

# [MS-DHA-Diff]:

## Device Health Attestation Protocol

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## Revision Summary

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# 1 Introduction

This document specifies the Device Health Attestation (DHA) Protocol.

The DHA protocol enables devices: to submit information about the code/programs that were loaded & executed during boot (the state the device is booted to) to a remote reporting service called Device Health Attestation Service (DHA-Service), and get an encrypted BLOB back that is cached on the device or made available to a MDM service provider.

Sections 1.5, 1.8, 1.9, 2, and 3 of this specification are normative. All other sections and examples in this specification are informative.

## 1.1 Glossary

This document uses the following terms:

**attestation:** A process of establishing some property of a computer platform or of a trusted platform module (TPM) key, in part through TPM cryptographic operations.

**attestation certificate (AIKCert):** An X.509 certificate, issued by a Privacy-CA ([TCG-Cred] section 2.6), that contains the public portion of an Attestation Identity Key signed by a Privacy-CA. It states that the public key is associated with a valid TPM. See [TCG-Cred] section 3.4 for more information.

**Attestation Identity Key (AIK):** An asymmetric (public/private) key pair that can substitute for the Endorsement Key (EK) as an identity for the trusted platform module (TPM). The private portion of an AIK can never be revealed or used outside the TPM and can only be used inside the TPM for a limited set of operations. Furthermore, it can only be used for signing, and only for limited, TPM-defined operations.

**binary large object (BLOB):** A discrete packet of data that is stored in a database and is treated as a sequence of uninterpreted bytes.

**endorsement certificate (EKCert):** An X.509 certificate issued by a platform manufacturer indicating that the trusted platform module (TPM) with the specified endorsement key was built into a specified computer platform. See [TCG-Cred] section 3.2 for more information.

**endorsement key (EK):** A Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public and private key pair, which is created randomly on the trusted platform module (TPM) at manufacture time and cannot be changed. The private key never leaves the TPM, while the public key is used for attestation and for encryption of sensitive data sent to the TPM. See [TCG-Cred] section 2.4 for more information.

**Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP):** An application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information systems (text, graphic images, sound, video, and other multimedia files) on the World Wide Web.

**Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS):** An extension of HTTP that securely encrypts and decrypts web page requests. In some older protocols, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer" is still used (Secure Sockets Layer has been deprecated). For more information, see [SSL3] and [RFC5246].

**Secure Sockets Layer (SSL):** A security protocol that supports confidentiality and integrity of messages in client and server applications that communicate over open networks. SSL supports server and, optionally, client authentication using X.509 certificates [X509] and [RFC5280]. SSL is superseded by Transport Layer Security (TLS). TLS version 1.0 is based on SSL version 3.0 [SSL3].

**simple type:** An element that can contain only text and appears as <simpleType> in an XML document or any attribute of an element. Attributes are considered simple types because they contain only text. See also complex type.

**TCP/IP:** A set of networking protocols that is widely used on the Internet and provides communications across interconnected networks of computers with diverse hardware architectures and various operating systems. It includes standards for how computers communicate and conventions for connecting networks and routing traffic.

**Transport Layer Security (TLS):** A security protocol that supports confidentiality and integrity of messages in client and server applications communicating over open networks. TLS supports server and, optionally, client authentication by using X.509 certificates (as specified in [X509]). TLS is standardized in the IETF TLS working group.

**trusted platform module (TPM):** A component of a trusted computing platform. The TPM stores keys, passwords, and digital certificates. See [TCG-Architect] for more information.

**XML namespace:** A collection of names that is used to identify elements, types, and attributes in XML documents identified in a URI reference [RFC3986]. A combination of XML namespace and local name allows XML documents to use elements, types, and attributes that have the same names but come from different sources. For more information, see [XMLNS-2ED].

**XML namespace prefix:** An abbreviated form of an XML namespace, as described in [XML].

**XML schema:** A description of a type of XML document that is typically expressed in terms of constraints on the structure and content of documents of that type, in addition to the basic syntax constraints that are imposed by XML itself. An XML schema provides a view of a document type at a relatively high level of abstraction.

**MAY, SHOULD, MUST, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT:** These terms (in all caps) are used as defined in [RFC2119]. All statements of optional behavior use either MAY, SHOULD, or SHOULD NOT.

## 1.2 References

Links to a document in the Microsoft Open Specifications library point to the correct section in the most recently published version of the referenced document. However, because individual documents in the library are not updated at the same time, the section numbers in the documents may not match. You can confirm the correct section numbering by checking the Errata.

### 1.2.1 Normative References

We conduct frequent surveys of the normative references to assure their continued availability. If you have any issue with finding a normative reference, please contact dochelp@microsoft.com. We will assist you in finding the relevant information.

[MS-MDM] Microsoft Corporation, "Mobile Device Management Protocol".

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>

[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt>

[TCG-Cred] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Credential Profiles", Specification Version 1.1, Revision 1.014, May 2007, [http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/IWG-Credential\\_Profiles\\_V1\\_R1\\_14.pdf](http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/IWG-Credential_Profiles_V1_R1_14.pdf)

[X509] ITU-T, "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-Key and Attribute Certificate Frameworks", Recommendation X.509, August 2005, <http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en>

[XMLNS] Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., et al., Eds., "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)", W3C Recommendation, December 2009, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-xml-names-20091208/>

[XMLSCHEMA1] Thompson, H., Beech, D., Maloney, M., and Mendelsohn, N., Eds., "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C Recommendation, May 2001, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-1-20010502/>

## 1.2.2 Informative References

[TPM] Trusted Computing Group, "TPM Work Group", <https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/groups/tpm/>

## 1.3 Overview


Many enterprises check software state and policy compliance before allowing computers to access corporate network resources. The goal of these checks is to ensure that the operating system (OS) is properly updated, the OS configuration meets company policy, and that antivirus software is up-to-date.

The Device Health Attestation (DHA) protocol provides a way for a device to submit its policy compliance status and software status in a tamper-resistant way to a Device Health Attestation Service (DHA-Service) such that its state can later be evaluated by an entity such as an MDM (mobile device management) to determine compliance status.

The following diagram describes the three components that interact in a Device Health Attestation communications.


1. **DHA-Enabled Device:** that supports Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in Firmware or Discreet format.
2. **Device Management Server (MDM):** initiates the Device Health Attestation flow, reviews the Device Health Attestation Report (DHA-Report), and evaluates whether the reported state is equivalent to compliance status.
3. **DHA-Service:** a component that processes Device Health Attestation data, produces DHA-Report.

This document discusses only the interaction between the client and the DHA-Service.



**Figure 1: Device health attestation**

The following is a sequence diagram that describes how the three components interact, during a Device Health Attestation session.




**Figure 2: Device, DHA-service communication**

### 1.4 Relationship to Other Protocols

The following figure illustrates the relationship of this protocol to industry-standard protocols.

The Device Health Attestation Protocol depends upon HTTPS [RFC2818] and can be used only with [MS-MDM].





**Figure 3: Relationship of DHA protocol to industry-standard protocols**

### 1.5 Prerequisites/Preconditions

The DHA protocol assumes the availability of the following resources:

- An HTTPS channel [RFC2818].
- A mobile device management service.
- Devices MUST support a Trusted Module Platform (TPM) that is designed based on standards specified in [TPM] .

### 1.6 Applicability Statement

The DHA protocol is applicable for monitoring/assessing the state into which a device is booted, and to monitor/verify if the device is booted to a secure/compliant state.

### 1.7 Versioning and Capability Negotiation

This document covers versioning issues in the following areas:

- **Supported Transports:** This protocol can be implemented on top of TLS/SSL and HTTPS as discussed in section 2.1.
- **Protocol Versions:** This is version 4.0 of the DHA protocol. It is also compatible with TPM-devices that have standardized around versions 1.2 and 2.0 of the TPM specification. The server implementation of the Device Health Attestation Protocol supports the following client versions:
  - Version 1.0: The first release of the protocol.
  - Version 2.0: An update to support a Security Version Number in the Health report.
  - Version 3.0: An update to support TPM 1.2 devices (which results in a TPMVersion node being added to the Health report).
  - Version 4.0: An update to add support for additional security measures.

## **1.8 Vendor-Extensible Fields**

None.

## **1.9 Standards Assignments**

None.

## 2 Messages

### 2.1 Transport

DHA is a client-to-server protocol that consists of an HTTP- based Web service. It supports TLS over HTTPS over TCP/IP [RFC2818], using the following implementation-specific endpoints:

**GET:**            devicehealthattestation/gethealthcertificate/v1  
                  devicehealthattestation/gethealthcertificate/v3  
                  devicehealthattestation/gethealthcertificate/v4

**VALIDATE:**    devicehealthattestation/validatehealthcertificate/v1  
                  devicehealthattestation/validatehealthcertificate/v3  
                  devicehealthattestation/validatehealthcertificate/v4

The TPM-compatible device and the DHA-Service communicate via a TLS/SSL protected communication channel in following format.

- Device Requests use TLS/SSL for forwarding DHA-Boot-Data to DHA-Service
- The DHA-Service Responses use TLS/SSL to forward an encrypted BLOB to the Device

### 2.2 Common Data Types

XML schema element definitions that are specific to a particular request/response body are described within the corresponding sections.

#### 2.2.1 Namespaces

This specification defines and references various XML namespaces that use the mechanisms specified in [XMLNS]. Although this specification associates a specific XML namespace prefix with each XML namespace that is used, the choice of any particular XML namespace prefix is implementation-specific and not significant for interoperability.

Prefixes and XML namespaces used in this specification are as follows.

Prefix	Namespace URI	Reference
xsd	http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema	[XMLSCHEMA 1]
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v1	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v3	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v4	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/response/v1	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/response/v3	This specification

Prefix	Namespace URI	Reference
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v1	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v3	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v4	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/response/v1	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/response/v3	This specification
xmlns	http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/response/v4	This specification

## 2.2.2 HTTP Methods

This protocol uses the existing set of standard HTTP methods.

## 2.2.3 HTTP Headers

None.

## 2.2.4 XML Elements

### 2.2.4.1 Claims

<Claims> contain Base64 opaque information that is gathered from the client and returned to the server, upon which the basis of health attestation is established. In the case of HealthCertificateRequest, <Claims> will also contain the TCG (boot) log from the client.

### 2.2.4.2 HealthCertificateBlob

An encrypted BLOB containing the Health Certificate.

## 2.2.5 Simple Types

The following table summarizes the set of custom simple type definitions that are included in this specification.

Simple type	Section	Description
Boolean_T	section 2.2.5.1	The contents are either true or false.

### 2.2.5.1 Boolean\_T

```
<xs:simpleType name="Boolean_T">:
  <xs:restriction base="xs:boolean">:
    <xs:pattern value="true|false"/>:
  </xs:restriction>:
</xs:simpleType>
```

### 2.2.6 Attributes

The following table summarizes the set of common XML schema attribute definitions that are included in this specification.

Attribute	Section	Description
ErrorCode	section 2.2.6.1	Contains the code that is associated with the error.
ErrorMessage	section 2.2.6.2	Contains a description of the error.

#### 2.2.6.1 ErrorCode

Contains the code that is associated with the error.

#### 2.2.6.2 ErrorMessage

Contains a description of the error.

### 2.2.7 Common Data Structures

None.

## 3 Protocol Details

### 3.1 DHA-Enabled Client Details

The DHA protocol enables Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions to get a Device Health Report (DHA-Report) from devices that meet the following requirements.

- Support Trusted Module Platform (TPM) version 1.xx or 2.xx in the following formats.
  - Firmware (i.e. Windows phone)
  - Discrete (i.e. PC devices that have a physical TPM chip)

The EK, EKCert and Windows Attestation Identity Key (AIK) and Windows Attestation Certificate (AIKCert), as specified in [TCG-Cred], MUST be provisioned previous to initiating the attestation protocol. The health attestation protocol can be initiated asynchronously after boot once the TPM has been provisioned (i.e. EK, EK Cert, AIK, AIK Cert are created) or it can be initiated as a part of a service request by mobile device management server. For more information about the AIK enrollment process, see [X509].

The Device Health Report (DHA-Report) is device bound and is valid only for the current boot cycle. It will also have a time bounded lifetime to force an attestation check for long-running devices.

Following is a brief overview of the Device Health Attestation, asynchronous processing flow:


1. Upon Boot the device sends information about its boot state (DHA-Boot-Data) to Device Health Attestation Service (DHA-Service)
2. DHA-Service replies back with an encrypted data BLOB (DHA-Encrypted-Data)
3. When a Device Management Server (MDM-Server) needs to get a Device Health Report (DHA-Report), it sends a request to the TPM-compatible device (that is enrolled to - managed by the MDM-Server), initiates the DHA data validation session
4. The TPM-compatible device sends an alert to the Device Management Server, informs that the Device Health Validation Data (DHA-Validation-Data) is ready for pickup
5. The Device Management Server sends a request to the TPM-compatible device to get the DHA-Validation-Data
6. The TPM-compatible device sends the DHA-Validation-Data to Device Management Server (MDM-Server)
7. The Device Management Server (MDM-Server) adds a "Nonce" to the payload, forwards the DHA-Validation-Data to DHA-Service
8. The DHA-Service review the data, sends a report (DHA-Report) to the Device Management Server (MDM-Server)

## Device Health Attestation – Asynchronous Flow

### (A) Device sends DHA-Boot-Data when it boots or reboots



### (B) Device Management server gets a DHA-Report




**Figure 4: Device health attestation asynchronous processing flow**

Following is a brief overview of the Device Health Attestation, synchronous processing flow:

1. The Device Management Server (MDM-Server) sends a request to the TPM-compatible device to initiate the DHA data validation session
2. The TPM-compatible device sends an alert to the Device Management Server (MDM-Server), informs that the data is not ready for pickup
3. The TPM-compatible sends its boot data (DHA-Boot-Data) to the DHA-Service
4. The DHA-Service sends an encrypted BLOB back to the TPM-compatible device
5. The TPM-compatible device sends an alert to the Device Management Server (MDM-Server) informs that DHA data is ready for pickup
6. The Device Management Server sends a request to the TPM-compatible device to get the DHA-Validation-Data
7. The TPM-compatible device sends the DHA-Validation-Data to Device Management Server (MDM-Server)


8. The Device Management Server (MDM-Server) adds a "Nonce" to the payload, forwards the DHA-Validation-Data to DHA-Service
9. The DHA-Service review the data, sends a report (DHA-Report) to the Device Management Server (MDM-Server)

**Device Health Attestation – Synchronous Flow**



**Figure 5: Device health attestation synchronous processing flow**


The DHA-enabled client is a computing device that supports TPM in firmware or discrete format, and is enrolled/managed by a Device Management Server (MDM-Server). The following state diagram shows an exchange in a negotiation between the TPM-compatible device and the Device Health Attestation Service (DHA-Service).





## Figure 6: Device Health Attestation

The Device Management Server (MDM-Server) can initiate a request for DHA Data as needed. When the Device Management Server (MDM-Server) sends this request: the TPM-compatible device prepares DHA-Validation-Data, forward it to Device Management Server (MDM-Server)



## Figure 7: Device to MDM-Server communication

### 3.1.1 Abstract Data Model

None.

### 3.1.2 Timers

None.

### 3.1.3 Initialization

The Device health attestation flow is triggered on a TPM-compatible device under the following conditions.

- When the device boots.
- When the device reboots.

### 3.1.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

The device receives a mobile device management request for device health verification.

### 3.1.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The following HTTP methods can be performed on this resource.

HTTP method	Section	Description
POST	section 3.1.5.1.1	Send DHA-Boot-Data to DHA-Service

The responses to all the resources can result in the following status codes.

Status code	Reason phrase	Description
200	HTTP OK	Successful request
400	Bad Request	The server cannot or will not process the request due to something that is perceived to be a client error (e.g., malformed request syntax, invalid request message framing, request mismatch or deceptive request routing, invalid BLOB )
500	Internal Server Error	A generic error message, given when an unexpected condition was encountered and no more specific message is suitable. An issue is preventing the service from issuing certificates

### 3.1.5.1 DHA-Boot-Data

The TPM-compatible client sends DHA-Boot-Data (i.e. TCG logs, PC measurements, a signed certificate) to the DHA-Service (DHA-Service) - receives an Encrypted BLOB from the DHA-Service Provider (DHA-EB).

#### 3.1.5.1.1 POST

This method sends information from the TPM-compatible device to the DHA-Service.

##### 3.1.5.1.1.1 Request Body

The request body from the TPM-compatible device to the DHA-Service is an encrypted BLOB. It resembles the following.

```
<HealthCertificateRequest ProtocolVersion='4'
xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v4'>

<Claims>AQAAAAQAAABlAAAAABgEAAAAAAAAAUqQAA/1RDR4AYACIACzrz01nPbX4MkSK7O8Tam7UYSUM6q51mumDTW/9KK
ir8AAAAAAAAAALEZshCdiDh7rYJANltqkYJzMLFAAAAAQALA/////wAUQ31e1GTYuKMMGHqqWhQhOCq+TmQAFAAEAQBP18
y38myfaPpJJ1PLY+bfckDowdGVcjAyYFRF8AJuRdP+cv7UpMxE+JnNRseYWYjVXiWqkeQ81ctjKLx/oIFdL2m/s7mRroC
j4C7dUWWeqnHiboAgT3+9UF1dgUacBq5T/ /BAUwAwEB/zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTv91bLj+
/1erYd/uoZnT3FYeiIEIiLOi+9UcQDOUDVYdpUI7mqxogHVAgMBAAGjggF2MIIBcJASBgkrBgEEAYI3FQEEBQIDAQABMC
MGCSSGAQQBgjcVAgQWBBT4wWu3f3dTSvM1Nx1OoSZ7DyBwgDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUE62/Qwm9gnCcJNVPMMW7VipiKG9QwGQY
JKwYBBAGCNxQCBAweCgBTAHUAYgBDAEEwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wHwYDVR0jBBGwFoAURWZS
Q+F+WBG/1k6eI1UIOzoiaqgwXAYDVR0fBFUwUzBRoE+
.
.
.
.neJUBAAAFdCQ0wFAAAABwAAgAEAAAALANgEPWt7ha01jrO2rmqHOrfvI6JjUsXcT6pa7trPXrQbHQAAAEV4aXQgQm9v
dCBTZxJ2aWNlcyBjbnZvY2F0aW9uBQAAAAcAAIABAAAAcWc1T3VCy9hyqBqdneqDmyuNdHx+vV6mYVxA9C9EptvroCgAA
ABFeG10IEJvb3QgU2VydmljZXMyUmV0dXJuZWQgd2l0aCBTdWNjZXNz</Claims>

<AIKPublic>U1NBMQAIAAADAAAAAEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQABYw9/R0sYTF0SYzKfM7gy2aASjwB/S6L3ztZ+FjEaLifQJ0
77/wVIVLbzI2gB9tVPL5G8q+...../xtRyILLzYSXMDx0mwysTwHhbB3zUx1j51mli0tuAhRtBbccH1aYW0DjCfJ
MFNPZvCBpa29O2E+23zWHz01hqw==</AIKPublic>
</HealthCertificateRequest>
```

##### 3.1.5.1.1.2 Response Body

The response body from the DHA-Service to the TPM-compatible device is an encrypted BLOB (DHA-Encrypted-Data).

### 3.1.5.1.1.3 Processing Details

The encrypted BLOB is cached on the client in encrypted format.

### 3.1.6 Timer Events

None.

### 3.1.7 Other Local Events


When the TPM-compatible device is booted or rebooted, it triggers an event that sends the DHA-Boot-Data to the DHA-Service over TLS/SSL protected communication channel.

## 3.2 DHA-Service Details

The DHA-Service consists of two major communication paths:

- The path between the TPM-compatible device and the DHA-Service
- The path between the DHA-Service and the MDM-Server

The following state diagram shows the exchange between the DHA-Service and the TPM-compatible client.



**Figure 8: Device to DHA-Service communication**

### 3.2.1 Abstract Data Model

None.

### 3.2.2 Timers

None.

### 3.2.3 Initialization

None.

### 3.2.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

None.

### 3.2.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The following HTTP methods can be performed on this resource.

HTTP method	Section	Description
POST	section 3.2.5.1.1	Sends an encrypted BLOB (DHA-Encrypted-Data to TPM-compatible device upon request

The responses to all the resources can result in the following status codes.

Status code	Reason phrase	Description
200	HTTP OK	Successful request
400	Bad Request	The server cannot or will not process the request due to something that is perceived to be a client error (e.g., malformed request syntax, invalid request message framing, request mismatch or deceptive request routing, invalid BLOB)
500	Internal Server Error	A generic error message, given when an unexpected condition was encountered and no more specific message is suitable. An issue is preventing the service from issuing certificates

#### 3.2.5.1 DHA-Encrypted-Data

The DHA-Service receives the DHA-Boot-Data from the TPM-compatible device. The DHA-Service reviews the data, creates an Encrypted BLOB (DHA-Encrypted-Data), and sends it to the TPM-compatible device. When the TPM-compatible device receives the DHA-Encrypted-Data, it caches the data in its local storage.

##### 3.2.5.1.1 POST

This method sends information from the DHA-Service to the TPM-compatible device.

##### 3.2.5.1.1.1 Request Body

The health certificate validation request body is specified in section 3.1.5.1.1.1, Boot Data POST Request body.

```
<HealthCertificateValidationRequest ProtocolVersion='4' xmlns='http://schemas
.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v4'>
  <Claims>
    AQA AAAQA AAB1AAAABgEAAAAAAD/VENHgbgAIgALotk7Wc9tfgyRIrs7xNqbtRhJQzqrmWa6Y
    NNb/0oqKvwAEAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAAAAAALiQchCdiDh7rYJANltqkYJzMLfAAAAAQ
    ALA///wAUQ31e1GTyUkMMGHqqWhQhOCq+TmQAFAAEAQBwMAodpzmBxpW2kdqfsVF15u4y+9S
    65aq6a5LbL8E3DLVa2FFGXmDS0/vy3XNmu8q3UfPNZ99TR+ff7g/IhDLjInGzCEQ04YTP6/V
    L+1Fgt9dJvTe8Cm5BRu4QwdM9g+cGGWu3eeTghRAdsG4OdNknMP2IuAihKJF5xrymWw5TtVpn
    Fc/MjCzrMqAcQmH3GEBMZrstjr0yTcqZaXsca4Ydn7kCAk8HLuV7GVkcuF9s7C8mlKEfgQMXs
    LAF/oyDYWl4QGc4166+anFOFhpnvfA5hYUtBMctOvi0LqCML6yAIJuZnNxI3MdIkVLWAnnOYe
    k/YQ//OKtF9Bitz2pGF0A
  </Claims>
  <HealthCertificateBlob>
    77u/PD94bWwgdMvyc21vbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluc2Z0idXRmLTgiPz48T3BhcXVlSGVhbHRoQ
```

```

2VydGlmaWNhdGUgeG1sbnM6eHNkPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8yMDAxL1hNTFNjaGVtYS
IgeG1sbnM6eHNkPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8yMDAxL1hNTFNThrdFNVMFRWYi9KdWlyO
FFySjgvdWw4dU9ibm5DUWVERVhnbC9qVHVXehJYUTVFEsUVobHBISis2WStNVepBMElvZUwXQ
k9sSktZNGxqSDAvOXZvdnppU0pUZXLnLaUI3OGV4RHpHRmtBYjZhb3duWWZxSHBazWZTd2g3Tn
FpZmJPRUhosVpOz1l4NmhfLYtxMk52c1l1UWgVNW9yK3Vvd3RkMDkwWjRiVytMQT09PC9DZXJ
0aWZpY2F0ZUtleT48SVY+Z3Mr.....5SjhQQk9oUUhNDUxQTFRwMrNVJTUjVVSUxTNF
EvNktyV1VJNlh6RTU0U0R5cXpST2pXTDdXNVVpb1BNbnJCV0ozWVRQSOVKY250ekRmN1BRTEd
JVmg4dkxqWitadmRBZVZML0tRdHBza0k2NGttZHRmd3BVdkIyb0xMTjVIAVBRTGFkMGVmOXc5
Ty9sQW9qTYXWv1VQLzJLRjklbkdvTFNUYlZ6QUw3WmNkSENkQWt4MGh4bkFicUh5ZmowTGJoT
FFWNzhNWit2QldJdzNkVXBCZEJxUHl6aWJzREpoSW9uQTRRYkN2OExnaUpzMzZk5tejK3OU
ovblkxOVVvTjNjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUj
jUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUjBjUj
</HealthCertificateBlob>:
</HealthCertificateValidationRequest>

```

### 3.2.5.1.1.2 Response Body

Response (DHA-Service->MDM-Server): DHA-Service reviews the data, creates a report (DHA-Report), and forwards the report to MDM-Server.

The response body from the DHA-Service to the MDM-Server is an encrypted BLOB. It resembles the following.

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<HealthCertificateValidationResponse xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" ErrorCode="0" ErrorMessage="DHA
validation report was generated successfully." ProtocolVersion="4"
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/response/v4
">
  <HealthCertificateProperties>
    <Issued>2017-07-11T22:11:44.6953646Z</Issued>
    <AIKPresent>true</AIKPresent>
    <AttestationMethod>EK Certificate</AttestationMethod>
    <BitlockerEnabledAtBoot>false</BitlockerEnabledAtBoot>
    <BitlockerProtector>
      <UnlockType>None</UnlockType>
    </BitlockerProtector>
    <BootAppSVN>1</BootAppSVN>
    <BootDebuggingDisabled>true</BootDebuggingDisabled>
    <BootManagerSVN>1</BootManagerSVN>

    <BootRevListInfo>005D447A7CC6D101200000000B00CBB56E8B19267E24A2986C4A616CCB58B4D53F6020AC8FD5
FC205C20F2AB00BC</BootRevListInfo>
    <CodeIntegrityEnabled>true</CodeIntegrityEnabled>

    <CodeIntegrityPolicy>0000000000001002C000B0020000000550070006400610074006500520076006B005300
690050006F006C006900630079002E007000370062000000B3A95AD6A26B2AA407C92BCD3B84E112D141589D3E0E3
981D51594FEBD72DFDC</CodeIntegrityPolicy>
    <CrashDumpEncryptionEnabled>false</CrashDumpEncryptionEnabled>
    <CredentialGuardEnabled>false</CredentialGuardEnabled>
    <DataExecutionPreventionPolicy>0</DataExecutionPreventionPolicy>

    <ELAMDriverHash>B4CA876CD2DCAB929A5B54016C703D026CB22EAA54E8B8C99DA61A1D53F244BF</ELAMDriverH
ash>
    <ELAMDriverLoaded>true</ELAMDriverLoaded>
    <ELAMDriverName>\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\WdBoot.sys</ELAMDriverName>
    <ELAMSignerName>Microsoft Windows Early Launch Anti-malware
Publisher</ELAMSignerName>
    <FlightSigningNotEnabled>false</FlightSigningNotEnabled>
    <MemoryScrubbingProtectionEnabled>false</MemoryScrubbingProtectionEnabled>
    <NoSecureBootCustomPolicy>true</NoSecureBootCustomPolicy>
    <NotBootedIntoSafeMode>true</NotBootedIntoSafeMode>
    <NotBootedIntoWinPE>true</NotBootedIntoWinPE>
    <OSKernelDebuggingDisabled>true</OSKernelDebuggingDisabled>

    <OSRevListInfo>8073EEA7F8FAD001200000000B00A8285B04DE618ACF4174C59F07AECC002D11DD7D97FA5D464F
190C9D9E3479BA</OSRevListInfo>

```

```
<PageFileEncryptionEnabled>>false</PageFileEncryptionEnabled>
<PCRS hashAlgorithm="SHA1">
  <PCR n="0">7714E74524EBFBF671A485D3813A1926A34AB768</PCR>
  <PCR n="1">C7070A78B978C8B6E5E35DCBB1C98B87F7444EBE</PCR>
  <PCR n="2">B2A83B0EBF2F8374299A5B2BDFC31EA955AD7236</PCR>
  <PCR n="3">B2A83B0EBF2F8374299A5B2BDFC31EA955AD7236</PCR>
  <PCR n="4">DF5A11CF11030E2D9FA4E9BAB4BB7AF608B96EA3</PCR>
  <PCR n="5">7699BEA5781384130D674525E2B223D832922A01</PCR>
  <PCR n="6">B2A83B0EBF2F8374299A5B2BDFC31EA955AD7236</PCR>
  <PCR n="7">DF1F73DC71C6E4B054CCBB2A9BE0768978A7E1E3</PCR>
  <PCR n="8">0000000000000000000000000000000000000000</PCR>
  <PCR n="9">0000000000000000000000000000000000000000</PCR>
  <PCR n="10">0000000000000000000000000000000000000000</PCR>
  <PCR n="11">EBB98DF76613280F20DC38221143A9E727399486</PCR>
  <PCR n="12">FA38CE6A9101EF44002A5A89AFC3D094963976AC</PCR>
  <PCR n="13">24FED52A0787AFE466CF4008B2815A6E3822C511</PCR>
  <PCR n="14">D2366C862C4CB94577FA277F024C14AE149A3512</PCR>
  <PCR n="15">0000000000000000000000000000000000000000</PCR>
  <PCR n="16">0000000000000000000000000000000000000000</PCR>
  <PCR n="17">FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</PCR>
  <PCR n="18">FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</PCR>
  <PCR n="19">FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</PCR>
  <PCR n="20">FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</PCR>
  <PCR n="21">FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</PCR>
  <PCR n="22">FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</PCR>
  <PCR n="23">0000000000000000000000000000000000000000</PCR>
</PCRS>
<ProductionSignedBootManager>>false</ProductionSignedBootManager>
<PublicAIK>

<Modulus>C6A0F391172685AA295410DE040E117B59611BC01B099914137097C02D11F30606E4375C2826260749D0
845074DB902250E5BD3CB7080AE52615FEAEF6C146EFBE35B807EFC2CE767DA2BFE2043B70C3B4297C2B7C116A527
BAB3A446B2F7C462DEA6C2F9CC4959F88DF465F94BE224066460CC6CA09CC7D9470195287BC11C8A9AD4007BD3C19
1D87C7A52C99749D31FBB36A400E1BF7508FB11B3F82944E13644CF1E5539C47A8C8A8D72A4D6F11CD98C58CEE03A
951B6407F7CDC088959B2DAA14C1655D7D8827B2EC45535D1764D3BBFDAAFA32435ECCADDBCA2975C4DDBD1B2E40E
F196EC0F551A79089F33392AC803915B0E05E181AAFBBC80F973CD9F</Modulus>
  <Exponent>010001</Exponent>
</PublicAIK>
<PublicEK>

<Modulus>F1000C75A4B88005728CF2CFD184661233AA1B437843AA6DCE542B5507998F2EED883F2DCC2F2E10659
2B77E12FA57EE5EE60D1F51164425480C4E565355F63B1420B7BE6B8D8FBD3EFFDB47AAE4C3ACA1FF077DBC3418F4
C60E1A4C39836D799EA13E3F1EB67853D707E23FBC195C3F688210E697F5F02D5D3C8BD6D4FD7AA51F3380477026F
0AE14AA8B7C576997F5BC72B2A106972A4B732FA8CC6DEB7EBDF2C067237B66FC4AAE9CC42B636034B3B696CE1AB
029950764CD0FFBDF421CE36D55697F28F3D3D1944888B3C0E71BCF79C4EF598DD7217D5783B8552B833E4997187B
03FC09516C274CBE6830EBB400E8B43FF6934C175286EE0EB5A7277D</Modulus>
  <Exponent>010001</Exponent>
</PublicEK>
<ResetCount>3815208462</ResetCount>
<RestartCount>426123972</RestartCount>
<SecureBootCustomPolicyHash />
<SecureBootEnabled>>false</SecureBootEnabled>
<TestSigningDisabled>>true</TestSigningDisabled>
<TpmVersion>2.0</TpmVersion>
<UefiSignersUsedDuringBoot hashAlgorithm="SHA256" />
<VBSDecryptionPublicKey>

<Modulus>B2D860A22DAB2F8EF9D3725B6621193FC86D0E1AF13D45DB74DE080A344F91B9241B69E445CFCEB7CDE3
7BD42325D981E006517253C7EB71618145D281C3220E44D1FC7203FA25E9FE8839FB9B5380FA01B863911EF7B4E50
D8E30593B3D34A4980887946F7084C3D55930540F6B1EAAADD8BEA14ED14745203F05CA902712B8AF6F0B15A2F89A
C1DBD204B46335E8B35BD36CBB97725F1DDF9DEF87A0A6E447CA73DA1C8176ED87DBCCC51BF1B338E537EB6A7B2EC
A64C46A62605BC067289DD696819AD7E37B8F43DC36EAD3244B24737B0E3E3FD83EBD78DDEE6CB3A85E7B072D4825
7433915CD7B313793E56A24E6AC9A256BE1BCCEDBE1A64437EAD3AC3</Modulus>
  <Exponent>010001</Exponent>
</VBSDecryptionPublicKey>
<VBSIOMMUEnabled>>false</VBSIOMMUEnabled>
<VBSMemoryScrubbingProtectionEnabled>>false</VBSMemoryScrubbingProtectionEnabled>
<VBSSigningPublicKey>

<Modulus>F37D9E557BD9BD566E0B9F8AF40C08E7C425D531823876406F3063BDA0EC5C69DF85ED207B7E07DA4745
```

```
6E85D4588B865A7EDD75A9D6C5A765B0600001D8C3AE928453FFFE8D6E7B0614617BF5D3047156CF9CACE9457BA4A
5CCAADC999FF86D991B77C32AF24032AB7BEBE23B08BD6EBDF351DCC9365BCD919A8A97DC5610B1B596969196D183
8772DF882E557DDEA7A72ED5F0CD1F8A3D0D5FEA124C1CDAD90337C324382E7AFBE62B5E361D852E1AD04D0F93C0F
CB5918C39C08586C5883075AA2F7AA6EF62E4197C5073D86A50E605586CAC3F7CC823CEF23C6F58E6BEE6C144F817
A7F3A5B0989175F0FA10452C4644B2DBC7DE63648048FFC655B4D771</Modulus>
  <Exponent>010001</Exponent>
</VBSSigningPublicKey>
<VirtualizationBasedSecurityEnabled>true</VirtualizationBasedSecurityEnabled>

<WindowsBootManagerHash>1C44308B27F5184D8BF42944FC4E10588B7EFBD4D188A01A2F03ECCEDCC02429</Win
dowsBootManagerHash>

<WindowsOSLoaderHash>6F9F505E5B913A32DC9BA6053F5C64EC1003E84C63D6E3A26A252674BBF9BCF7</Window
sOSLoaderHash>
  <SystemProperties>
    <SystemProperty name="IntelAMTNotProvisioned">true</SystemProperty>
    <SystemProperty name="IntelMEFirmwareVersion">9.1.41.3024</SystemProperty>
    <SystemProperty name="IntelSA00075Unaffected">true</SystemProperty>
  </SystemProperties>
</HealthCertificateProperties>
</HealthCertificateValidationResponse> >
```

### 3.2.5.1.1.3 Processing Details

The Device Management Server (MDM-Server) adds a "Nonce" to the payload, and forwards the DHA-Validation-Data to DHA-Service. The TCG log that contains health measurements is validated against the Platform Configuration Registers in the TPM (PCR) table. A report is created.

### 3.2.6 Timer Events

None.

### 3.2.7 Other Local Events

None.

## 4 Protocol Examples



## **5 Security**

### **5.1 Security Considerations for Implementers**

None.

### **5.2 Index of Security Parameters**

None.

## 6 Appendix A: Full XML Schema

For ease of implementation, the following are the XML schemas for this protocol.

### 6.1 Health CertificateRequestV1 Schema

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema id="HealthCertificateRequest"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v1"
  targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v1"
  elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateRequest" type="HealthCertificateRequest_T"/>

  <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateRequest_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>A request for a Health Certificate </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="Claims" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
      <!-- AIKCertificate and RSASigningKey are mutually exclusive -->
      <xs:element name="AIKCertificate" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="RSASigningKey" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
      <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
          <xs:minInclusive value="1"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
      <xs:minLength value="1"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
```

### 6.2 Health CertificateRequestV3 Schema

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema id="HealthCertificateRequest"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v3"
  targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/
v3"
  elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateRequest" type="HealthCertificateRequest_T"/>

  <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateRequest_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>
        A request for a Health Certificate.
        AIKCertificate, RSASigningKey and EKCertificates are mutually exclusive.
      </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
  </xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>
```

```

    Each represents one of the three supported ways of obtaining a Health
Certificate
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="Claims"          type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>

    <xs:element name="AIKCertificate"  type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="AIKPublic"      type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="EKCertificates"  type="EKCertificates_T"      minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
        <xs:minInclusive value="3"/>
      </xs:restriction>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="EKCertificates_T">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation>
      A set of EK certificates (leaf and intermediates) as retrieved from the client
TPM.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="EKCertificate"   type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="EKIntermediateCA" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="10"/>
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:attribute name="KAClaim" use="required">
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:attribute>
  <xs:attribute name="AIKPublic" use="required">
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
    <xs:minLength value="1"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

### 6.3 Health CertificateRequestV4 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<xs:schema id="HealthCertificateRequest"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v4"
  targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/request/v4"
  elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateRequest" type="HealthCertificateRequest_T"/>

```

```

<xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateRequest_T">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation>
      A request for a Health Certificate.
      AIKCertificate, RSASigningKey and EKCertificates are mutually exclusive.
      Each represents one of the three supported ways of obtaining a Health
Certificate
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="Claims" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    <xs:element name="AIKCertificate" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="AIKPublic" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="EKCertificates" type="EKCertificates_T" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="TCGLogs" type="TCGLogs_T"/>
    <xs:element name="SystemProperties" type="SystemProperties_T"/>
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
        <xs:minInclusive value="4"/>
      </xs:restriction>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="SystemProperties_T">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation>
      A nested structure to allow you to create a series of system properties. This
is currently used
      to support non attestable Intel-SA-00075 Vulnerability Detection.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="SystemProperty" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
      <xs:complexType>
        <xs:simpleContent>
          <xs:extension base="xs:string">
            <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
          </xs:extension>
        </xs:simpleContent>
      </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="TCGLogs_T">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation>
      A nested structure to allow you to create a series of TCG logs under a parent
log with a unique name.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="Log" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
      <xs:complexType>
        <xs:simpleContent>
          <xs:extension base="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
            <xs:attribute name="type" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
            <xs:attribute name="state" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
          </xs:extension>
        </xs:simpleContent>
      </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
  </xs:sequence>

```

```

</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="EKCertificates_T">
  <xs:annotation>
    <xs:documentation>
      A set of EK certificates (leaf and intermediates) as retrieved from the
client TPM.
    </xs:documentation>
  </xs:annotation>
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="EKCertificate" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="EKIntermediateCA" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="10"/>
  </xs:sequence>
  <xs:attribute name="KAClaim" use="required">
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:attribute>
  <xs:attribute name="AIKPublic" use="required">
    <xs:simpleType>
      <xs:restriction base="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
    <xs:minLength value="1"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

## 6.4 HealthCertificateResponseV1 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema id="HealthCertificateResponse"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/response/v1"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/response/v1"
elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateResponse" type="HealthCertificateResponse_T"/>

  <xs:complexType name="ResponseCommon_T">
    <xs:attribute name="ErrorCode" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ErrorMessage" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:group name="HealthCertificateResponseData">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>Health certificate response data</xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="HealthCertificateBlob" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
        <xs:annotation>
          <xs:documentation>
            The base 64 encoded Health Certificate blob. The Health Certificate
            blob represents a UTF16 XML string of type OpaqueHealthCertificate_T
            defined in OpaqueHealthCertificate.xsd. We do not expose the
            OpaqueHealthCertificate_T explicitly to simplify things for the client.
          </xs:documentation>
        </xs:annotation>
        <xs:simpleType>

```

```

        <xs:restriction base="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
            <xs:minLength value="1"/>
        </xs:restriction>
    </xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:group>

<xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateResponse_T" >
    <xs:complexContent>
        <xs:extension base="ResponseCommon_T">
            <xs:group ref="HealthCertificateResponseData" minOccurs="0"/>
        </xs:extension>
    </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
        <xs:minLength value="1"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

## 6.5 HealthCertificateResponseV3 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema id="HealthCertificateResponse"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/response/v3"
    xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/response/v3"
    elementFormDefault="qualified">

    <xs:element name="HealthCertificateResponse" type="HealthCertificateResponse_T"/>

    <xs:complexType name="ResponseCommon_T">
        <xs:attribute name="ErrorCode" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ErrorMessage" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
            <xs:simpleType>
                <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
                    <xs:minInclusive value="3"/>
                </xs:restriction>
            </xs:simpleType>
        </xs:attribute>
    </xs:complexType>

    <xs:group name="HealthCertificateResponseData">
        <xs:annotation>
            <xs:documentation>Health certificate response data</xs:documentation>
        </xs:annotation>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="HealthCertificateBlob" type="HealthCertificateBlob_T"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:group>

    <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateResponse_T" >
        <xs:complexContent>
            <xs:extension base="ResponseCommon_T">
                <xs:group ref="HealthCertificateResponseData" minOccurs="0"/>
            </xs:extension>
        </xs:complexContent>
    </xs:complexType>

```

```

    <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateBlob_T" >
      <xs:simpleContent>
        <xs:extension base="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
          <xs:attribute name="IV" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"
            use="optional"/>
          <xs:attribute name="EKChallenge" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"
            use="optional"/>
        </xs:extension>
      </xs:simpleContent>
    </xs:complexType>

    <xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
      <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
        <xs:minLength value="1"/>
      </xs:restriction>
    </xs:simpleType>
  </xs:schema>

```

## 6.6 HealthCertificateResponseV4 Schema

There is no new schema for the v4 response. It is the same as the schema for v3.

## 6.7 HealthCertificateValidationRequestV1 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

  xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v1"

  targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/r
equest/v1"
    elementFormDefault="qualified"
    attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest"
    type="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T"/>

  <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>A request for Health Certificate validation </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="Nonce" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
      <xs:element name="Claims" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
      <xs:element name="HealthCertificateBlob" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
      <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
          <xs:minInclusive value="1"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
      <xs:minLength value="1"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

## 6.8 HealthCertificateValidationRequestV3 Schema

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v3"

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v3"
    elementFormDefault="qualified"
    attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

    <xs:element name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest"
type="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T"/>

    <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T">
        <xs:annotation>
            <xs:documentation>A request for Health Certificate validation </xs:documentation>
        </xs:annotation>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="Nonce" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
            <xs:element name="Claims" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
            <xs:element name="HealthCertificateBlob" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
        </xs:sequence>
        <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
            <xs:simpleType>
                <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
                    <xs:minInclusive value="3"/>
                </xs:restriction>
            </xs:simpleType>
        </xs:attribute>
    </xs:complexType>

    <xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
        <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
            <xs:minLength value="1"/>
        </xs:restriction>
    </xs:simpleType>

</xs:schema>
```

## 6.9 HealthCertificateValidationRequestV4 Schema

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v4"

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v4"
    elementFormDefault="qualified"
    attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

    <xs:element name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest"
type="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T"/>

    <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T">
        <xs:annotation>
            <xs:documentation>A request for Health Certificate validation </xs:documentation>
        </xs:annotation>
        <xs:sequence>
            <xs:element name="Nonce" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
            <xs:element name="Claims" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
            <xs:element name="HealthCertificateBlob" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
        </xs:sequence>
    </xs:complexType>

</xs:schema>
```



```

    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
      <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
          <xs:minInclusive value="4"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
      <xs:minLength value="1"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

## 6.10 HealthCertificateValidationResponseV1 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v1"

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/request/v1"
  elementFormDefault="qualified"
  attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest"
type="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T"/>

  <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateValidationRequest_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>A request for Health Certificate validation </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="Nonce" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
      <xs:element name="Claims" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
      <xs:element name="HealthCertificateBlob" type="NonEmptyBase64Binary"/>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
      <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
          <xs:minInclusive value="1"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
      <xs:minLength value="1"/>
    </xs:restriction>
  </xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

## 6.11 HealthCertificateValidationResponseV3 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/respons
e/v3"

```

```

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/response/v3"
  elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <xs:element name="HealthCertificateValidationResponse"
type="HealthCertificateValidationResponse_T"/>

  <xs:complexType name="ResponseCommon_T">
    <xs:attribute name="ErrorCode" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ErrorMessage" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
    <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
      <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:int">
          <xs:minInclusive value="3"/>
        </xs:restriction>
      </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:complexType name="HealthCertificatePublicProperties_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>Health certificate non machine identifiable properties
</xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="Issued" type="xs:dateTime"/>
      <xs:element name="AIKPresent" type="Boolean_T" />
      <xs:element name="ResetCount" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="RestartCount" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="DEPPolicy" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="BitlockerStatus" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="BootManagerRevListVersion" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="CodeIntegrityRevListVersion" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="SecureBootEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="BootDebuggingEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="OSKernelDebuggingEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="CodeIntegrityEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="TestSigningEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="SafeMode" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="WinPE" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="ELAMDriVerLoaded" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="VSMEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
      <xs:element name="PCRHashAlgorithmID" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="BootAppSVN" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="BootManagerSVN" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="TpmVersion" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="PCR0" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
      <xs:element name="CIPolicy" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs
="0" maxOccurs ="1"/>
      <xs:element name="SBCPHash" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs
="0" maxOccurs ="1"/>
      <xs:element name="BootRevListInfo" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs
="0" maxOccurs ="1"/>
      <xs:element name="OSRevListInfo" type="xs:hexBinary" minOccurs
="0" maxOccurs ="1"/>

      <!--
        PCR related values are not sent, per design
      <xs:element name="PCRCount" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
      <xs:element name="PCRSize" type="xs:unsignedShort"/>
      <xs:element name="PCRHashAlgorithmID" type="xs:unsignedShort"/>

      <xs:element name="PCR" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
      -->
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:complexType name="HealthStatusMismatchFlags_T">
    <xs:annotation>

```

```

        <xs:documentation>If there's a status mismatch, these flags will be
set</xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
        <!-- Hibernate/Resume count -->
        <xs:element name="ResumeCount" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <!-- Reboot count -->
        <xs:element name="RebootCount" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="PCR" type="Boolean_T"/>

        <xs:element name="BootAppSVN" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootManagerSVNChain" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootAppSVNChain" type="Boolean_T"/>

    </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateValidationResponse_T" >
    <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>Health certificate validation response </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:complexContent>
        <xs:extension base="ResponseCommon_T">
            <xs:sequence>
                <!--Optional element, present only when the certificate can be
verified and decrypted-->
                <xs:element name="HealthCertificateProperties"
type="HealthCertificatePublicProperties_T" minOccurs="0"/>
                <!--Optional element, present only when the reason for a validation
failure is a mismatch between the
current health state and the certificate health state-->
                <xs:element name="HealthStatusMismatchFlags"
type="HealthStatusMismatchFlags_T" minOccurs="0"/>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:extension>
    </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="Boolean_T">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:boolean">
        <xs:pattern value="true|false"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>

```

## 6.12 HealthCertificateValidationResponseV4 Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"

xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/response/v4"
"

targetNamespace="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/security/healthcertificate/validation/r
esponse/v4"
    elementFormDefault="qualified">

    <xs:element name="HealthCertificateValidationResponse"
type="HealthCertificateValidationResponse_T"/>

    <xs:complexType name="ResponseCommon_T">
        <xs:attribute name="ErrorCode" type="xs:int" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ErrorMessage" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
        <xs:attribute name="ProtocolVersion" use="required">
            <xs:simpleType>
                <xs:restriction base="xs:int">

```

```

        <xs:minInclusive value="4"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="HealthCertificatePublicProperties_T">
    <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>Health certificate non machine identifiable
properties.</xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="Issued" type="xs:dateTime"/>
        <xs:element name="AIKPresent" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="AttestationMethod" type="xs:string"/>
        <xs:element name="BitlockerEnabledAtBoot" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BitlockerProtector"
type="BitlockerUnlockFlags_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootAppSVN" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
        <xs:element name="BootDebuggingDisabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootManagerSVN" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
        <xs:element name="BootRevListInfo" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="CodeIntegrityEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="CodeIntegrityPolicy" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="CrashDumpEncryptionEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="CredentialGuardEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="DataExecutionPreventionPolicy" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
        <xs:element name="ELAMDriverHash" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="ELAMDriverLoaded" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="ELAMDriverName" type="xs:string"/>
        <xs:element name="ELAMSignerName" type="xs:string"/>
        <xs:element name="FlightSigningNotEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="MemoryScrubbingProtectionEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="NoSecureBootCustomPolicy" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="NotBootedIntoSafeMode" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="NotBootedIntoWinPE" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="OSKernelDebuggingDisabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="OSRevListInfo" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="PageFileEncryptionEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="PCRS" type="PCRS_T"/>
        <xs:element name="ProductionSignedBootManager" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="PublicAIK" type="PubKeyInfo_T"/>
        <xs:element name="PublicEK" type="PubKeyInfo_T"/>
        <xs:element name="ResetCount" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
        <xs:element name="RestartCount" type="xs:unsignedInt"/>
        <xs:element name="SecureBootCustomPolicyHash" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="SecureBootEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="TestSigningDisabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="TpmVersion" type="xs:string"/>
        <xs:element name="UefiSignersUsedDuringBoot"
type="SignerThumbprintList_T"/>
        <xs:element name="VBSDecryptionPublicKey" type="PubKeyInfo_T"/>
        <xs:element name="VBSIOMMUEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="VBSMemoryScrubbingProtectionEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="VBSSigningPublicKey" type="PubKeyInfo_T"/>
        <xs:element name="VirtualizationBasedSecurityEnabled" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="WindowsBootManagerHash" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="WindowsOSLoaderHash" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
        <xs:element name="SystemProperties"
type="SystemProperties_T"/>
        <xs:element name="HealthProperty" type="HealthProperty_T"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="PubKeyInfo_T">
    <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="Modulus" type="xs:hexBinary" />
        <xs:element name="Exponent" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
    </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

```

```

    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:complexType name="SystemProperties_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>
        A nested structure to allow you to create a series of system properties. This
is currently used
        to support non attestable Intel-SA-00075 Vulnerability Detection.
      </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="SystemProperty" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
        <xs:complexType>
          <xs:simpleContent>
            <xs:extension base="xs:string">
              <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
            </xs:extension>
          </xs:simpleContent>
        </xs:complexType>
      </xs:element>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:complexType name="BitlockerUnlockFlags_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>
        Bitlocker unlock supports various mechanisms for unlocking the system drive
these include,
        none, cached, media, tpm, nkp, pin, external, recovery, passphrase and nbp.
These flags may be
        extended into the future. This structure allows an extensible way to show
these types.
      </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="UnlockType" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:sequence>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:complexType name="SignerThumbprintList_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>
        A signer thumbprint list is a named list of signer owners and the SHA256 hash
of their provided
        X509 Certificate. These X509 certificates are the chosen entries from the
UEFI db used to boot
        the system.
      </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
      <xs:element name="SignerThumbprint" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
        <xs:complexType>
          <xs:simpleContent>
            <xs:extension base="xs:hexBinary">
              <xs:attribute name="name" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
              <xs:attribute name="owner" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
            </xs:extension>
          </xs:simpleContent>
        </xs:complexType>
      </xs:element>
    </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="hashAlgorithm" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
  </xs:complexType>

  <xs:complexType name="PCRS_T">
    <xs:annotation>
      <xs:documentation>

```

```

        A nested structure that contains all of the PCRs in the system the nested
type itself has its own
        attribute name.
    </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="PCR" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:simpleContent>
                <xs:extension base="xs:hexBinary">
                    <xs:attribute name="n" type="xs:unsignedInt" use="required"/>
                </xs:extension>
            </xs:simpleContent>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="hashAlgorithm" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="HealthStatusMismatchFlags_T">
    <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>If there's a status mismatch, these flags will be
set</xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:sequence>
        <xs:element name="ResumeCount" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="RebootCount" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="PCR" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootApplication" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootManagerSVNChain" type="Boolean_T"/>
        <xs:element name="BootApplicationChain" type="Boolean_T"/>
    </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="HealthCertificateValidationResponse_T" >
    <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>Health certificate validation response </xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:complexContent>
        <xs:extension base="ResponseCommon_T">
            <xs:sequence>
                <!--Optional element, present only when the certificate can be verified
and decrypted-->
                <xs:element name="HealthCertificateProperties"
type="HealthCertificateProperties_T" minOccurs="0"/>
                <!--Optional element, present only when the reason for a validation
failure is a mismatch between the
current health state and the certificate health state-->
                <xs:element name="HealthStatusMismatchFlags"
type="HealthStatusMismatchFlags_T" minOccurs="0"/>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:extension>
    </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="Boolean_T">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:boolean">
        <xs:pattern value="true|false"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="HealthProperty_T">
    <xs:annotation>
        <xs:documentation>Generic health properties strings can be added to this with
unique names.</xs:documentation>
    </xs:annotation>
    <xs:simpleContent>
        <xs:extension base="xs:string">

```

```
        <xs:attribute name="Name" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
    </xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:simpleType name="NonEmptyBase64Binary">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:base64Binary">
        <xs:minLength value="1"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

</xs:schema>
```

## 7 (Updated Section) Appendix B: Product Behavior

The information in this specification is applicable to the following Microsoft products or supplemental software. References to product versions include updates to those products.

The terms "earlier" and "later", when used with a product version, refer to either all preceding versions or all subsequent versions, respectively. The term "through" refers to the inclusive range of versions. Applicable Microsoft products are listed chronologically in this section.

### Windows Client

- Windows 10 operating system

- Windows 11 operating system

### Windows Server

- Windows Server 2016 operating system
- Windows Server operating system
- Windows Server 2019 operating system
- Windows Server 2022 operating system

Exceptions, if any, are noted in this section. If an update version, service pack or Knowledge Base (KB) number appears with a product name, the behavior changed in that update. The new behavior also applies to subsequent updates unless otherwise specified. If a product edition appears with the product version, behavior is different in that product edition.

Unless otherwise specified, any statement of optional behavior in this specification that is prescribed using the terms "SHOULD" or "SHOULD NOT" implies product behavior in accordance with the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT prescription. Unless otherwise specified, the term "MAY" implies that the product does not follow the prescription.

<1> Section 2.1: Version 4 (v4) is not supported in Windows 10 v1703 operating system or earlier client implementations, or in Windows Server 2016.



## 8 Change Tracking

This section identifies changes that were made to this document since the last release. Changes are classified as Major, Minor, or None.

The revision class **Major** means that the technical content in the document was significantly revised. Major changes affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of major changes are:

- A document revision that incorporates changes to interoperability requirements.
- A document revision that captures changes to protocol functionality.

The revision class **Minor** means that the meaning of the technical content was clarified. Minor changes do not affect protocol interoperability or implementation. Examples of minor changes are updates to clarify ambiguity at the sentence, paragraph, or table level.

The revision class **None** means that no new technical changes were introduced. Minor editorial and formatting changes may have been made, but the relevant technical content is identical to the last released version.

The changes made to this document are listed in the following table. For more information, please contact [dochelp@microsoft.com](mailto:dochelp@microsoft.com).

Section	Description	Revision class
7 Appendix B: Product Behavior	Updated for this version of Windows Client.	Major

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