(PolicyPdAccountInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO PolicyPdAccountInfo;
    [case(PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation)]
        POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO PolicyServerRoleInfo;
    [case(PolicyReplicaSourceInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO PolicyReplicaSourceInfo;
    [case(PolicyModificationInformation)]
        POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO PolicyModificationInfo;
    [case(PolicyAuditFullSetInformation)]
        POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO PolicyAuditFullSetInfo;
    [case(PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation)]
        POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO PolicyAuditFullQueryInfo;
    [case(PolicyDnsDomainInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO PolicyDnsDomainInfo;
    [case(PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO PolicyDnsDomainInfoInt;
    [case(PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO PolicyLocalAccountDomainInfo;
} LSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION, *PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO {
    unsigned long QualityOfService;
} POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO,
*PPOLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO {
    unsigned long InfoLength;
    [size_is(InfoLength)] unsigned char * EfsBlob;
} LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO, *PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO;

typedef [switch_type(POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS)]
union _LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION {
    [case(PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation)]
        POLICY_DOMAIN_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE_INFO
        PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInfo;
    [case(PolicyDomainEfsInformation)]
        LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO PolicyDomainEfsInfo;
    [case(PolicyDomainKerberosTicketInformation)]
        POLICY_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO
        PolicyDomainKerbTicketInfo;
} LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION, *PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO {
    [range(0,5)] unsigned long Entries;
    [size_is(Entries)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING Names;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO {
    PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE Password;
    PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE OldPassword;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;

```

```

    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FlatName;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    unsigned long TrustDirection;
    unsigned long TrustType;
    unsigned long TrustAttributes;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX;

typedef struct _LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION {
    LARGE_INTEGER LastUpdateTime;
    unsigned long AuthType;
    [range(0,65536)] unsigned long AuthInfoLength;
    [size_is(AuthInfoLength)] unsigned char * AuthInfo;
} LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION, *PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION {
    [range(0,1)] unsigned long IncomingAuthInfos;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION IncomingAuthenticationInformation;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION
        IncomingPreviousAuthenticationInformation;
    [range(0,1)] unsigned long OutgoingAuthInfos;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION OutgoingAuthenticationInformation;
    PLSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION
        OutgoingPreviousAuthenticationInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX Information;
    TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO PosixOffset;
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION AuthInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION;

typedef LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_BASIC;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB {
    [range(0, 65536)] unsigned long AuthSize;
    [size_is( AuthSize )] unsigned char * AuthBlob;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB AuthBlob;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX Information;
    TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO PosixOffset;
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL AuthInformation;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 {
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING Name;
    RPC_UNICODE_STRING FlatName;
    PRPC_SID Sid;
    unsigned long TrustDirection;
    unsigned long TrustType;
    unsigned long TrustAttributes;
    unsigned long ForestTrustLength;
    [size_is(ForestTrustLength)] unsigned char * ForestTrustInfo;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2,
*PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2 {
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 Information;
    TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO PosixOffset;
    LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION AuthInformation;

```



```

} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2,
 *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2;

typedef struct _TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES {
    unsigned long SupportedEncryptionTypes;
} TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES,
 *PTRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES;

typedef [switch_type(TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS)]
union _LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO {
    [case(TrustedDomainNameInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO TrustedDomainNameInfo;
    [case(TrustedControllersInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO TrustedControllersInfo;
    [case(TrustedPosixOffsetInformation)]
        TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO TrustedPosixOffsetInfo;
    [case(TrustedPasswordInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO TrustedPasswordInfo;
    [case(TrustedDomainInformationBasic)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_BASIC TrustedDomainInfoBasic;
    [case(TrustedDomainInformationEx)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX TrustedDomainInfoEx;
    [case(TrustedDomainAuthInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION TrustedAuthInfo;
    [case(TrustedDomainFullInformation)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION TrustedFullInfo;
    [case(TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL
            TrustedAuthInfoInternal;
    [case(TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL
            TrustedFullInfoInternal;
    [case(TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 TrustedDomainInfoEx2;
    [case(TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal)]
        LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2 TrustedFullInfo2;
    [case(TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes)]
        TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES TrustedDomainSETs;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO;

typedef struct _LSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET {
    [range(0,256)] unsigned long Entries;
    [size_is(Entries)] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING UserRights;
} LSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET, *PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET;

typedef struct _LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX {
    unsigned long EntriesRead;
    [size_is(EntriesRead)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX EnumerationBuffer;
} LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX, *PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX;

//
// Methods
//
//
// The following notation conventions are used for some IDL methods:
//
// void
// Lsar_LSA_TM_XX( void );
//
// (where XX represents the opnum.)
//
// This notation indicates that the method is defined in this
// interface but is described in the
// Local Security Authority (Translation Methods) protocol
// specification.
//
// void OpnumXXNotUsedOnWire(void);
//

```

```

// (where XX represents the opnum.)
//
// This notation indicates that the method is defined in this
// interface but is not seen on the wire.
//

// Opnum 0
NTSTATUS
LsarClose(
    [in,out] LSAPR_HANDLE *ObjectHandle
);

// Opnum 1
void Opnum1NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 2
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumeratePrivileges(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in, out] unsigned long *EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);

// Opnum 3
NTSTATUS
LsarQuerySecurityObject(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE ObjectHandle,
    [in] SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,
    [out] PLSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *SecurityDescriptor
);

// Opnum 4
NTSTATUS
LsarSetSecurityObject(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE ObjectHandle,
    [in] SECURITY_INFORMATION SecurityInformation,
    [in] PLSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor
);

// Opnum 5
void Opnum5NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 6
NTSTATUS
LsarOpenPolicy(
    [in,unique] wchar_t *SystemName,
    [in] PLSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *PolicyHandle
);

// Opnum 7
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION *PolicyInformation
);

// Opnum 8
NTSTATUS
LsarSetInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION PolicyInformation
);

```

```

// Opnum 9
void Opnum9NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 10
NTSTATUS
LsarCreateAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *AccountHandle
);

// Opnum 11
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumerateAccounts(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] [out] unsigned long *EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);

// Opnum 12
NTSTATUS
LsarCreateTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION TrustedDomainInformation,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *TrustedDomainHandle
);

// Opnum 13
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] [out] unsigned long *EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
);

// Opnum 14
void
Lsar_LSA_TM_14( void );

// Opnum 15
void
Lsar_LSA_TM_15( void );

// Opnum 16
NTSTATUS
LsarCreateSecret(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SecretName,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *SecretHandle
);

// Opnum 17
NTSTATUS
LsarOpenAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *AccountHandle
);

// Opnum 18
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,
    [out] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET *Privileges

```

```

);

// Opnum 19
NTSTATUS
LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET Privileges
);

// Opnum 20
NTSTATUS
LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,
    [in] unsigned char AllPrivileges,
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET Privileges
);

// Opnum 21
void Opnum21NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 22
void Opnum22NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 23
NTSTATUS
LsarGetSystemAccessAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,
    [out] unsigned long *SystemAccess
);

// Opnum 24
NTSTATUS
LsarSetSystemAccessAccount(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE AccountHandle,
    [in] unsigned long SystemAccess
);

// Opnum 25
NTSTATUS
LsarOpenTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *TrustedDomainHandle
);

// Opnum 26
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE TrustedDomainHandle,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO *TrustedDomainInformation
);

// Opnum 27
NTSTATUS
LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE TrustedDomainHandle,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomainInformation
);

// Opnum 28
NTSTATUS
LsarOpenSecret(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING SecretName,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,

```

```

        [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *SecretHandle
    );

// Opnum 29
NTSTATUS
LsarSetSecret(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE SecretHandle,
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE EncryptedCurrentValue,
    [in, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE EncryptedOldValue
);

// Opnum 30
NTSTATUS
LsarQuerySecret(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE SecretHandle,
    [in, out, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE *EncryptedCurrentValue,
    [in, out, unique] PLARGE_INTEGER CurrentValueSetTime,
    [in, out, unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE *EncryptedOldValue,
    [in, out, unique] PLARGE_INTEGER OldValueSetTime
);

// Opnum 31
NTSTATUS
LsarLookupPrivilegeValue(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING Name,
    [out] PLUID Value
);

// Opnum 32
NTSTATUS
LsarLookupPrivilegeName(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLUID Value,
    [out] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING *Name
);

// Opnum 33
NTSTATUS
LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING Name,
    [in] short ClientLanguage,
    [in] short ClientSystemDefaultLanguage,
    [out] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING *DisplayName,
    [out] unsigned short *LanguageReturned
);

// Opnum 34
NTSTATUS
LsarDeleteObject(
    [in,out] LSAPR_HANDLE *ObjectHandle
);

// Opnum 35
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in,unique] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING UserRight,
    [out] PLSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER EnumerationBuffer
);

// Opnum 36
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumerateAccountRights(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [out] PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET UserRights
);

```

```

// Opnum 37
NTSTATUS
LsarAddAccountRights(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET UserRights
);

// Opnum 38
NTSTATUS
LsarRemoveAccountRights(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID AccountSid,
    [in] unsigned char AllRights,
    [in] PLSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET UserRights
);

// Opnum 39
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO * TrustedDomainInformation
);

// Opnum 40
NTSTATUS
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomainInformation
);

// Opnum 41
NTSTATUS
LsarDeleteTrustedDomain(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_SID TrustedDomainSid
);

// Opnum 42
NTSTATUS
LsarStorePrivateData(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING KeyName,
    [in,unique] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE EncryptedData
);

// Opnum 43
NTSTATUS
LsarRetrievePrivateData(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING KeyName,
    [in, out] PLSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE *EncryptedData
);

// Opnum 44
NTSTATUS
LsarOpenPolicy2(
    [in,unique,string] wchar_t *SystemName,
    [in] PLSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *PolicyHandle
);

// Opnum 45

```

```

void
Lsar_LSA_TM_45( void );

// Opnum 46
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryInformationPolicy2(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION *PolicyInformation
    );

// Opnum 47
NTSTATUS
LsarSetInformationPolicy2(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION PolicyInformation
    );

// Opnum 48
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO *TrustedDomainInformation
    );

// Opnum 49
NTSTATUS
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO TrustedDomainInformation
    );

// Opnum 50
NTSTATUS
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in, out] unsigned long *EnumerationContext,
    [out] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER_EX EnumerationBuffer,
    [in] unsigned long PreferredMaximumLength
    );

// Opnum 51
NTSTATUS
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX
        TrustedDomainInformation,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION
        AuthenticationInformation,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *TrustedDomainHandle
    );

// Opnum 52
void Opnum52NotUsedOnWire( void );

// Opnum 53
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,

```

```

        [out, switch_is(InformationClass)]
            PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION *PolicyDomainInformation
    );

// Opnum 54
NTSTATUS
LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS InformationClass,
    [in, unique, switch_is(InformationClass)]
        PLSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION PolicyDomainInformation
    );

// Opnum 55
NTSTATUS
LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PRPC_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *TrustedDomainHandle
    );

// Opnum 56
void Opnum56NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 57
void
Lsar_LSA_TM_57( void );

// Opnum 58
void
Lsar_LSA_TM_58( void );

// Opnum 59
NTSTATUS
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX
        TrustedDomainInformation,
    [in] PLSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL
        AuthenticationInformation,
    [in] ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
    [out] LSAPR_HANDLE *TrustedDomainHandle
    );

// Opnum 60
void Opnum60NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 61
void Opnum61NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 62
void Opnum62NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 63
void Opnum63NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 64
void Opnum64NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 65
void Opnum65NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 66
void Opnum66NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 67
void Opnum67NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 68

```



```

void
Lsar_LSA_TM_68( void );

// Opnum 69
void Opnum69NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 70
void Opnum70NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 71
void Opnum71NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 72
void Opnum72NotUsedOnWire(void);

// Opnum 73
NTSTATUS
LsarQueryForestTrustInformation(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSA_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE HighestRecordType,
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION * ForestTrustInfo
);

// Opnum 74
NTSTATUS
LsarSetForestTrustInformation(
    [in] LSAPR_HANDLE PolicyHandle,
    [in] PLSA_UNICODE_STRING TrustedDomainName,
    [in] LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE HighestRecordType,
    [in] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION ForestTrustInfo,
    [in] unsigned char CheckOnly,
    [out] PLSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION * CollisionInfo
);
}

```

## 7 Appendix B: Product Behavior

The information in this specification is applicable to the following Microsoft products or supplemental software. References to product versions include released service packs.

~~Note: Some of the information in this section is subject to change because it applies to a preliminary product version, and thus may differ from the final version of the software when released. All behavior notes that pertain to the preliminary product version contain specific references to it as an aid to the reader.~~

- Windows NT operating system
- Windows 2000 operating system
- Windows XP operating system
- Windows Server 2003 operating system
- Windows Server 2003 for Small Business Server 2003
- Windows Server 2003 R2 operating system
- Windows Vista operating system
- Windows Server 2008 operating system
- Windows 7 operating system
- Windows Server 2008 R2 operating system
- Windows 8 operating system
- Windows Server 2012 operating system
- Windows 8.1 operating system
- Windows Server 2012 R2 operating system
- Windows 10 operating system
- Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ operating system

Exceptions, if any, are noted below. If a service pack or Quick Fix Engineering (QFE) number appears with the product version, behavior changed in that service pack or QFE. The new behavior also applies to subsequent service packs of the product unless otherwise specified. If a product edition appears with the product version, behavior is different in that product edition.

Unless otherwise specified, any statement of optional behavior in this specification that is prescribed using the terms SHOULD or SHOULD NOT implies product behavior in accordance with the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT prescription. Unless otherwise specified, the term MAY implies that the product does not follow the prescription.

<1> Section 2.1: By default, the "\\PIPE\lsarpc" endpoint allows anonymous access on Windows NT 3.1 operating system, Windows NT 3.5 operating system, Windows NT 3.51 operating system, Windows NT 4.0 operating system, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, and Windows Vista RTM. Anonymous access to this pipe is removed by default on Windows Vista operating system with Service Pack 1 (SP1), Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ in both the non-domain controller configuration and the read-only domain controller configuration. The pipe access check happens before any other access check; therefore, it overrides any other access.

<2> Section 2.1: Windows implementations of the client and **server role** for this protocol use the tamper-resistance functionality provided by SMB transport on the products that are available, and are enabled as specified in [MS-SMB] section 3.1.1.1 (the *MessageSigningPolicy* parameter), and [MS-SMB2] section 3.1.1.1 (the *RequireMessageSigning* parameter).

<3> Section 2.1: If an implementation of the client role violates this specification and uses the RPC-provided security-support-provider mechanism for the RPC connection to a Windows implementation, Windows processes all messages as specified in section 3.1 (that is, there is no change in message processing behavior), except for the messages that use encryption specified in section 5.1. During encryption and decryption, Windows implementations for the server role use a hard-coded key instead of the SMB transport-provided session key. The hard-coded key is represented below as bytes in hexadecimal form.

"53 79 73 74 65 6d 4c 69-62 72 61 72 79 44 54 43"

<4> Section 2.1: The Windows implementation of the server role for this protocol supports the RPC-provided security-support-provider mechanisms, as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3.2.1.4.1. The following security-support providers are registered by the responder.

Windows version	Security support provider registered
Windows NT, Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10	RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT
Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 <del>Technical Preview</del>	RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT On the domain controllers the following are also supported: RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_KERBEROS RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE

<5<5> Section 2.1: Servers running Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003 accept calls at any authentication level. Without [MSKB-3149090] installed, servers running Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10 v1507 operating system, or Windows 10 v1511 operating system also accept calls at any authentication level.

<6> Section 2.1: The server implementation of this protocol in Windows 2000 Server operating system, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ places a limit of 1 MB on the packets received. The limit in Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 is 4 MB.

<67> Section 2.2: Data type fields that are described as "Reserved" or "MUST be ignored" are sent as 0 (or NULL in the case of pointers) by Windows client implementations, and are ignored upon receipt by Windows Server operating system implementations.

<78> Section 2.2: The following table is a timeline of when each structure, data type, or enumeration was introduced. All structures, data types, and enumerations listed in the table continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Data type	Product
LSAPR_HANDLE (section 2.2.2.1)	Windows NT 3.1
STRING (section 2.2.3.1)	Windows NT 3.1

<b>Data type</b>	<b>Product</b>
LSAPR_ACL (section 2.2.3.2)	Windows NT 3.1
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL (section 2.2.3.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR (section 2.2.3.4)	Windows NT 3.1
SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL (section 2.2.3.5)	Windows NT 3.1
SECURITY_CONTEXT_TRACKING_MODE (section 2.2.3.6)	Windows NT 3.1
SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE (section 2.2.3.7)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES (section 2.2.2.4)	Windows NT 3.1
ACCESS_MASK (section 2.2.1.1)	Windows NT 3.1
SECURITY_INFORMATION (section 2.2.1.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_PRIVILEGE_DEF (section 2.2.8.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_ENUM_BUFFER (section 2.2.8.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_ACCOUNT_INFORMATION (section 2.2.5.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_ACCOUNT_ENUM_BUFFER (section 2.2.5.2)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_SYSTEM_ACCESS_CODE (section 2.2.1.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LSA_UNICODE_STRING (section 2.2.2.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_TRUST_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_BASIC (section 2.2.7.8)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR (section 2.2.2.5)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_INFORMATION_CLASS (section 2.2.4.1)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_INFO (section 2.2.4.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_AUDIT_EVENTS_INFO (section 2.2.4.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_PRIMARY_DOM_INFO (section 2.2.4.5)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_ACCOUNT_DOM_INFO (section 2.2.4.6)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_PD_ACCOUNT_INFO (section 2.2.4.7)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE (section 2.2.4.8)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_LSA_SERVER_ROLE_INFO (section 2.2.4.9)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_REPLICA_SRCE_INFO (section 2.2.4.10)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_MODIFICATION_INFO (section 2.2.4.11)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_SET_INFO (section 2.2.4.12)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_AUDIT_FULL_QUERY_INFO (section 2.2.4.13)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_DNS_DOMAIN_INFO (section 2.2.4.14)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_POLICY_INFORMATION (section 2.2.4.2)	Windows 2000

<b>Data type</b>	<b>Product</b>
LSAPR_TRUSTED_ENUM_BUFFER (section 2.2.7.19)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_PRIVILEGE_SET (section 2.2.5.5)	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_INFORMATION_CLASS (section 2.2.7.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO (section 2.2.7.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_NAME_INFO (section 2.2.7.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_TRUSTED_CONTROLLERS_INFO (section 2.2.7.5)	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_POSIX_OFFSET_INFO (section 2.2.7.6)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_TRUSTED_PASSWORD_INFO (section 2.2.7.7)	Windows NT 3.1
LSAPR_CR_CIPHER_VALUE (section 2.2.6.1)	Windows NT 3.51
LSAPR_USER_RIGHT_SET (section 2.2.5.3)	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_CLASS (section 2.2.4.15)	Windows NT 3.51
LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_INFORMATION (section 2.2.4.16)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_POLICY_DOMAIN_EFS_INFO (section 2.2.4.18)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_DOMAIN_KERBEROS_TICKET_INFO (section 2.2.4.19)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX (section 2.2.7.9)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX2 (section 2.2.7.10)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_AUTH_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.17)	Windows XP
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.11)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_BLOB (section 2.2.7.16)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_AUTH_INFORMATION_INTERNAL (section 2.2.7.12)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.13)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION_INTERNAL (section 2.2.7.14)	Windows 2000
LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FULL_INFORMATION2 (section 2.2.7.15)	Windows XP
LUID ([MS-DTYP] section 2.3.7)	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES (section 2.2.7.18)	Windows Vista
LSAPR_LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES (section 2.2.5.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD_TYPE (section 2.2.7.22)	Windows XP
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_BINARY_DATA (section 2.2.7.23)	Windows XP
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO (section 2.2.7.24)	Windows XP
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_RECORD (section 2.2.7.21)	Windows XP
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.25)	Windows XP
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD_TYPE (section 2.2.7.26)	Windows XP

Data type	Product
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_RECORD (section 2.2.7.27)	Windows XP
LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_INFORMATION (section 2.2.7.28)	Windows XP

<89> Section 2.2.1.1.2: The following is a timeline of when each access mask was introduced. All access masks continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Value	Product
0x00000000	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION 0x00000001	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_VIEW_AUDIT_INFORMATION 0x00000002	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION 0x00000004	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_TRUST_ADMIN 0x00000008	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_CREATE_ACCOUNT 0x00000010	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_CREATE_SECRET 0x00000020	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_CREATE_PRIVILEGE 0x00000040	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_SET_DEFAULT_QUOTA_LIMITS 0x00000080	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_SET_AUDIT_REQUIREMENTS 0x00000100	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_AUDIT_LOG_ADMIN 0x00000200	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_SERVER_ADMIN 0x00000400	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_LOOKUP_NAMES 0x00000800	Windows NT 3.1
POLICY_NOTIFICATION 0x00001000	Windows 2000

<910> Section 2.2.1.1.5: The following is a timeline of when each access mask was introduced. All access masks continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Value	Product
TRUSTED_QUERY_DOMAIN_NAME 0x00000001	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_QUERY_CONTROLLERS 0x00000002	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_SET_CONTROLLERS 0x00000004	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_QUERY_POSIX 0x00000008	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_SET_POSIX 0x00000010	Windows NT 3.1
TRUSTED_SET_AUTH 0x00000020	Windows 2000
TRUSTED_QUERY_AUTH 0x00000040	Windows 2000

<1011> Section 2.2.1.2: The POLICY\_MODE\_ALL flag applies to Windows 2000 Server and later versions.

<1112> Section 2.2.1.2: The POLICY\_MODE\_ALL\_NT4 flag applies to Windows NT 3.1 through Windows NT 4.0.

<1213> Section 2.2.1.2: The following is a timeline of when each mode was introduced. All modes continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Value	Product
0x00000000 No access	Windows NT 3.1
0x00000001 POLICY_MODE_INTERACTIVE	Windows NT 3.1
0x00000002 POLICY_MODE_NETWORK	Windows NT 3.1
0x00000004 POLICY_MODE_BATCH	Windows NT 3.1
0x00000010 POLICY_MODE_SERVICE	Windows NT 3.1
0x00000020 POLICY_MODE_PROXY	Windows NT 3.1

Value	Product
0x00000040 POLICY_MODE_DENY_INTERACTIVE	Windows 2000
0x00000080 POLICY_MODE_DENY_NETWORK	Windows 2000
0x00000100 POLICY_MODE_DENY_BATCH	Windows 2000
0x00000200 POLICY_MODE_DENY_SERVICE	Windows 2000
0x00000400 POLICY_MODE_REMOTE_INTERACTIVE	Windows XP
0x00000800 POLICY_MODE_DENY_REMOTE_INTERACTIVE	Windows XP

<1314> Section 2.2.2.4: The Windows implementation of the RPC client for this protocol leaves this structure to be filled by a higher-layer application and does not verify the structure's contents except for **RootDirectory**, which must be NULL.

<1415> Section 2.2.2.5: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP operating system Service Pack 1 (SP1), the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **Length** field of this structure (using the range primitive specified in [MS-RPCE]).

<1516> Section 2.2.4.1: The following is a timeline of when each enumeration value was introduced. All enumeration values continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Value	Product
PolicyAuditLogInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyAuditEventsInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyPrimaryDomainInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyPdAccountInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyAccountDomainInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyLsaServerRoleInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyReplicaSourceInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyInformationNotUsedOnWire	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyModificationInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyAuditFullSetInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyAuditFullQueryInformation	Windows NT 3.1
PolicyDnsDomainInformation	Windows 2000
PolicyDnsDomainInformationInt	Windows 2000



Value	Product
PolicyLocalAccountDomainInformation	Windows Vista

<1617> Section 2.2.4.4: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **MaximumAuditEventCount** field of this structure (using the range primitive, as specified in [MS-RPCE]).

<1718> Section 2.2.4.14: The following applies to Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~.

The Windows RPC server always throws an RPC\_S\_PROCNUM\_OUT\_OF\_RANGE exception for the message processing of LsarQueryInformationPolicy, LsarQueryInformationPolicy2, LsarSetInformationPolicy, and LsarSetInformationPolicy2, if the server is configured to emulate Windows NT 4.0 for PolicyDnsDomainInformation information level.

<1819> Section 2.2.4.16: The PolicyDomainQualityOfServiceInformation enumeration value and corresponding POLICY\_DOMAIN\_QUALITY\_OF\_SERVICE\_INFO structure are parts of LSAPR\_POLICY\_DOMAIN\_INFORMATION only in the Windows 2000 Server implementation of this protocol.

<1920> Section 2.2.4.18: Microsoft implementations of the Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol do not enforce data in **EfsBlob** to conform to the layout specified in [MS-GPEF] section 2.2.1.2.1.

<2021> Section 2.2.5.3: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **Entries** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).

<2122> Section 2.2.5.5: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **PrivilegeCount** field of this structure (using the range primitive specified in [MS-RPCE]).

~~<22> Section 2.2.6.1: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **Length** field of this structure (using the range primitive as specified in [MS-RPCE]).~~

<23> Section 2.2.6.1: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **Length** field of this structure (using the range primitive as specified in [MS-RPCE]).

~~<24> Section 2.2.6.1: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **MaximumLength** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

<2425> Section 2.2.7.2: The following is a timeline of when each enumeration value was introduced. All enumeration values continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Value	Product
TrustedDomainNameInformation	Windows NT 3.1
TrustedControllersInformation	Windows NT 3.1

Value	Product
TrustedPosixOffsetInformation	Windows NT 3.1
TrustedPasswordInformation	Windows NT 3.51
TrustedDomainInformationBasic	Windows 2000
TrustedDomainInformationEx	Windows 2000
TrustedDomainAuthInformation	Windows 2000
TrustedDomainFullInformation	Windows 2000
TrustedDomainAuthInformationInternal	Windows 2000
TrustedDomainFullInformationInternal	Windows 2000
TrustedDomainInformationEx2Internal	Windows XP
TrustedDomainFullInformation2Internal	Windows XP
TrustedDomainSupportedEncryptionTypes	Windows Vista

<2526> Section 2.2.7.5: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **Entries** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).

<2627> Section 2.2.7.9: The following is a timeline of when each flag value was introduced. Unless otherwise specified, all flag values continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Possible value	Value	Product
TANT (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE)	0x00000001	Windows 2000.
TAUO (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY)	0x00000002	Windows 2000.
TAQD (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN)	0x00000004	Windows 2000 operating system Service Pack 2 (SP2) and Windows XP.
TAFT (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE)	0x00000008	Windows Server 2003.
TACO (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION)	0x00000010	Windows Server 2003.
TAWF (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)	0x00000020	Windows Server 2003.
TATE (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL)	0x00000040	Windows Server 2003.
TANC (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION_NO_TGT_DELEGATION)	0x00000200	Windows Server 2012 operating system
TAPT (TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST)	0x00000400	Windows Server 2016 <b>Technical Preview</b>
Obsolete	0x00400000	Introduced in Windows 2000 RTM. Became obsolete in Windows 2000 operating system Service Pack 4 (SP4).

Possible value	Value	Product
Obsolete	0x00800000	Introduced in Windows 2000 RTM. Became obsolete in Windows 2000 SP4.

~~<27> Section 2.2.7.11: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **IncomingAuthInfos** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

<28> Section 2.2.7.11: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **IncomingAuthInfos** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).

~~<29> Section 2.2.7.11: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **OutgoingAuthInfos** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

~~<2930> Section 2.2.7.16: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **AuthSize** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

~~<3031> Section 2.2.7.17: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **AuthInfoLength** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

~~<3132> Section 2.2.7.23: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **Length** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

~~<3233> Section 2.2.7.25: In Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows XP SP1, the Windows RPC server and RPC client do not enforce restrictions on the **RecordCount** field of this structure (using the range primitive defined in [MS-RPCE]).~~

<3334> Section 3.1.1.1: A Windows responder for this protocol contains the following values for the policy object after setup.

Name	Value
Auditing Log Information	Windows maintains the following hard-coded information about the state of the audit log: MaximumLogSize = 8192 AuditLogPercentFull = 0 AuditRetentionPeriod = 8533315 AuditLogFullShutdownInProgress = FALSE TimeToShutdown = 288342 NextAuditRecordId = 0
Audit Full Information	Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 <del>Technical Preview</del> return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER for this information class.
Event	On Windows 2000 and Windows XP:

Name	Value
Auditing Options	<p>AuditingMode = FALSE  MaximumAuditEventCount = 9  EventAuditingOptions = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }</p> <p>On Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2003 R2:  AuditingMode = TRUE  MaximumAuditEventCount = 9  EventAuditingOptions = { 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 }</p> <p>On Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 <del>Technical Preview</del>:  AuditingMode = TRUE  MaximumAuditEventCount = 9  EventAuditingOptions = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }</p>
Primary Domain Information	<p>Name = &lt;Workgroup Name&gt;  Sid = NULL</p>
DNS Domain Information	<p>Name = &lt;Workgroup Name&gt;  DnsDomainName = &lt;Empty String&gt;  DnsForestName = &lt;Empty String&gt;  DomainGuid = { 0 }  Sid = NULL</p>
Account Domain Information	<p>DomainName = &lt;Machine Netbios name&gt; DomainSid = &lt; S-1-5-21-X-Y-Z&gt; where X, Y, Z are random numbers</p>
Server Role Information	<p>LsaServerRole = PolicyServerRolePrimary</p>
Replica Source Information	<p>ReplicaSource=&lt;Empty String&gt;  ReplicaAccountName=&lt;Empty String&gt;</p>
Kerberos Policy Information	<p>&lt;No value&gt;</p>
Encrypting File System (EFS) Policy Information	<p>&lt;No value&gt;</p>
Security Descriptor	<p>The security descriptor in Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, Windows NT 4.0, and Windows 2000 can be expressed in Security Description Definition Language (SDDL), as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.5.1, as follows:  O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD)</p> <p>In Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows</p>

Name	Value
	<p>Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 <del>Technical Preview</del>, the security descriptor can be expressed in SDDL as follows:</p> <pre>O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD)(A;;0x0000801;;;AN)(A;;0x00001000;;;LS)(A;;0x00001000;;;NS)</pre> <p>In Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10, the security descriptor can be expressed in SDDL as follows:</p> <pre>O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD)(A;;0x0000801;;;AN)(A;;0x00001000;;;LS)(A;;0x00001000;;;NS)(A;;0x00001000;;;S-1-5-17)</pre> <p>See sections 2.2.1.1.1 and 2.2.1.1.2 for the definitions of the generic and object-specific access rights, respectively, that are included in these security descriptors.</p>

~~<34> Section 3.1.1.1: Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 do not store this information.~~

<35> Section 3.1.1.1: Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 do not store this information.

<36> Section 3.1.1.1: Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 do not store this information.

<37> Section 3.1.1.1: ~~Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 do not store this information.~~

~~<38> Section 3.1.1.1:~~ Only the Windows 2000 implementation of this protocol stores quality of service information.

~~<3839>~~ Section 3.1.1.1: The security descriptor in Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, Windows NT 4.0, and Windows 2000 can be expressed in Security Description Definition Language (SDDL), as specified in [MS-DTYP] section 2.5.1, as follows:

```
O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD)
```

In Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2, the security descriptor can be expressed in SDDL as follows:

```
O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD)(A;;0x0000801;;;AN)(A;;0x00001000;;;LS)(A;;0x00001000;;;NS)
```

In Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~, the security descriptor can be expressed in SDDL as follows:

```
O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD)(A;;0x0000801;;;AN)(A;;0x00001000;;;LS)(A;;0x00001000;;;NS)(A;;0x00001000;;;S-1-5-17)
```

See sections 2.2.1.1.1 and 2.2.1.1.2 for the definitions of the generic and object-specific access rights, respectively, that are included in these security descriptors.

~~<3940>~~ Section 3.1.1.1: Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 domain controllers use the Netlogon Remote Protocol, as specified in [MS-NRPC] section 1.3.3, to converge Event Auditing Options abstract data. These versions of Windows do not implement Kerberos Policy Information abstract data.

Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ domain controllers use the Group Policy: Security Protocol Extension, as specified in

[MS-GPSB] section 2.2.2 to converge Kerberos Policy Information abstract data and [MS-GPSB] section 2.2.4 to converge Event Auditing Options abstract data.

<4041> Section 3.1.1.2.1: The following is a timeline of when each privilege value was introduced. All privilege values continue to be supported in all subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Name	Product
SE_ASSIGNPRIMARYTOKEN_NAME "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_AUDIT_NAME "SeAuditPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_BACKUP_NAME "SeBackupPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_NAME "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_CREATE_GLOBAL_NAME "SeCreateGlobalPrivilege"	Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP operating system Service Pack 2 (SP2), and Windows Server 2003
SE_CREATE_PAGEFILE_NAME "SeCreatePagefilePrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_CREATE_PERMANENT_NAME "SeCreatePermanentPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_CREATE_TOKEN_NAME "SeCreateTokenPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_DEBUG_NAME "SeDebugPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_ENABLE_DELEGATION_NAME "SeEnableDelegationPrivilege"	Windows 2000
SE_IMPERSONATE_NAME "SeImpersonatePrivilege"	Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP SP2, and Windows Server 2003
SE_INC_BASE_PRIORITY_NAME "SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_INCREASE_QUOTA_NAME "SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_LOAD_DRIVER_NAME "SeLoadDriverPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_LOCK_MEMORY_NAME "SeLockMemoryPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_MACHINE_ACCOUNT_NAME "SeMachineAccountPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.5
SE_MANAGE_VOLUME_NAME "SeManageVolumePrivilege"	Windows 2000 SP4 and Windows XP

Name	Product
SE_PROF_SINGLE_PROCESS_NAME "SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_NAME "SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_RESTORE_NAME "SeRestorePrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_SECURITY_NAME "SeSecurityPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME "SeShutdownPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_SYNC_AGENT_NAME "SeSyncAgentPrivilege"	Windows 2000
SE_SYSTEM_ENVIRONMENT_NAME "SeSystemEnvironment"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_SYSTEM_PROFILE_NAME "SeSystemProfilePrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_SYSTEMTIME_NAME "SeSystemtimePrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_TAKE_OWNERSHIP_NAME "SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_TCB_NAME "SeTcbPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_UNDOCK_NAME "SeUndockPrivilege"	Windows NT 3.1
SE_CREATE_SYMBOLIC_LINK_NAME "SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege"	Windows Vista
SE_INC_WORKING_SET_NAME "SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege"	Windows Vista
SE_RELABEL_NAME "SeRelabelPrivilege"	Windows Vista
SE_TIME_ZONE_NAME "SeTimeZonePrivilege"	Windows Vista
SE_TRUSTED_CREDMAN_ACCESS_NAME "SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege"	Windows Vista

<4142> Section 3.1.1.2.2: Windows products implement the exact set of system access rights that the protocol supports for a given version. See the Windows Behavior note in section 2.2.1.2 for a timeline of the system access introduction.

<4243> Section 3.1.1.3: The default security descriptor that is assigned to newly created account objects can be expressed in Security Description Definition Language (SDDL) as O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD).

See section 2.2.1.1.1 for the definitions of the generic access rights that are included in this security descriptor.

<4344> Section 3.1.1.3: Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 domain controllers use the Netlogon Remote Protocol, as specified in [MS-NRPC] section 1.3.3.

Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ domain controllers use the Group Policy: Security Protocol Extension, as specified in [MS-GPSB] section 2.2.6.

<4445> Section 3.1.1.4: The following is a timeline of when each secret name or name pattern was introduced. All secret names and name patterns continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Secret name or name pattern	Product
Starts with "G\$\$"	Windows NT 3.1 operating system
Starts with "G\$"	Windows NT 3.1
Starts with "L\$"	Windows 2000
Starts with "M\$"	Windows 2000
Starts with "_sc_"	Windows 2000
Starts with "NL\$"	Windows 2000
Starts with "RasDialParams"	Windows 2000
Starts with "RasCredentials"	Windows 2000
Equal to "\$MACHINE.ACC"	Windows NT 3.1
Equal to "SAC"	Windows 2000
Equal to "SAI"	Windows 2000
Equal to "SANSC"	Windows 2000

The Trusted Domain Secret type is used only in Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0.

For replication of secrets, Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 use Netlogon-based replication; while Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ use Active Directory replication.

<4546> Section 3.1.1.4: By default, the security descriptor assigned to newly created secret objects of type Local Secret can be expressed in Security Description Definition Language (SDDL) as O:BAG:SYD:(A;;GA;;;BA)(A;;GX;;;WD). This security descriptor implies that the secrets are shared between users by default, which means that a secret object created by an administrator is available to another administrator. An implementation ~~may~~ choose to not allow this behavior by assigning a different security descriptor.

See section 2.2.1.1.1 for the definitions of the generic access rights that are included in this security descriptor.



<4647> Section 3.1.1.5: The following is a timeline of when each information value was introduced. All information values continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Name	Product
Name	Windows NT 3.1
Flat Name	Windows 2000
Security Identifier	Windows NT 3.1
Trust Type	Windows 2000
Trust Direction	Windows 2000
Trust Attributes	Windows 2000
Posix Offset	Windows NT 3.1
Trust Incoming Passwords	Windows NT 3.51
Trust Outgoing Passwords	Windows NT 3.51
Forest Trust Information	Windows Server 2003
Supported Encryption Types	Windows Vista
Security Descriptor	Windows NT 3.1

<4748> Section 3.1.1.6.1: The default setting value is FALSE for Windows NT, Windows 2000, and Windows XP. The default setting value is TRUE for Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview**.

This setting can be set to FALSE on Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** by setting a "non-0" value on the following REG\_DWORD registry value:

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\TurnOffAnonymousBlock

Changes made to this setting must take effect immediately.

Note that the Boolean meaning of the TurnOffAnonymousBlock registry value is reversed from that of the LsaRestrictAnonymous setting in section 3.1.1.6.1.

<4849> Section 3.1.4: The Windows implementation of this protocol asks the RPC engine to perform a strict Network Data Representation (NDR) data consistency check at target level 5.0 (as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3) in Windows 2000 RTM, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview**.

<4950> Section 3.1.4: The Windows implementation of this protocol asks the RPC engine to include support for both NDR and NDR64 transfer syntaxes, in addition to the negotiation mechanism for determining what transfer syntax will be used (as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3) in Windows XP RTM, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008,

Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~.

<5051> Section 3.1.4: The Windows implementation of this protocol asks the RPC engine via the `strict_context_handle` attribute to reject use of context handles created by a method of a different RPC interface from this one, as specified in [MS-RPCE] section 3.

<5152> Section 3.1.4: The following is a timeline of when each method was introduced. All methods continue to be available in subsequent versions of Windows according to the applicability list at the beginning of this section.

Method	Product
LsarClose (section 3.1.4.9.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarEnumeratePrivileges (section 3.1.4.8.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarQuerySecurityObject (section 3.1.4.9.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarSetSecurityObject (section 3.1.4.9.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarOpenPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarQueryInformationPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarSetInformationPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.6)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarCreateAccount (section 3.1.4.5.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarEnumerateAccounts (section 3.1.4.5.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarCreateTrustedDomain (section 3.1.4.7.12)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains (section 3.1.4.7.8)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarCreateSecret (section 3.1.4.6.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarOpenAccount (section 3.1.4.5.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarEnumeratePrivilegesAccount (section 3.1.4.5.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarAddPrivilegesToAccount (section 3.1.4.5.5)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarRemovePrivilegesFromAccount (section 3.1.4.5.6)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarGetSystemAccessAccount (section 3.1.4.5.7)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarSetSystemAccessAccount (section 3.1.4.5.8)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarOpenTrustedDomain (section 3.1.4.7.1)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarQueryInfoTrustedDomain (section 3.1.4.7.13)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarSetInformationTrustedDomain (section 3.1.4.7.14)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarOpenSecret (section 3.1.4.6.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarSetSecret (section 3.1.4.6.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarQuerySecret (section 3.1.4.6.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarLookupPrivilegeValue (section 3.1.4.8.2)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarLookupPrivilegeName (section 3.1.4.8.3)	Windows NT 3.1

Method	Product
LsarLookupPrivilegeDisplayName (section 3.1.4.8.4)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarDeleteObject (section 3.1.4.9.3)	Windows NT 3.1
LsarEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight (section 3.1.4.5.9)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarEnumerateAccountRights (section 3.1.4.5.10)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarAddAccountRights (section 3.1.4.5.11)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarRemoveAccountRights (section 3.1.4.5.12)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfo (section 3.1.4.7.2)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfo (section 3.1.4.7.3)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarDeleteTrustedDomain (section 3.1.4.7.4)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarStorePrivateData (section 3.1.4.6.5)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarRetrievePrivateData (section 3.1.4.6.6)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarOpenPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.1)	Windows NT 3.51
LsarQueryInformationPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.3)	Windows 2000
LsarSetInformationPolicy2 (section 3.1.4.4.5)	Windows 2000
LsarQueryTrustedDomainInfoByName (section 3.1.4.7.5)	Windows 2000
LsarSetTrustedDomainInfoByName (section 3.1.4.7.6)	Windows 2000
LsarEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx (section 3.1.4.7.7)	Windows 2000
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx (section 3.1.4.7.11)	Windows 2000
LsarQueryDomainInformationPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.7)	Windows 2000
LsarSetDomainInformationPolicy (section 3.1.4.4.8)	Windows 2000
LsarOpenTrustedDomainByName (section 3.1.4.7.9)	Windows 2000
LsarCreateTrustedDomainEx2 (section 3.1.4.7.10)	Windows 2000
LsarQueryForestTrustInformation (section 3.1.4.7.15)	Windows XP
LsarSetForestTrustInformation (section 3.1.4.7.16)	Windows XP

<5253> Section 3.1.4: Some gaps in the opnum numbering sequence correspond to opnums that are specified in [MS-LSAT]. All other gaps in the opnum numbering sequence apply to Windows as follows.

Opnum	Description
1	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
5	Not used by Windows.
9	Not used by Windows.
21	Not used by Windows.

Opnum	Description
22	Not used by Windows.
52	Not used by Windows.
56	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
60	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
61	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
62	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
63	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
64	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
65	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
66	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
67	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
69	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
70	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
71	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
72	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.
75	Used only locally by Windows, never remotely.

<5354> Section 3.1.4.4.1: The Windows RPC server for this protocol ignores this parameter except for the **RootDirectory** field. It verifies whether the value is NULL and returns STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if it is not.

<5455> Section 3.1.4.4.2: The Windows RPC server for this protocol ignores this parameter except for the **RootDirectory** field. It verifies whether the value is NULL and returns STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER if it is not.

<5556> Section 3.1.4.4.3: Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER for this information class.

<5657> Section 3.1.4.4.3: In the case of Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview**, the Windows RPC server always throws an RPC\_NT\_PROCNUM\_OUT\_OF\_RANGE exception if the server is configured to emulate NT4 for PolicyDnsDomainInformation information level.

~~<57> Section 3.1.4.4.5: Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER for this information class.~~

<58> Section 3.1.4.4.5: ~~Windows 2000~~, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER for this information class.

<59> Section 3.1.4.4.5: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 behavior: The Windows RPC server always throws an RPC\_NT\_PROCNUM\_OUT\_OF\_RANGE exception if the server is configured to emulate NT4 for PolicyDnsDomainInformation information level.

<5960> Section 3.1.4.5.1: Windows checks whether the SID is valid, but does not validate the structure of the SID.

<6061> Section 3.1.4.5.5: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 ignore invalid LUIDs and return STATUS\_SUCCESS instead of STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER.

<6162> Section 3.1.4.5.6: Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10 do not allow removal of "SeAuditPrivilege", "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege", "SeImpersonatePrivilege", and "SeCreateGlobalPrivilege" from accounts represented with SIDs "S-1-5-19" and "S-1-5-20". Such requests are rejected with STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.

<6263> Section 3.1.4.5.9: Furthermore, Windows checks that the caller is a member of Builtin Administrators.

<6364> Section 3.1.4.5.12: Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ do not allow removal of "SeAuditPrivilege", "SeChangeNotifyPrivilege", "SeImpersonatePrivilege", and "SeCreateGlobalPrivilege" from accounts represented with SIDs "S-1-5-19" and "S-1-5-20". Such requests are rejected with STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED.

<6465> Section 3.1.4.6: Windows 2000 Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008 support these methods. ~~Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview support these methods by default, but can be configured not to support them.~~

<65> ~~Section 3.1.4.6.1: Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 Technical Preview support these methods by default, but can be configured not to support them.~~

<66> Section 3.1.4.6.1: Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 limit the secret name length to 128 characters. Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 return STATUS\_NAME\_TOO\_LONG for lengths that are greater than 128 characters. Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER for lengths that are greater than 128 characters.

<6667> Section 3.1.4.6.1: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ do not allow a secret whose name is prefixed by "G\$\$" to be created, and return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER to indicate this constraint failure to the caller.

<6768> Section 3.1.4.6.1: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2003 operating system with Service Pack 1 (SP1), Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** do not allow the secret name to be "G\$\$", "G\$", "L\$", "M\$", "\_sc\_", "NL\$", "RasDialParams" or "RasCredentials". They return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER to indicate this constraint failure to the caller.

<6869> Section 3.1.4.6.1: Global secrets (those that are prefixed with "G\$") cannot be created on domain controllers on which the **directory** service is stopped. A request to create a global secret on a domain controller on which the directory service is stopped fails with status code STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED.

<6970> Section 3.1.4.6.2: Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** have a special case for secret name search for downlevel compatibility with Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, and Windows NT 3.51. If the secret name is in the form "G\$\$<NAME>", where "<NAME>" matches the name of a trusted domain, the response is STATUS\_SUCCESS. In this case, secret information is Authentication Information of type TRUST\_AUTH\_TYPE\_CLEAR ([MS-ADTS] section 6.1.6.9.1.1, the **AuthType** field) from the trusted domain object.

<7071> Section 3.1.4.6.3: Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** have a special case for secret set operation for downlevel compatibility with Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, and Windows NT 3.51. If the secret name is in the form "G\$\$<NAME>", where "<NAME>" matches the name of a trusted domain, the result is that the set request writes the secret value into the authentication information section of the trusted domain object. The access check in this case is identical to that required for setting authentication information on a trusted domain object, rather than that pertaining to changing a secret value.

<7172> Section 3.1.4.6.3: If decryption of *EncryptedCurrentValue* fails, Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, and Windows Vista return STATUS\_UNKNOWN\_REVISION (0xC0000058); Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER\_1 (0xC00000EF).

<7273> Section 3.1.4.6.3: If decryption of *EncryptedOldValue* fails, Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, and Windows Vista return STATUS\_UNKNOWN\_REVISION (0xC0000058); Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER\_1 (0xC00000EF).

<7374> Section 3.1.4.6.4: Windows rejects the secret query requests of type "system" by returning STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED. Windows also rejects the secret query requests of type "local" from network clients with STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

<7475> Section 3.1.4.6.4: If Windows 2000 Server, Windows Server 2003, or Windows Server 2003 R2 process a global secret with a value that has its **Length** field set to 0, they fill in the *EncryptedCurrentValue* with the following values before encryption.

```
Length = 0
MaximumLength = 0
```

Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 **Technical Preview** set the value of *EncryptedCurrentValue* to NULL.



<~~7576~~> Section 3.1.4.6.4: If Windows 2000 Server, Windows Server 2003, or Windows Server 2003 R2 process a global secret with a value that has its **Length** field set to 0, they fill in the *EncryptedOldValue* with the following values before encryption.

```
Length = 0
MaximumLength = 0
```

Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ set the value of *EncryptedOldValue* to NULL.

<~~7677~~> Section 3.1.4.6.5: If decryption of *EncryptedData* fails, Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, and Windows Vista return STATUS\_UNKNOWN\_REVISION (0xC0000058); Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ return STATUS\_INVALID\_PARAMETER\_1 (0xC00000EF).

<~~7778~~> Section 3.1.4.7: Windows NT 3.1, Windows NT 3.5, Windows NT 3.51, and Windows NT 4.0 use trusted domain objects on non-domain controllers to join a machine to a domain. Therefore, trusted domain object methods are allowed on these products even when the machine is not a domain controller. There is, however, one extra check in this case, which is that the trusted domain object's security identifier musthas to be the same as the security identifier in Primary Domain Information. This also artificially limits the number of trusted domain objects on such systems to one.

<~~7879~~> Section 3.1.4.7.1: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ disallow callers that do not have the AuthenticatedUsers SID in their token from accessing trusted domain objects. Requests by such users are rejected with STATUS\_ACCESS\_DENIED.

<~~7980~~> Section 3.1.4.7.1: On Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~, Active Directory musthas to be running on the server in order for this request to succeed. Failing that, the STATUS\_DIRECTORY\_SERVICE\_REQUIRED status code is returned.

<~~8081~~> Section 3.1.4.7.3: Read-only domain controllers are supported on servers running Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~. They return the STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND error.

<~~8182~~> Section 3.1.4.7.3: Windows 2000 Server, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 support these *InformationClass* values.

<~~8283~~> Section 3.1.4.7.4: Read-only domain controllers are supported on servers running Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~. They return the STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND error.

<~~8384~~> Section 3.1.4.7.10: Windows Server 2003 for Small Business Server 2003 does not support this message. Attempts to create a TDO in this environment causes the server to return STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED\_ON\_SBS.

<~~8485~~> Section 3.1.4.7.10: The operation is not supported on Windows Server 2003 for Small Business Server 2003.

<~~8586~~> Section 3.1.4.7.10: Servers running Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, or Windows Server 2008 R2 return the STATUS\_INVALID\_DOMAIN\_STATE error when the TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE or the TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_CROSS\_ORGANIZATION bit is set in the **TrustAttributes** field of the *TrustedDomainInformation* input parameter.

<8687> Section 3.1.4.7.10: Read-only domain controllers are supported on servers running Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, or Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~. They return the STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND error.

<8788> Section 3.1.4.7.11: The operation is not supported on Windows Server 2003 for Small Business Server 2003.

<8889> Section 3.1.4.7.12: The operation is not supported on Windows Server 2003 for Small Business Server 2003.

<8990> Section 3.1.4.7.13: When not at DS\_BEHAVIOR\_WIN2003 forest functional level, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ hide the presence of the TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE bit in the **Trust Attributes** field of a trusted domain object.

<9091> Section 3.1.4.7.14: Servers running Windows 2000 Server, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 return the STATUS\_INVALID\_INFO\_CLASS error when the information class is TrustedDomainInformationBasic.

<9192> Section 3.1.4.7.14: Servers running Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, or Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~ return the STATUS\_OBJECT\_NAME\_NOT\_FOUND error.

<9293> Section 3.1.4.9.1: The server will not return the security descriptor of objects that it stores in Active Directory. It will return the security descriptor of objects in its local policy only. The objects stored in Active Directory include Global Secrets and trusted domain objects in Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~. For objects that fall into this category, the server will return the STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED status code.

<9394> Section 3.1.4.9.2: The server will not return the security descriptor of objects that it stores in Active Directory. It will return the security descriptor of objects in its local policy only. The objects stored in Active Directory include Global Secrets and trusted domain objects. For objects that fall into this category, a Windows server returns the STATUS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED status code.

<9495> Section 3.1.4.10: On Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~, when processing the LsarOpenSecret (section 3.1.4.6.2) and LsarCreateSecret (section 3.1.4.6.1) methods, the length of the string is allowed to not be a multiple of 2. If **Length** is not a multiple of 2, the length of the Unicode string will be assumed to be **Length** - 1.

<9596> Section 3.1.4.10: Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 do not perform this check. On Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016 ~~Technical Preview~~, when processing the LsarOpenSecret and LsarCreateSecret methods, the **Buffer** field is allowed to contain zero or many NULL Unicode characters at the end of the string.

~~<96> Section 3.1.4.10: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 implementations of this protocol do not validate the Luid.HighPart field.~~

<97> Section 3.1.4.10: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 implementations of this protocol do not validate the Luid.~~LowPartHighPart~~ field.

<98> Section 3.1.4.10: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 implementations of this protocol do not validate the ~~Luid.LowPart~~ field.

~~<99> Section 3.1.4.10: Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2003 R2 implementations of this protocol do not validate the Attributes field.~~



## 8 Change Tracking

~~No table of This section identifies changes is available. The that were made to this document is either new or has had no changes since its the last release. Changes are classified as New, Major, Minor, Editorial, or No change.~~

~~The revision class **New** means that a new document is being released.~~

~~The revision class **Major** means that the technical content in the document was significantly revised. Major changes affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of major changes are:~~

- ~~▪ A document revision that incorporates changes to interoperability requirements or functionality.~~
- ~~▪ The removal of a document from the documentation set.~~

~~The revision class **Minor** means that the meaning of the technical content was clarified. Minor changes do not affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of minor changes are updates to clarify ambiguity at the sentence, paragraph, or table level.~~

~~The revision class **Editorial** means that the formatting in the technical content was changed. Editorial changes apply to grammatical, formatting, and style issues.~~

~~The revision class **No change** means that no new technical changes were introduced. Minor editorial and formatting changes may have been made, but the technical content of the document is identical to the last released version.~~

~~Major and minor changes can be described further using the following change types:~~

- ~~▪ New content added.~~
- ~~▪ Content updated.~~
- ~~▪ Content removed.~~
- ~~▪ New product behavior note added.~~
- ~~▪ Product behavior note updated.~~
- ~~▪ Product behavior note removed.~~
- ~~▪ New protocol syntax added.~~
- ~~▪ Protocol syntax updated.~~
- ~~▪ Protocol syntax removed.~~
- ~~▪ New content added due to protocol revision.~~
- ~~▪ Content updated due to protocol revision.~~
- ~~▪ Content removed due to protocol revision.~~
- ~~▪ New protocol syntax added due to protocol revision.~~
- ~~▪ Protocol syntax updated due to protocol revision.~~
- ~~▪ Protocol syntax removed due to protocol revision.~~
- ~~▪ Obsolete document removed.~~

~~Editorial changes are always classified with the change type **Editorially updated**.~~

Some important terms used in the change type descriptions are defined as follows:

- **Protocol syntax** refers to data elements (such as packets, structures, enumerations, and methods) as well as interfaces.
- **Protocol revision** refers to changes made to a protocol that affect the bits that are sent over the wire.

The changes made to this document are listed in the following table. For more information, please contact [dochelp@microsoft.com](mailto:dochelp@microsoft.com).

<b>Section</b>	<b>Tracking number (if applicable) and description</b>	<b>Major change (Y or N)</b>	<b>Change type</b>
<a href="#">1.2.1 Normative References</a>	<a href="#">Added a new normative reference for [MSKB-3149090].</a>	Y	<a href="#">Content update.</a>
<a href="#">1.2.2 Informative References</a>	<a href="#">73151 : Added the [SCHNEIER] reference.</a>	N	<a href="#">Content update.</a>
<a href="#">2.1 Transport</a>	<a href="#">Updated the authentication level details for the transport requirements, and added a new product behavior note.</a>	Y	<a href="#">Content update.</a>
<a href="#">2.2.7.9 LSAPR_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFORMATION_EX</a>	<a href="#">73151 : Added a referral to the [SCHNEIER] reference.</a>	N	<a href="#">Content update.</a>

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